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i 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
The UK competition authorities are responsible for regulating company mergers that 
were originally considered to have adverse effects that were “against the public 
interest”, or presently that could result in a “substantial lessening of competition”. The 
research in this thesis examines wider economic side effects of this regulatory policy 
that fall outside the remit of the competition authorities. Data on 63 merger cases that 
were subject to the merger regulatory process by the UK competition authorities 
between 1989 and 2002 are studied for effects on two economic aspects, shareholder 
value and managers’ motivations to undertake mergers. 
 
Some previous studies have suggested that competition regimes can destroy shareholder 
value. The research in this thesis confirms the finding from earlier studies of greater 
gains to shareholders in target rather than bidding companies, but does not find 
evidence supporting overall loss of shareholder value to target company shareholders 
when a merger is prohibited. It finds evidence that when the regulatory regime is stable 
and well understood the capital market behaves efficiently in response to new 
information. However, for a sub group of the mergers involving companies with a new 
regulatory regime, of which industry and the market had little or no experience with 
respect to mergers, the capital market operated less efficiently.  
 
A number of studies have also considered the motivation of managers to follow a 
merger strategy. Apparently, none has looked at the influence of competition regulation 
on merger motives using stock market data and event study techniques. This research 
examined data for the stock market’s perceptions of what motivated managers to pursue 
their initial merger bid. The findings suggest that Synergy and Hubris dominate as 
motivations for mergers and that, unintentionally, competition policy may help to 
reduce the number of mergers motivated by Managerialism 
 
 
Keywords:  
Competition policy, event study, privatised industries, synergy, hubris, managerialism. 
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1 
1 Introduction. 
 
 
1.1 Background to the Research 
For many decades mergers have been a popular strategic choice of managers looking to 
improve the position of a company in a short time. Mergers between two firms offer 
opportunities such as improved access to markets, increased scale of operations, 
acquisition of particular expertise or intangible assets, and rapid entry into foreign 
markets. Such potential advantages promise rapid growth for the business. While these 
potential advantages suggest mergers are a successful method of growing a business, the 
empirical evidence of success shows a less certain picture. In addition mergers can, in 
certain circumstances, reduce competition in an industry and lead to adverse economic 
effects, which are judged not to be in the best interests of the economy. 
 
Researchers have used profitability, productivity and impact on share prices to measure 
the success of mergers. Meeks (1977) studied the effects of mergers on profitability in 
UK firms and concluded between half and two-thirds of the firms in the UK sample 
suffered a fall in profits following a merger. Sirower (1997) studied stock market prices 
in US mergers. He found strong support for a negative relationship between the level of 
premium paid and the acquiring firm’s performance. A flow of studies have concluded 
around half or more of acquiring companies fail to create additional shareholder value, 
with acquirers only achieving increased value of around 1%. However for target 
companies the position is much better with target company shareholders receiving much 
higher returns in order to convince them to sell their shares. A considerable literature 
has grown as aspects of performance are examined (for a review of earlier studies, see 
Chiplin and Wright, 1988, pp. 66-73;  for later studies, see Sirower, 1997, Appendix A, 
pp. 145-166).  This literature is examined in greater depth in Chapter 2. With such 
evidence of actual outcomes not approaching the pre-bid promises, why do managers 
pursue an option where risks of failure are high? To answer this question researchers 
2 
have investigated relationships between merger performance and many theoretical and 
practice factors that may affect merger outcomes.  
 
Not only do mergers raise concerns about shareholder value impact and profitability 
performance, but also some mergers have the potential to reduce competition within an 
industry. A company may be able to increase its market power and have a dominant 
effect on prices in their industry by acquiring their competitors and thereby reducing 
competitive forces. For this reason, over several decades, the UK has developed a 
competition policy to support and encourage fair trade. Part of this policy involves the 
control of some mergers where the combination is judged to be "against the public 
interest". More recently, the test has been changed to identify mergers causing "a 
substantial lessening of competition". If any merger causes concern on competition 
grounds to the statutory competition regulator, the Office of Fair Trading (OFT), UK 
policy requires that it be investigated, and remedies provided when the inquiry finds 
evidence of adverse effects. These inquiries are carried out on a case-by-case basis 
using a tribunal-based approach. Originally the Monopolies and Mergers Commission 
(MMC) carried out these inquiries. More recently this has become known as the 
Competition Commission (CC). This regime has considerable powers and can apply 
remedies to the merger if it is possible to neutralise the adverse effects or, if not, to 
prohibit the merger completely. If the merger deal has been closed before the regulatory 
process is completed, an adverse effects decision can still require action to be taken 
even though the merger deal has been completed. Remedies can be applied, or if the 
merger is prohibited, it could be required for the deal to be unwound to restore the pre-
merger competitive position. 
 
The UK merger regulation regime is concerned wholly with competition issues and 
does not have any responsibility or remit relating to shareholders and managers. 
However, the regulatory process and decisions may have an effect on shareholder value 
and managers’ motivation for mergers. For example, an MMC/CC inquiry may 
announce a decision based on the identification of adverse effects. If the companies 
involved are quoted on a stock exchange, investors in the market react to the news by 
buying or selling shares, and the traded prices would change to reflect the new position 
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of both companies (and their competitors). Although the OFT and MMC/CC do not 
have a responsibility for shareholder value effects, their decisions nevertheless can 
result in value changes. 
 
Managers’ motivations at the planning stage of a merger can also be influenced by the 
existence of the merger regulation regime. Managers should be aware of the 
competition legislation governing mergers and incorporate their judgements on 
competition issues into their proposed merger plans. If they deal with competition issues 
correctly and comprehensively in their announcement of the bid, they will be judged 
more favourably by investors in the capital markets than if they apparently ignore 
competition issues or appear overly optimistic about what the merger can achieve. 
 
The MMC/CC inquiry process has the effect of slowing down the deal while the inquiry 
is undertaken, and asking searching questions about the nature and purpose of the 
merger. Managers are aware of the possibility of their deal being referred and 
scrutinised in detail by a powerful external body. The risk of having the deal exposed to 
this scrutiny increases with the severity of the concerns of adverse competition issues. 
The larger the issues, the greater the risk of a merger being referred for inquiry. It could 
therefore be expected that managers proposing mergers with probable adverse 
competition effects would exercise greater care in preparing their deal in an attempt to 
minimise the amount of regulatory involvement. Expected increases in the care 
exercised during preparation of the bid could also be expected to improve the overall 
performance of the merger subsequently for shareholders. The inquiry process and the 
preparation for the inquiry can also offer time and an opportunity for managers to 
review the merger. On reflection they may decide that it would be wiser not to proceed, 
and being referred for inquiry may allow an opportunity to withdraw from a deal. 
 
In summary, this thesis investigates the interactions between two aspects of mergers and 
the UK merger regulation regime. The impact of the UK policy on shareholder value 
and managers’ motivation for mergers are coincidental to the main purpose of the 
competition regulatory regime, and are side-effects of the policy. It is important to know 
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the extent to which any side-effects of policies exist and whether there are any 
unintended benefits or detriments arising as a result. 
 
The remainder of chapter develops the research question and then looks at the benefits 
of the research, the outline methodology, the organisation and content of the following 
chapters. Some specific terms are also defined for use throughout the thesis, and finally 
limitations that have been chosen to apply to the research are explained and justified. 
 
 
1.2 The Research Problem and its Contributions 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine evidence of effects that the UK merger 
regulation regime has on shareholder value and managers’ motivations for mergers. As 
discussed in section 1.1 above, the UK merger regulatory regime does not have any 
responsibility for these aspects, they are side-effects of the UK policy. However 
knowledge of them makes an important contribution to understanding the complete 
impact of the UK competition policy and regime on UK society. 
 
1.2.1 The research question 
The problem addressed by this research can be encapsulated in the question: - 
 
What effect does the regulation of mergers by the competition authorities in the 
UK have on shareholder value and managers’ motivations for undertaking 
mergers? 
 
The research finds values of bidding and target companies do change at each step in the 
regulatory process, updating the valuations after each decision announcement, as 
uncertainties are replaced by specific outcomes. However, when considering a merger 
deal from initial bid to completion including the regulatory steps, broadly there is no 
adverse shareholder cost due to the regulatory process. This is discussed fully in 
Chapter 8. 
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Market efficiency plays an important role in this process. It is concluded from the 
research that the capital market was less efficient when dealing with companies in what, 
for convenience, have been called “privatised industries” in this thesis, namely those 
industries, having their own industry specific regulators working in tandem with the 
OFT for mergers, than for companies in other industries where the OFT is the only 
regulator. 
 
For managers, the research concludes that the managerial motivation to pursue mergers 
is mainly to gain synergistic benefits. However there is also evidence of errors, due to 
hubris and overconfidence, which cause some value reductions. The research finds only 
a small amount of evidence of managerialist behaviour, where managers pursue mergers 
to increase their welfare rather than create shareholder value. This is in contrast to 
findings in some US studies (see Berkovitch and Narayanan, 1993; Seth et al., 2000), 
where stronger evidence of managerialism was found.  
 
The research concludes that there is an inverse relationship between the degree of 
synergy seeking and the degree of regulatory intervention. By contrast there is a direct 
relationship between evidence of error-prone mergers and the degree of regulatory 
intervention by the competition authorities. 
 
1.2.2 Contributions made by the research 
Answering the research question in section 1.2.1 above provides contributions to 
empirical knowledge, theory, methodology and policy and practice areas. These are 
discussed fully in Chapter 8, but in summary this thesis makes contributions in the 
following areas: - 
 Understanding the impact of merger regulation on shareholder returns 
 Comparisons with similar work in the US and the UK 
 Aspects of methodology used 
 Findings of the effects of regulatory scrutiny on managers’ motivations for 
mergers. 
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The in-depth discussion in Chapter 8 categorises and details over 20 contributions into 
four groups, covering contributions to Theory, Empirical Findings, Methodology and 
Policy and Practice. These contributions include new findings and developments, 
confirmation, or otherwise, of previous findings. 
1.3 Justification for the Research 
The conclusions from this research improve knowledge in four main areas listed below. 
The results, conclusions and contributions to knowledge gained in these areas are the 
justifications for this research. 
 
1.3.1 Knowledge gaps 
The Literature Review (Chapter 2) identifies that there has been relatively little research 
into the side-effects of UK merger regulation. Franks and Harris (1993) and Forbes 
(1994) researched the shareholder value aspects of UK merger policy from 1965 to 
around 1990, but there has been relatively little work post-1990, particularly looking at 
any shareholder value effects of the mergers in the privatised, ex-nationalised utility 
industries which were using the tandem regulator model. 
 
There has not been research into the relationship between the merger regulatory regime 
and evidence of managers’ motives for undertaking mergers. While some studies in the 
US have looked at managers’ motivation for mergers in general, and for cross-border 
mergers, there have not been any similar studies in the UK. 
 
1.3.2 Understanding of unintentional aspects of merger policy 
Over the period 1989 to 2002 a total of 9872 mergers were completed in the UK1. Only 
a small fraction of 1.6% were referred for investigation2 and adverse effects were found 
in only 0.7%3. While these figures are very small they demonstrate policing actions will 
                                                 
1
 Source: Office of Fair Trading Annual Reports 
2
 Source: Office of Fair Trading Annual Reports 
3
 Source: Competition Commission: Website http://www.competition-commission.org.uk/inquiries 
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be undertaken by the UK competition authorities to enforce the UK competition policy. 
This policing action is an important signal to companies, indicating that: - 
 The competition authorities act to seek out merger cases giving rise to 
competition concerns and 
 Where adverse effects of mergers are judged to exist appropriate remedies are 
enforced. 
 
This research helps complete the understanding of how the UK policy operates with 
respect to side-effects of the policy and the impact on shareholders and the managers. 
This is essential for a complete understanding of policy, so the impact of side-effects 
can be considered to be either to the benefit or detriment of the main purpose of the 
policy. 
 
1.3.3 Use of event study methodology to identify the impact of 
specific stages in the regulatory process 
The methodology based on event studies, covered in Chapters 4 and 5, is adopted to 
study particular intervals during the merger regulatory process. This allows direct 
measurements to be taken relating to specific decision announcements in the regulatory 
process. It also underpins the evidence of motives prior to the referral decision, allowing 
both completed and uncompleted cases to be compared. No other methodology could 
adequately and precisely address these issues because they do not have the ability to 
target specific events. 
 
1.3.4 Wider understanding of the regulatory regime effects for 
practice and policy 
This research provides useful information on UK merger regulation for investors, 
managers and policy makers. It provides investors with an updated review of the 
shareholder value changes occurring at the different steps in the regulatory process. It 
also provides empirical evidence on the tandem regulatory approach for privatised 
industries and evidence of reduced market efficiency for early privatisation mergers.  
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Managers will receive insights about how the capital market perceives their motives for 
pursuing mergers. A comparison of value reducing motivations between error prone 
decisions involving hubris and managerialist behaviour gives a measure of their relative 
importance. This has important connotations for aspects of Corporate Governance 
practice. 
 
Policy makers will gain a more complete overall understanding of the operation of the 
UK merger regulation regime by understanding the wider coincidental side-effects in 
conjunction with the main effects of the regulatory process. This will allow them to 
understand better whether these coincidental effects benefit or hinder the principal aims 
of the policy and have wider social impacts.  
 
 
1.4 Methodology 
The research in this thesis investigates empirical evidence of the effect of UK merger 
regulation on shareholder value and managers’ motivations. The research methodology 
appropriate for measurement of shareholder value is of a quantitative nature and in the 
traditions of the financial economics literature. Broadly these methodologies are based 
either on share price data when companies are quoted on a public stock exchange, or on 
profitability and balance sheet data contained in publicly filed accounting statements. 
Within these two broad categories many methodological alternatives exist for 
measuring value and value changes over time. These alternative approaches are 
discussed fully in Chapter 4 - Methodology, and Chapter 5 - Research Data and 
Methods, and this introductory discussion is only in outline. 
 
Part of the research question relates to the effects of merger regulation on managers’ 
motives, which would appear to be suitable for a wide range of methodologies including 
both qualitative and quantitative techniques. This second part of the research question 
involves a fundamental choice between two methods. Data can either be collected from 
the managers involved in the mergers, or from historic data generated by  “third-party 
observers” about the mergers. While the option of collecting data from managers 
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involved in the mergers has some advantages, it does also have some practical 
problems. Recalling details and reasons for events that occurred up to 15 or more years 
earlier can be unreliable, particularly as many records may have been lost. Tracing, 
contacting and gaining the agreement of key managers to take part can also be difficult 
and lead to patchy data on a few cases. An alternative of studying mergers in progress is 
equally fraught with the difficulties of identifying mergers at the highly confidential 
planning stage and seeking to gain the agreement of key managers who are operating in 
secretive processes and under considerable time pressures. Even if mergers can be 
identified before announcement, outsiders will not be welcome for workload and 
commercial confidentiality reasons. Even if all of these problems were overcome key 
managers are unlikely to admit to managerialist behaviour or behaving arrogantly or 
over-confidently, and are likely to give answers that will not reflect badly on them 
today, whatever the original outcome of the merger. The difficulty of extracting 
accurate and truthful accounts of why they initially pursued the merger is significant 
and should not be underestimated, particularly as managers may have received 
significant personal benefits for executing the merger. 
 
By contrast, the use of historic public records of the mergers overcomes these 
difficulties. Although the historic data may not be as rich in detail as that collected 
directly from the managers involved in the mergers, it avoids the problem of fading 
personal recollections, while the adoption of information from third parties removes 
personal subjectivity and provides a more objective view of events. For these reasons 
the daily stock market records and the press releases associated with events throughout 
the progress of each merger have been used in an event study methodology in this 
thesis. A set of propositions relating to patterns of price movements are then used to 
categorise motivations as perceived by capital market investors. Motivations discovered 
through this process represent the collective perceptions of stock market investors about 
the merger deal. This approach eliminates many of the difficulties of obtaining suitable, 
accurate and objective data about the mergers. The approach also strongly aligns with 
and complements the event study approach used to measure shareholder value for the 
first part of the research question.  
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The chosen methodology is positivistic and uses a hypothetico-deductive approach. The 
details of methodology, the data and methods used are contained in Chapters 4 and 5.  
 
 
1.5 Outline of the Thesis 
The remaining sections of this chapter cover definitions of a few specific terms used 
throughout the following chapters, which have a special significance to the work. These 
definitions will clarify the specific meanings of particular words used in the context of 
this thesis and differentiate that meaning from their common usage. This allows 
repetitious clarifications to be largely avoided in later chapters. 
 
Finally this chapter will outline the chosen limitations applied to the research, and gives 
the reasons and justification for them. These chosen limits, or delimitations, apply 
restrictions to the scope of the research for several reasons and are additional and in 
contrast to the limitations imposed by the choice of methodology. 
 
The Literature Review (Chapter 2) reviews the existing knowledge surrounding the area 
of the research question. Earlier research is discussed in the key disciplines of Financial 
Economics, Regulatory Policy and Practice, Theories of the Firm, and Corporate 
Governance and examines previous contributions impinging on the research question in 
section 1.2 above. The chapter identifies both the wider published knowledge and the 
gaps in knowledge relating to the specific research question. 
 
Chapter 3 - Mergers and Merger Regulation in the UK - outlines commercial and 
regulatory merger practice and where concerns of potential lessening of competition can 
arise. The development of the regulatory framework is described together with the role 
of the competition authorities (OFT, MMC and CC) and the regulatory process followed 
by them. The merger regulatory arrangement for privatised industries, having their own 
industry specific regulators, is also briefly described. 
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The choice of an appropriate methodology is discussed in detail in Chapter 4. The 
chapter examines possible methodologies for the research question, and gives the 
reasons and justification for the choices made. 
 
Data and the methods used for the analysis are explained in Chapter 5. The chapter 
gives a detailed insight into the data selected and the methods used to produce the 
results. Choices of data sources are explained and justified. The method used to process 
the data, and the propositions and tests used are detailed.  
 
Results are presented in the next two chapters. Chapter 6 presents the results appropriate 
to shareholder value aspects of the research question, while Chapter 7 deals with the 
results of managers’ motivations for pursuing mergers. These two chapters taken 
together present the findings of the research addressing the research question. 
 
The results presented in Chapters 6 and 7 are considered in relation to the research 
question in Chapter 8. Conclusions are drawn from this discussion and the limitations of 
the research are discussed together with the contribution the research makes to 
knowledge.  
 
Finally as an aid to the reader, Appendix 1 brings together the concepts associated with 
managers’ motivations for mergers. It discusses the practical manifestations of these 
ideas, together with looking at how some specific practical merger situations fit into this 
conceptual framework. 
 
 
1.6 Definitions 
For the most part, terms used throughout this thesis take the meanings in common 
English language usage, and in the English language literature covering the subject 
areas. However the words listed below have a more specific context in this thesis in 
addition to their common English language meaning. In order to avoid repetitious 
explanations and confusion about which meanings apply in each case, a convention has 
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been adopted. Common usage meaning is attached to the word when it begins with a 
lowercase letter. When the word begins with an upper case letter the specific meanings 
associated with this thesis, as defined below, are intended. The specifically defined 
terms are as follows: - 
 
 Manager - means a senior manager, within a company planning or 
implementing mergers, who is part of the small team of decision makers driving 
the merger process and is one of the key decision makers. This meaning can 
only apply to a limited number of corporate managerial roles, typically being 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Chairman and Chief Financial Officer (CFO). 
This definition excludes managers in other functional or operational roles within 
the company, as they will not normally be key decision-makers and drivers of 
the mergers, even though they may be involved in specialist support activities 
for planning and implementation. 
 
 Synergy - means being motivated by synergy seeking behaviour. This 
motivation is associated with the principles expressed by Penrose (1959) in “The 
Theory of the Growth of the Firm”. It involves activities aimed only at seeking 
opportunities for maximisation of profitability from the firm’s assets. 
 
 Managerialism - means being motivated by managerial self-interest while also 
adopting a strategy that it is sufficient to just satisfy shareholders needs. This 
meaning adopts the concepts and principles used by Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
in their paper “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure”. It considers maximisation of self-interest to be the 
heuristic adopted by Managers, as they act in an agent / principal relationship 
with shareholders. 
 
 Hubris - means being motivated by the intention to seek synergistic benefits but 
key valuation decisions are affected by hubris. These decisions are based on 
overconfident or arrogant assumptions by Managers. This hubris leads to error-
prone evaluations which appear as over-valuations in bids. This definition is 
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associated with the concepts and principles expressed by Roll (1986) in his 
paper “The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers”. 
 
All other terms used in this thesis are intended to have the common English language 
usage. 
 
 
1.7 The Delimitation of Scope 
This section reviews choices made that impose limitations on the scope of the research. 
These choices create additional limitations to those arising from the choice of 
methodology, which are discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. The delimitations limit the 
research to the UK regulatory regime, over a study period from 1989 to 2002, and study 
side effects of policy on shareholders and managers’ motivations. These delimitations 
are explained and justified below. 
 
1.7.1 UK merger regulation policy and regime 
The research question formulated in section 1.2.1 above limits the scope of this research 
to the UK economy. However the same question could be asked about other economic 
regions. There are significant differences between these regions, and the UK has been 
chosen for a number reasons, mainly relating to the longstanding development of 
competition regulation, and the legal framework and processes employed. Its 
longstanding evolution makes it the second oldest effective competition regulatory 
regime in the world after the US regime. It also has a long, well-documented continuous 
historic record of events and data relating to public companies. 
 
Today many countries and regions of the world have adopted competition legislation to 
encourage fair trade practices in their nations. However each country or region develops 
their particular approach to encouraging competition in a form most suitable for their 
nation. This is influenced by the political and legal systems of each country and the 
cultural values and norms of the nations. While the broad principles of upholding an 
encouraging competition lie at the basis of national policies, the details of legislation, 
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processes of implementation and enforcement can be very different between countries. 
In addition, the periods over which regimes have operated vary widely, and the public 
records of company events may not always be reliable and continuous. These 
differences can make inter-country comparisons difficult, and data relating to individual 
national regimes needs to be carefully considered before, for example, regime data 
could be consolidated or compared. 
 
Data is available to allow study of the UK merger regulatory regime from as early as 
1965 to the present. Over this period the basic principles of the UK merger regulation 
process have remained largely unchanged. The UK system has always relied on a case-
by-case approach, with each investigation judged on its own particular merits by a 
tribunal-based system of inquiries carried out by the Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission (MMC) from 1965 to 31st March 1999. From 1st April 1999 the MMC was 
replaced by the Competition Commission (CC), though its role with respect to merger 
regulation remained substantially unchanged. This inquiry process allows the 
competition aspects of each case to be judged by Commissioners appointed for their 
knowledge of competition law and economics, business or the particular industry 
involved. By contrast the rather older US system bases its approach on the US Sherman 
Act of 1890 and the Clayton Act of 1914, and uses the courts to judge on antitrust 
behaviour. This thesis has therefore chosen to look at one national regime. The UK 
provides a well-established and stable study model for which reliable data is available. 
Some earlier research by Franks and Harris (1993) and Forbes (1994) have looked at 
shareholder value aspects for the period 1965 to around 1990, and this thesis extends the 
knowledge to 2002.  
 
1.7.2 Study period from 1989 to 2002 
The study period (1989 to 2002) was chosen to allow a comparison between the first 
and second halves of the period of UK merger regulation policy since 1965, since the 
earlier period from 1965 to around 1990 was studied by Franks and Harris (1993) and 
Forbes (1994). The chosen period also covered the phase in British political history 
when nationalised state utilities were privatised by the Thatcher and Major Conservative 
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Governments from 1979 to 1997. This privatisation programme brought competition to 
previously monopoly industries, and introduced a series of industry specific regulators 
to foster and encourage competition in these industries. Their purpose was to protect 
smaller competitors and new entrants from the power of the incumbent operators, and to 
encourage rapid growth of competition in the industry. These industry specific 
regulators also worked in tandem with the UK competition regulator, the OFT, on 
certain matters such as mergers and disputes related to license terms and conditions. The 
chosen study period is of particular interest as it gives a period for comparison of 
merger regulation between privatised and non-privatised industries. This provides an 
opportunity to investigate and compare aspects of the modified regulatory approach 
involving tandem regulators over a comparable period.  
 
The point chosen to end the study period is marked by the introduction of the Enterprise 
Act 2002. The 2002 Act introduced several changes to the regulatory process. Powers to 
regulate mergers on competition grounds were previously reserved to the politically 
elected Secretary of State, who was advised by the OFT and the MMC/CC. The 2002 
Act devolved these powers to the OFT and CC removing some opportunities for 
political discretion to be introduced into decisions. It is too early to assess in detail what 
effect this 2002 Act would have on the research question, but the 2002 Act does mark 
the introduction of an interesting new regulatory phase to UK competition policy and a 
fruitful topic for future research. 
 
The research period from 1989 to 2002 therefore represents a period over which a stable 
UK regime can be investigated and compared with mergers carried out in the newly 
formed privatised industries. It also allows comparisons with the earlier research studies 
covering 1965 to around 1990. The basis of the merger regulation regime remained 
substantially unchanged over the period 1965 to 2002, even though other aspects of the 
UK competition regime had steadily evolved over the same period. 
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1.7.3 Side-effects of policy on shareholder value and Managers’ 
motivation 
Mergers have effects on shareholder value and managerial motivations, as well as 
employee welfare and create wider economic and social effects. The primary purpose of 
the UK competition regime is to consider the economic and social effects. This aim is 
central to the test used by the competition authorities between 1965 and 2002, namely 
that the merger should be “in the public interest” (the so-called "public interest" test). 
The UK merger regulation policy covers the direct effects of mergers on the market and 
the economy, which includes customers. Since 2002 the new “substantial lessening of 
competition” test has further restricted the scope of competition policy. These direct 
effects, and the effectiveness of UK policy has been researched elsewhere (for example, 
see Clarke et al., 1998) and is not investigated in this thesis. 
 
This thesis has chosen only to examine evidence of the side-effects of UK policy on 
shareholders and managers’ motivations. Employees are also affected by mergers, and 
the nature of the effects can be wide ranging, covering such issues as job security, 
pension entitlements, economic impacts from earnings, disruption to family life and 
possible need to relocate, stress and motivational effects. Although mergers affect 
employees of the merging companies in many different ways, the research in this thesis 
only examines the effects on employees when they are also a shareholder and / or a 
senior Manager. The methodology used in this thesis is chosen to examine the 
relationship between regulatory policy and shareholder value and Managers’ 
motivations for mergers, and is not appropriate to examine wider effects of mergers on 
employees. The wider effects of mergers on employees are therefore excluded from this 
research.  
 
1.8 Conclusions. 
This chapter has presented the background to the research and the structure and content 
of the thesis. It has addressed the following points: - 
 
 Established the basic issues and background to the research problem. 
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 Established the research question. 
 Justified the need for the research. 
 Discussed in outline possible methodologies and why the chosen approach was 
selected. 
 Explained the structure and content of the thesis. 
 Defined specific terms used throughout the thesis to ensure uniformity and avoid 
repetitious explanations. 
 Identified and explained the delimitations to the research imposed by choice (by 
contrast to limitations of the methodology) with regards to study of the UK 
regime, the study period and the parties studied, and justified the selection of 
these choices. 
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2 Literature Review. 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 1 the background to the research was discussed and the main area to be 
researched identified. The question “What effect does the regulation of mergers by the 
competition authorities in the UK have on shareholder value and managers’ 
motivations for undertaking mergers?” was developed to define the area of interest. 
This chapter explores the literature available in the three key study domains of Financial 
Economics, Strategic Management and Industrial Organisation, which encompass the 
area of research interest.  
 
The literature of the Financial Economics, Strategic Management and Industrial 
Organisation domains overlap. Within this large combined area of literature there are a 
number of key subject areas, which have a direct bearing on the field of research 
interest. The key subject areas are Market Behaviour, Event Studies, Merger 
Performance, Regulation and Theories of the Firm and Corporate Governance. 
 
This chapter outlines the key areas of literature relevant to this thesis and examines the 
development of research themes in these subject areas, including the relevant 
discussions and debates. It concludes by summarising what is known and where the 
gaps in the knowledge of the chosen research area lie. 
 
 
2.2 Overview and relationship of the key disciplines to the area 
of research interest 
Chapter 1, in the introduction to the research, identified the key disciplines as Financial 
Economics, Strategic Management and Industrial Organisation. The overlapping 
relationship between these key literatures domains is shown diagrammatically in Figure 
2-1 below. 
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Figure 2-1 Diagrammatic relationships of the literature and key subject areas 
 
The Strategic Management literature deals with the use of mergers as a strategic tool. 
This view of mergers is considered to place the acquiring company in an improved 
strategic position in the industry regarding access to larger markets, reduced operational 
and supplier costs, increased access to scare resources and assets, and to achieve 
financial improvements. The Financial Economics literature relating to mergers covers 
what financial factors lead to financial success of mergers. This often investigates 
factors such as the success of mergers overall, which types of mergers are most 
successful and the most effective methods for structuring the financial elements of the 
deal. In particular, literature on the financial performance of mergers that were subject 
to competition regulation is of great interest to this research. The USA anti trust 
authorities and the UK competition regulation process are amongst the oldest and most 
researched merger regulatory regimes, while, for example, studies of the EU merger 
regulation authority provides evidence from younger regimes. Finally the Industrial 
Organisation literature deals with assessing the role, impact, economics and 
performance of industrial and organisational structures and the understanding of 
corporate governance practices on the running of companies.  
 
Within this combined and overlapping literature there are a number of specific subject 
areas that have a direct relationship to the research question. These key subject areas are 
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briefly outlined below. The subject of merger performance tries to answer the question 
“are mergers and acquisitions successful?” It looks at the various metrics and issues 
possibly involved as well as concluding as to whether mergers are successful or not 
based on various definitions but normally centred on profitability. The subject of 
regulation is essentially about controlling and limiting commercial activities for the 
greater public benefit. In the case of mergers, competition regulation seeks to avoid the 
reduction of competition and the building of monopolistic powers by companies. This 
literature also discusses the success, or otherwise, of regulatory approaches in achieving 
and maintaining public benefits. Capital market performance and behaviour lies at the 
heart of understanding shareholder value changes and is central to the methods used in 
this research. The subject covers the behaviour of markets, their response to 
information, and the econometric and statistical techniques and discussions around the 
subject of event studies. Finally theories of the firm and merger motivation lie at the 
heart of trying to understand why managers continue to carryout mergers when the 
success rate is well documented as poor and the activity classed as risky in terms of 
having a predictable outcome. 
 
Below we look briefly at each key area in overview before going on to review them in 
more depth. 
 
2.2.1 Merger performance 
This body of literature studies the performance of mergers, from financial and strategic 
perspectives. It examines factors and circumstances that impact on the performance of 
mergers and draws conclusions about the overall performance, and the impact of 
various factors on merger outcomes. Not only does this area cover the measurement and 
metrics used when assessing overall merger performance, but covers the study of 
financial and strategic factors influencing merger outcomes and adds to our knowledge 
of empirical evidence of how mergers perform in the short and long term under 
differing conditions. 
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2.2.2 Capital market performance and behaviour 
This body of literature covers the way in which financial markets work and behave and 
is central to Financial Economics. The concept of the Efficient Market Hypothesis 
(EMH) is the basis for many of financial models, studies and measurement approaches 
including event study techniques. The concept of a market being efficient in its response 
to new information is central to event study methodology, and therefore to much of the 
research in this thesis. 
 
The EMH has been proposed as a basis for studying the way competitive financial 
markets operate, but there has been considerable academic discussion about whether the 
EMH is an appropriate model, to what extent financial markets are efficient, and the 
precise form of the EMH to best serve as a working hypothesis. This work is central to 
measurement of market value changes of companies and is therefore an important 
theoretical foundation for the research in this thesis. 
 
2.2.3 Merger regulation 
Literature on merger regulation covers the effects of merger regulation policy and 
competition regimes. It considers both the social welfare benefits and the financial 
implications of public policy. The research in this thesis is primarily interested in the 
effects of UK merger regulation on shareholders and managers and, while this is not of 
primary interest in the regulation literature, which is concerned with social welfare, it is 
important when considering the overall benefits of competition regulation on all 
stakeholders. The wider aspects of EU and USA merger regulation will be considered 
so the UK position can be seen in the context of other administrations. 
 
2.2.4 Theories of the firm and merger motivation 
Studies on theories of the firm and manager motivations are central to the Industrial 
Organisation and Strategic Management literatures. The relevant studies cover 
knowledge of models of the firm and research into how aspects of management 
behaviour influence outcomes. This literature also draws on Corporate Governance 
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research and investigates how internal governance activity in a firm can influence 
managerial behaviour. 
 
2.3 Merger performance 
This section of the literature deals with how well mergers have performed. Its origins 
date back to studies in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s when interest in merger 
performance started to grow. Early researchers were initially interested in waves of 
merger activity, and identification of their characteristics in an attempt to explain the 
phenomenon (for example, see the review by Sudarsanam, 2003, ch 2). An awareness of 
a high failure rate of mergers grew through the 1970’s, and the associated literature 
began to develop distinct research themes. For example Mandelker (1974) considered 
whether the market for acquisitions is competitive and Jaffe (1974) examined the 
subject of insider trading and privileged information adding to the knowledge of price 
movements in merger cases. Initially the methods used to assess performance and the 
criteria used to judge success were specific to each study, with researchers taking 
different approaches and using differing metrics. Many of the early studies measured 
performance in terms of operating performance and profitability (e.g. Meeks, 1977) and 
were based on empirical studies of company reported accounting data. Around the late 
1960’s, as interest developed in the behaviour of capital markets (for example see Fama, 
1965; Fama et al., 1969; Fama, 1970), researchers began to investigate the effects 
mergers had on share prices (for example, see Jaffe, 1974; Mandelker, 1974). The 
degree to which mergers were judged to be successful to some extent depended on the 
precise research method adopted, but, overall, the results suggested that around a half or 
more of mergers failed. A comprehensive summary of the Financial Economics 
literature covering merger performance is given by Sudarsanam (2003, see ch 4, pp 63-
94) which reviews a number of UK, US and EU performance studies using short run 
announcement returns methods, long run event study methods, and approaches using 
operating performance. His conclusions are discussed in para. 2.3.1 below. 
 
As research studies continued to confirm the evidence of a high merger failure rate, 
interest increased in the reasons for failure and what could be done to improve 
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performance. However, Schoenberg (2006) has reported that while there is broad 
agreement in the literature on the percentage of successful merger cases, there is little 
agreement on the criteria used to assess the success of mergers. As a result, he suggests 
that a wide selection of metrics should be used in studies of merger performance to take 
account of the varying perspectives involved in judging success. 
 
 The literature divides into several threads. Financial research has investigated financial 
factors relating to performance. Strategic Management and Industrial Organisation 
researchers have looked at the strategic and industry structure factors influencing 
performance. We examine these threads next. 
 
2.3.1 Financial performance of mergers 
A flow of studies has produced evidence that while around half or more mergers fail to 
produce the economic synergies predicted by the managers, shareholders of target 
companies benefit more than shareholders of bidding companies. Meeks (1977) studied 
the effects of mergers on profitability and efficiency in the UK. He concluded that: - 
1. There seems to be financial incentives to managers, having little or no 
ownership interest in the firm, to pursue growth at the expense of profitability. 
2. Proposed efficiency gains cannot be relied upon post-merger and evidence 
suggests that efficiency declined post-merger. 
3. Financial constraints and investment criteria appear to work less tightly for 
mergers and takeovers than for investments in assets, resulting in companies 
demonstrating rapid growth by takeover but being unremarkable in terms of 
their profitability. 
 
Much of the research into mergers has concentrated on the effects on firm performance, 
measured mainly in terms of profitability, productivity and the impact on share prices. 
Profitability studies tend to show negative effects from mergers, while productivity and 
event studies tend to show more positive effects. For example, Meeks (1977) studied the 
effects of mergers in the UK on firm profitability, and concluded between a half and 
two-thirds of the firms in his sample suffered a fall in profits after a merger (for a 
review of the earlier literature, see Chiplin and Wright, 1988, pp. 66-73).  
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Later work by Sirower (1997) studied stock market prices in US mergers. He found 
strong support for a negative relationship between the level of premium paid by the 
acquiring firm and performance. He argues that this is because bidders may overpay for 
the economic gains available from a merger, in the form of the level of premium they 
pay to shareholders of the target firm to win their acceptance of the takeover bid. 
Sirower did not provide the reasons for the overpayment, but noted that once an 
overpaid deal has been completed it is not usually possible to recover from the damage 
done to asset value (see Sirower, 1997, Appendix A, pp. 145-166 for a review of later 
studies).  
 
Finance researchers have been actively searching for links between specific financial or 
organisational factors in mergers and performance outcomes. This work has focused on 
such factors as the methods of payment used for the deal, and whether a friendly bid 
(i.e. agreed between the companies) or a hostile bid (i.e. bidder makes an offer directly 
to the target firm’s shareholders) is more successful(for example, see Sudarsanam and 
Mahate, 2003; 2006). 
 
Sudarsanam (2003, ch 4) reviews the literature on merger performance in the UK, USA 
and EU on the basis of the different measurement criteria and benchmarking that 
features in the studies. Short run performance measures use announcement returns to 
identify market price performance of bidder and target companies in the deal period. By 
comparison, long run return performance measures use market returns over various 
periods of up to several years post deal to identify the acquirer’s performance. The 
review by Sudarsanam concludes that on short and long run performance: - 
 Shareholder value is created in the short term, but almost all of it goes to the 
target firms’ shareholders. 
 Acquirers’ shareholders suffer significant wealth loss in the long term, more so 
in mergers than in tender offers (purchase of the target assets) where a 
distinction can be made. 
Operating performance studies were also reviewed by Sudarsanam (2003, ch 4). He 
concludes: - 
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“Profitability based assessments indicate that a merger either performs as well as 
benchmarks or it experiences significant profit decline, though there are some 
indications of distorting influences of accounting policies and rules.”  
 
 
2.3.2 Strategy and Management related to merger performance 
The strategy literature approaches mergers through their ability to change the strategic 
position of a company, usually relatively quickly, in terms of gaining benefits from 
revenue enhancement opportunities, changed competition and markets, and from 
economies of scale. These sources of benefits can be divided further, but it is agued that 
the overall value of these benefits needs to exceed the price paid for the merger before 
any value has been created. Simply providing benefits is not sufficient for success if the 
acquirer has been overburdened by the costs of achieving them (see Sirower, 1997 for a 
full discussion). 
 
Over the last three decades strategic management researchers have been seeking 
empirical evidence of a relationship between merger performance and diversification 
strategies. There is considerable popular support in the management world for the 
concept that mergers involving relatedly diversified companies perform better than 
mergers involving unrelatedly diversified companies. This is based on relatedly 
diversified companies having more shared assets and knowledge, leading to economies 
of scale and scope. It is argued that this leads to greater potential synergistic benefits in 
mergers when a related diversification strategy is followed. However, the empirical 
evidence for this popular view is actually mixed and inconsistent. Initially, work by 
Rumelt (1974; 1982) suggested that relatedly diversified companies outperformed 
unrelatedly diversified companies, but this was challenged, for example by Bettis 
(1981) and Montgomery (1982), who were unable to find a clear relationship and 
Christiansen and Montgomery (1981), who found only a marginal difference. This later 
work was based on a methodology measuring cross-sectional performance related to 
categories of diversification. More research work by Palich et al. (2000) has suggested 
that company performance reaches a maximum with related limited diversification, but 
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performance declines when companies are either undiversified or when they have 
extensive unrelatedly diversification. 
 
More direct assessments of merger performance against relatedness have been carried 
out on shareholder returns using event study analysis. The result is conflicting evidence. 
For example, Lubatkin (1987), Chatterjee (1986), Lubatkin and O’Neill (1987), Singh 
and Montgomery (1987), and Seth (1990a; 1990b) have found no significant differences 
in returns to shareholders of acquiring firms based on relatedness. Other researchers, for 
example Agrawal et al. (1992) have found conglomerate (i.e. unrelated) mergers 
outperform non-conglomerate (i.e. related) mergers. 
 
Overall, the empirical evidence on the relationship between performance and 
relatedness is confused and inconsistent. In spite of the popular belief that the concept 
of relatedness is an important strategic determinant of merger performance, at present it 
is not supported by clear empirical evidence. 
 
One area of debate is the effect of merger regulation and the degree of regulation that is 
appropriate. This is central to this thesis and is covered more fully in section 2.5 below. 
  
2.4 Capital market performance and behaviour 
This section looks at the research that has been carried out on the behaviour of stock 
markets and stock market prices. This knowledge forms the basis for key assumptions 
in this research. Event studies are used to measure share price changes. This section 
examines the literature relating to event studies as a method of measurement of merger 
performance and the methodological issues involved. 
 
2.4.1 Market behaviour 
Attempts to understand the behaviour of market prices of financial securities in a 
modern economic context date back to the early 1960s. Researchers were initially 
concerned with the statistical nature of share price changes, which do not conform to a 
Gaussian description. Fama (1965) reviewed the early research into the nature of share 
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prices and changes. He concluded price changes followed a Paretian statistical 
distribution, which had statistical implications due to the large variance and erratic 
nature of the data. Following that initial work on the nature of security prices, research 
expanded into what factors drove security price changes. The Efficient Market 
Hypothesis (EMH) was proposed by Fama et al. (1969), in which they argued that a 
capital market is efficient in pricing securities when new information becomes 
available.. The hypothesis was based on the concept of rational economic man trading 
on the stock market. For example, when new favourable information became available 
its value impact on companies was quickly and accurately assessed by the capital 
market. If a company was re-valued as a result of new favourable information, securities 
would be bought if their price was below the new estimated price. This arbitrage buying 
would continue, creating demand and raising the price, until the price of the security 
reached the new valuation price. At this point demand for the security would disappear 
because there was no further opportunity to make a profit. Similarly prices may fall 
when unfavourable news becomes available. The equilibrium price would remain at the 
new level until any further new information was received when the market arbitrage 
process cycle would repeat, allowing the market to readjust to the new information.  
 
Some debate took place over the following decades about the precise form of the EMH. 
The forms that emerged were referred to as the strong form, the semi-strong form and 
the weak form. Fama (1970) investigated the evidence in support of these three forms, 
which can be defined as: - 
 Strong form – market prices fully reflect all information, whether publicly 
available or not. 
 Semi-strong form – market prices fully reflect all obviously publicly available 
information. 
 Weak form – market prices fully reflect all past information. 
He concluded that there was strong evidence to support the weak and semi-strong 
forms, but evidence was weaker in support of the strong form, which involves traders 
with monopolistic access to information (i.e. corporate managers and market analysts). 
The debate continues regarding the most realistic or appropriate form of the EMH for 
given circumstances. 
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In spite of the debate about the EMH and its precise form, a number of issues and 
paradoxes in financial economics remained unanswered. Amongst these issues were 
subjects of material significance to financial economists. For example, EMH alone 
could not explain the mechanisms associated with market volatility and the 
phenomenon of market price bubbles, when prices keep rising above underlying 
economic value, until without warning the prices suddenly begin to fall as the so-called 
bubble bursts. Another example is the puzzle of the closed-end fund. The closed-end 
fund is a mutual fund that holds shares in publicly traded companies. It issues a fixed 
number of shares that are traded on the stock market. To liquidate a holding in the fund 
investors sell to other investors rather than redeem shares with the fund itself. The 
empirical finding is that shares in these funds typically sell at prices that are not equal to 
the per share market value of the underlying assets held by the fund. The shares sell 
typically at a discount, but sometimes at a premium. 
 
Interest in such phenomena lead to the development of behavioural finance, which 
incorporates some “irrational” elements of human behaviour into the model of stock 
market trading. Almost two decades after Fama (1965) first carried out his examination 
of the behaviour of share prices, Shiller et al. (1984) reported their initial research in 
this area looking at share prices in the context of social dynamics. Shiller (1987; 1989) 
continued to research behavioural finance with wider studies of stock market, bond 
market and homes market volatility. This work developed our understanding and 
established the concept of financial market models based on a mix of rational and 
irrational investors.  Later work, for example by Schleifer (2000) and Shiller (2001), 
built on these models to develop the understanding of conditions in which market 
bubbles form. As the models of behavioural finance theory have developed, the 
adoption of complex systems approaches have been explored, for example in research 
by Sornette (2003), which has helped to identify critical factors in market price data, 
enabling market bubble price peaks to be predicted. 
 
In essence the assumptions underlying the EMH are relaxed and widened in the 
behavioural finance literature. For example, the EMH concept of rational economic 
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man, who makes trading decisions on a rational basis using all available information 
and who is able to accurately assess the value impact of new information on a company, 
is replaced by three groups of investors. Firstly, arbitrage traders seek opportunities to 
trade by selling one group of shares and immediately buy the same shares, or an 
alternative with identical risk, at a lower price. These professional traders operate with 
rapid access to the latest prices and information, and behave in a similar manner to 
rational man in the EMH. A second group of traders, referred to as “noise traders”, 
behave differently. Their buying and selling decisions are based on rumour, speculation 
and personal sentiment. Consequently, they tend to buy when prices are rising and sell 
when prices fall, in contrast to the arbitrage trader, who buys low and sells high. A third 
group of investors are passive investors who hold stock, but are not actively trading. At 
any time these three types of investors are operating in the stock market, but over time, 
the ratio of these groups changes in relationship to one another. 
 
As the ratio of these investor groups change, the characteristics of the market change in 
response. When the arbitrage traders predominate, markets act in a stable way with 
prices quickly settling to a new equilibrium price after the receipt of new information. 
As more noise traders enter the market, and their ratio increases relative to other groups, 
arbitrage traders influence the equilibrium price to a reduced degree. Complex models 
of market behaviour, based on the mix and behaviour of these three types of investors 
have been developed, and they help to explain some of the phenomena not explained by 
the EMH. However, while these models go some way to explain some of the market 
phenomena, there are some practical problems in their application. The theory of 
behavioural finance is still developing and as yet all the factors affecting market 
behaviour are not fully understood. In addition, some of the key factors are internal to 
the models and not currently observable in stock market data. Some researchers (e.g. 
see, Sornette, 2003) have attempted to identify key patterns in price movements to 
predict future critical phases in market behaviour, in an analogous way to detecting 
seismic movements prior to earthquake events. Behavioural finance can give insights 
that were previously not possible, and we are now able to say that there is evidence that 
markets do not behave in a wholly rational way at all times, though identifying the 
degree of irrationality at any time still remains a significant challenge.  
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The debate about the EMH is still open. Fama (1991; 1998) has responded to critical 
points in the debate around the EMH and the challenges from behavioural finance. He 
has concluded that no other theory manages to provide a viable replacement for the 
EMH. At the time of this research, the state of the debate about the EMH could be 
summarised as follows: - 
 The EMH can be considered to be an approximation of real market behaviour 
(where trading by noise traders is either considered to not be present, or cancels 
out on average, leaving only arbitrage trading in the market). 
 The real market can be considered to operate both rationally and irrationally at 
different times and in different circumstances, though it is very difficult at any 
moment to determine the degree of irrationality that applies to the market. 
 The assumption that markets are fully informationally efficient is probably an 
oversimplification of reality at many points in time.  
 Rejection of the assumption of market efficiency leaves us with no alternative 
model at this point, which could replace the EMH. 
In short, in studying the financial markets the EMH may not be perfect, but neither is it 
possible to replace it at present with a better hypothesis. 
 
2.4.2 Event studies 
Event studies have been used from the late 1960’s for research into security prices and 
market behaviour (see for example Fama, 1965; Fama et al., 1969). They have been 
used principally for two purposes, firstly in empirical investigations of market 
efficiency and tests of the EMH. Their second use has been to measure abnormal share 
price returns occurring in response to specific events and management decisions. Event 
studies are used in this thesis to measure share price changes resulting from specific 
announcements during the progress of a merger deal. The event study methodology 
used in the research is explained in Chapter 4 and 5.    
 
While event studies have been accepted in principle, there has been discussion in the 
event studies literature about methodology and econometric issues. We first discuss the 
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literature relating to the econometric issues, and following this, the literature on the 
wider subject of event study methodology. 
 
2.4.2.1 Econometric aspects. 
Event studies have grown from the first study of stock splits by Fama et al (1969) to be 
the predominant methodology for determining the impact of an event on capital market 
security returns. Over this period a number of econometric concerns have been 
discussed and addressed by researchers. Fama (1965) noted that the statistical 
distribution of security price data was not normally distributed (i.e. not a Gaussian 
distribution). The statistical regression techniques used in event study (and for other 
applications such as the determination of betas for the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM)) assumes normally distributed residuals. The use of non-normal data results in 
non-normal regression residuals and therefore raises questions regarding the validity of 
coefficients and the standard errors produced by the regression. Non-normality 
observation applied to both the price data and the first difference of the price data. For 
example, Fama (1965) suggested that share price data had a stable Paretian distribution 
with infinite variance. This raised the question of how regression techniques could be 
used with such data, and how valid were the regression coefficients and associated test 
statistics. Scholes and Williams (1977) identified the distribution of daily share price 
data was considerably more non-normal than monthly price data for the same securities. 
As the availability and use of daily data increased, Scholes and Williams (1977) 
identified another issue arising from the non-synchronous trading of the stocks being 
studied and the benchmark index or portfolio used in the event study. In particular, the 
distribution of price data was dependent on the frequency with which the security was 
traded and the distribution of the price data was most severely affected for infrequently 
traded (thinly traded) securities. Thin trading results in days when the stock is not traded 
and hence a new price is not recorded, or price changes do not occur (i.e. the first 
difference is zero). As a result, a large number of zeros appear in the daily returns 
producing highly leptokurtic data. Scholes and Williams proposed new formulae for 
estimators used to calculate betas for the CAPM, which corrected for the nature of the 
data in an attempt to overcome this problem. 
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Work by Dimson (1979) led to another proposed solution to the problem. Based on a 
multiple regression model with leading and lagged data. By 1980 event study usage had 
increased significantly and Brown and Warner (1980) set about trying to evaluate the 
many approaches that had been adopted by individual researchers. They compared 
methodologies and, using simulation techniques, examined probabilities of Type I and 
Type II errors. They concluded there was little evidence to justify complex 
methodologies (see Brown and Warner, 1980 pp 249, para 9.4): - 
 A “bottom line” that emerges from our study is this: beyond a simple one-factor 
market model, there is little evidence that more complicated methodologies 
convey any benefit. In fact, we have presented evidence that more complicated 
methodologies can actually make the researcher worse off, both compared to the 
market model and to even simpler methods, like Mean Adjusted Returns, which 
make no explicit risk adjustment. This is not to say that existing techniques 
cannot be improved; indeed, our results have led us to suggest a number of ways 
in which such improvements can be made. But even if the researcher doing an 
event study has a strong comparative advantage at improving existing methods, 
a good use of his time is still in reading old issues of the Wall Street Journal to 
more accurately determine event dates. 
 
The issue of using non-normal data and daily stock returns was addressed again by 
Brown and Warner (1985). Using simulation techniques, they investigated the 
interaction of daily return data, with its non-normal and non-synchronous 
characteristics, on ordinary least squares regression and alternative techniques used by 
researchers in event studies. Their conclusions reinforced their earlier findings in that 
the use of daily data with OLS regression was suitably specified, and that no 
improvement in the power of tests was found when using more complex techniques. In 
particular they noted that the procedures suggested by Scholes and Williams (1977) and 
Dimson (1979) did seem to reduce bias in OLS estimates of betas due to non-
synchronous data. However, they produced similar specification and power of tests of 
abnormal performance to that obtained with the OLS market model over a range of 
trading frequencies. A caution was provided about the possibility of non-synchronous 
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data inducing autocorrelation and the need for possible additional care; though they felt 
further research was needed on this. 
 
From the mid 1980s research attention broadened to include other econometric issues in 
addition to the non-normality of the data. Autocorrelation of the data, intertemporal and 
contemporaneous correlation between individual abnormal returns when summed over 
an event window, and event induced variance were also discussed, in addition to the use 
of the data involving thinly traded securities. Salinger (1992) investigated the effect of 
intertemporal and contemporaneous correlation on the summed abnormal returns over 
event periods. He showed that the correlation of residuals leads to underestimates of 
standard errors and proposed two procedures to control for this. Other researchers 
reported that events can result in both abnormal returns and changes to the risk of the 
security (for example, see  Brown et al., 1988). The change of risk is reflected in a 
change in variance during the event window. This change in variance raises the issue of 
how the changed variance should be considered when calculating test statistics for the 
event. Boehmer et al. (1991) found that event study methods too frequently reject a null 
hypothesis of zero abnormal performance when the event causes additional variance in 
the event period returns. They proposed an easy-to-use solution, by using normalised 
event returns and applying cross-sectional tests to these standardised residuals. 
 
Research on event studies with thinly traded stock by Maynes and Rumsey (1993), 
Bartholdy and Riding (1994), Cowan and Sergeant (1996), and Kallunki (1997), 
investigated the nature of returns to events on firms listed on small stock markets. In 
general, they concluded tests already existed for most situations and confirmed that 
event studies could be validly used for thinly traded stocks. 
 
2.4.2.2 Event study methodology 
Researchers have tailored the event study method to suit their specific research projects, 
and this has involved making mainly choices relating to the timing and width of the 
event window to be used. Event studies were being used in new fields, and increasingly 
for assessing the impact of management decision-making. In many cases researchers 
needed to investigate abnormal market returns over longer periods following a major 
34 
event. This interest had the effect of pushing event windows wider to periods of up to a 
year or more.  
 
McWilliams and Siegel (1997) investigated methodological issues and the accuracy of 
event studies. They found that there had been inadequate attention to theoretical and 
research design issues. In particular, the research design for long event windows gave 
cause for concern because of the possibility of drawing false inferences. McWilliams 
and Siegel (1997) recommend that the reasons for the choice of an event window should 
be carefully considered and the event window kept as short as possible, with an event 
window over two days needing justification. Brown and Warner (1980; 1985) had 
shown that increasing the event window width could severely reduce the statistical 
power of test statistics used, leading to false inferences. In addition, evidence suggests 
that the market price fully adjusts to unanticipated information quickly. Estimates range, 
for example, from 15 minutes by Dann et al. (1977), within one hour by Jain (1988) to 
90 minutes by Mitchell and Netter (1989).  A further reason for keeping event windows 
short is to improve control over confounding events (i.e. events that occur during the 
event window, which have a market price effect but are not related to the event being 
studied). After reviewing 29 event studies and finding event windows of up to 181 days 
that included a disturbing number of confounding events, McWilliams and Siegel 
(1997) made a set of recommendations to help researchers avoid problems in their 
research design (see McWilliams and Siegel, 1997, p. 652). Their recommendations are: 
- 
 
Steps for Implementing an Event Study. (from McWilliams and Siegel, 1997, p. 652) 
Step 1. Define an event that provides new information to the market. 
Step 2. Outline a theory that justifies a financial response to this new information. 
Step 3. Identify a set of firms that experience this event and identify the event dates. 
Step 4. Choose an appropriate event window and justify its length if it exceeds two days. 
Step 5. Eliminate or adjust for firms that experience other relevant events during the 
event window 
Step 6. Compute abnormal returns during the event window and test their significance. 
Step 7. Report the percentage of negative returns and the binomial Z or Wilcoxon test 
statistic. 
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Step 8. For small samples, use bootstrap methods and discuss the impact of outliers. 
Step 9. Outline theory that explains the cross-sectional variation in abnormal returns and 
test this theory econometrically. 
Step 10. Report firms’ names and event dates in a data appendix. 
 
2.5 Merger regulation 
This thesis is concerned with developing understanding of how merger regulation 
interacts with shareholder value and Managers’ motivations to undertake mergers. The 
methodology for examining these relationships depends on using event studies to 
measure corporate value changes in response to merger events being announced. 
Important studies examining issues closely related to this research are those by Eckbo 
(1983), Stillman (1983), Wier (1983), Franks and Harris (1993), Forbes (1994), Brady 
and Feinberg (2000),  Aktas, de Bodt and Roll (2001), and Duso, Nevan and Roeller 
(2003), which are now reviewed. 
 
In 1983 Eckbo argued that where a merger was anticompetitive, industry prices for 
goods and services would be expected to rise following the merger and reduced 
competition. This would lead to not only the bidder’s share price rising on the merger 
being announced, but also the competitors’ share prices would rise. Conversely he 
argued if the merger brought synergistic benefits without being anticompetitive, the 
bidder share price would rise on announcement of the merger while the competitors’ 
share prices would fall, reflecting the threat of increased competition and downward 
pressure on product prices. He carried out event studies on a sample of 259 horizontal 
and vertical mergers in the USA, of which 79 were challenged by the government’s 
anti-trust agencies and investigated the share price movements of the merging firms and 
their competitors. He found that there was no statistical evidence from rival company 
share price movements to support a collusive behaviour hypothesis for horizontal 
mergers. From this he concluded that horizontal mergers challenged by regulators had 
been based on cost saving efficiencies and not market power, and they were no more 
damaging to competition than vertical mergers. In the same year Stillman (1983) carried 
out a similar study of 11 horizontal mergers involving US companies between 1964 and 
1972 which were challenged by the antitrust enforcement agencies. His results were 
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consistent with those of Eckbo (1983). Both found a lack of statistical evidence to 
support referral to the anti-trust authorities on competition grounds. However, 
Fridolfsson and Stennek (2000) identified what they termed the “in play effect”, where 
following an unsuccessful merger bid event studies may not see a fall to pre-bid values 
of a target firm. This effect could be explained by the market considering the target firm 
as being in play for another bid. Such effects make it difficult for event studies to 
identify specific anti-competitive mergers. 
 
Research closer to the study in this thesis is that by Wier (1983). Wier looked at the 
costs of defending mergers challenged by the US anti-trust enforcement agencies. Again 
using event studies, she considered the effects on market capitalisation measured by 
abnormal returns at key events in the regulatory process. Her finding was that, on 
average, merger complaint announcements occasion abnormal losses and large costs, in 
the order of 3% of market value, which are born by shareholders of target firms if 
proposed mergers are cancelled. Wealth gains earned at the time of the bid 
announcement were cancelled out by losses by the time the competition inquiry ended. 
But she concluded that the effects on share prices will also be influenced by the ability 
of investors to accurately predict competition policy outcomes.  
 
The relevant studies for the UK are those by Franks and Harris (1993) and Forbes 
(1994). Using event studies and data from a sample of 159 UK mergers referred to the 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) between 1965 and 1990, Franks and 
Harris (1993) examined evidence of shareholder value changes to bidder and target 
companies in mergers. They identified substantial losses to shareholders when the 
MMC rejected merger bids.  In addition, they found that negative value returns occurred 
on referral and on the announcement of an adverse public interest finding by the MMC. 
Announcement of a favourable decision had a small positive effect. The value effects 
were greater and statistically significant for the target company, while the effects on 
bidder company returns were smaller and statistically insignificant. They also found that 
a MMC rejection of a merger led to a substantial reduction in the gains to the target 
company’s shareholders that had been recorded at the date of the merger bid. 
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Forbes (1994) investigated the value impact of MMC references using event studies of 
53 mergers in the period 1976 to 1990, although for bidding companies only. Abnormal 
returns were calculated for the initial announcement of the merger, announcement of 
referral to the MMC by the Minister, and the Commission’s decision. The value effects 
were found to be broadly consistent with those in Franks and Harris (1993). Bidder 
returns were again small and not statistically significant. 
 
More recently there has been an attempt to look at the impact on shareholder value of 
EU competition regulation. Brady and Feinberg (2000) examined 20 mergers from 1991 
to 1995 subjected to EU competition investigation, after the introduction of the EU’s 
merger regulations in 1990. This was the first time that the EU had taken formal powers 
to challenge mergers. They looked for evidence of regime effects (relating to cases 
grouped by EU member state and by industry sectors) and individual case effects of 
regulatory decisions on shareholder value. They found that the regime effects were 
weak. However, for individual cases enforcement of the merger regulations could have 
a substantial effect on individual company share prices. They also discovered that 
findings by the European Commission of “serious doubts” or the announcement of a 
“suspension” decision adversely affected the share price. In this case, the fact that 
investors seem to have had difficulty predicting inquiry outcomes, as reflected in share 
price movements, probably related to the fact that the merger regime in the EU was 
new. Another study, by Aktas, de Bodt and Roll (2001), looking at whether EU 
competition policy was biased against mergers involving non-EU firms, found clear 
confirmation that investors anticipate regulatory intervention. Hence, abnormal returns 
around the bid announcement date must be interpreted in the light of the probability and 
cost of regulatory intervention.  Duso, Nevan and Roeller (2003) discovered a similar 
effect on competitors’ share prices, drawing on the method proposed by Eckbo (1983) 
and Stillman (1983). They posited an anti-competitive merger would reduce competitive 
market forces within an industry and reduce downward pressure on prices and profit 
margins, which would be viewed positively by industry investors resulting in increased 
share prices for competitors. Hence a positive movement in competitors’ share prices is 
interpreted as a view in the capital market that the merger is anti-competitive.  From this 
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they identified instances where the European Commission’s findings on mergers may 
have been in error. 
 
 
2.6 Theories of the firm and merger motivation 
Several research studies have looked at mergers in terms of management and 
organisational changes, with a view to predicting the type of internal restructuring that 
should take place post merger if economic gains are to be maximised. A review of this 
literature was carried out by Schweiger and Goulet (2000) and covered research 
identifying the best approaches, both pre and post deal completion, to ensure the merger 
integration is as successful as possible. They reviewed research on a range of factors in 
the post merger integration process that are considered to impact on a successful 
outcome. These include cultural aspects, autonomy of the firms, learning, 
communications, incentives structures, speed of integration, and the integration decision 
process. They concluded that the accumulated evidence suggested cultural aspects and 
management of the integration process played important roles in influencing outcomes, 
including financial performance. However, in general the research reviewed was not 
sufficiently systematic to be linked into a comprehensive theory, and unanswered 
questions still remained for most of the factors reviewed. While “best practice” 
integration can maximise the outcome of a merger deal, it cannot make a success of a 
merger when the acquirer has over-paid for the target firm, and so integration success 
can only partly explain success or failures of mergers over the longer term. 
 
Other researchers have examined why firms may become involved in mergers and 
various explanations have been proposed. Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) and later 
Seth et al. (2000) examined groups of merger cases using event studies on market based 
data for evidence of motivations. Their general conclusion was that the Synergy 
hypothesis had the strongest evidence to support it. However they also found evidence 
supporting both the Hubris and Managerialism hypotheses. The research addressed the 
part played by these three hypotheses of motivation in US firms involved in domestic 
and cross-border mergers. The work on motivation in this thesis follows the method 
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used by Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) and Seth et al. (2000), and we look at these 
three theories of the firm in more detail below. 
 
The Synergy hypothesis proposes that managers are motivated to create value. Mergers 
take place when the value of the combined firm is greater than the sum of the values of 
the individual firms (e.g. see Singh and Montgomery, 1987; Bradley et al., 1988; Seth, 
1990b). This increase in value is shared between the owners of the acquiring firm and 
the target firm. As competition for ownership of the target firm increases, the target 
receives an increasingly large proportion of the value because its share price is bid up. 
When all the benefits of merging are captured by the owners of the target, the acquiring 
firm has presumably no incentive to undertake the merger. Under this hypothesis, the 
bidder is able accurately to judge the value of the combined firm and withdraws from 
the merger when the merger will no longer create additional value for the bidder’s 
shareholders.  The additional value of the combined firm can arise from various sources, 
including improved asset utilisation including intellectual property, improved efficiency 
of operations, access to new and possibly global markets, increased market power, or 
from financial re-engineering and other efficiency gains (Seth, 1990a). 
 
Underlying the Synergy hypothesis is the general explanation for firm growth provided 
by Penrose (1959). Penrose viewed the firm as a collection of productive assets and 
proposed that the long run profitability of the firm is closely associated with the ability 
to use its tangible and intangible assets more efficiently. The search for productive 
opportunities leads the firm to seek new products and markets in which it can grow and 
so maintain or increase its marginal revenues. The Synergy hypothesis assumes that the 
firm is unique and specialised resources are not acquired without cost. However, 
transfer of assets is only done when value can be created, and value-destroying transfers 
are not carried out. The Synergy hypothesis explains the motivation of bidding firms to 
undertake value-creating mergers, but research has shown that a significant number of 
mergers either fail to create or may even destroy value, as reviewed in section 2.3 
above. While around a half or more of mergers may fail to achieve the expected 
economic synergies, shareholders in target firms are likely to benefit more than 
shareholders in bidding firms. This is because a bidder may overestimate the economic 
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gains from a merger, and pays an excessive premium to shareholders in the target firm 
to win their acceptance of the takeover bid. Whether this overpayment is done 
knowingly or in error (Seyhun, 1990), the Managerialism and Hubris hypotheses were 
proposed to explain the motivation for mergers where value is not created. 
 
The Managerialism hypothesis4 suggests Managers knowingly overpay in takeovers. 
Managers embark on mergers to maximise their own utility, such as remuneration, job 
security and perquisites, at the expense of their shareholders. Managers often try to 
achieve this by seeking an increase in size of the firm, without seeking genuine 
synergistic benefits and increased profitability. Gains to shareholders are judged to be 
just sufficient to avoid a shareholder challenge to the Manager’s plans. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) proposed a modified theory of the firm incorporating agency costs in 
their seminal model of governance. They proposed that the firm should be viewed as a 
nexus of contracts between the parties involved in the business. Managers represent one 
of these parties and their remuneration contracts, involving rewards and benefits for 
taking actions, may not necessarily align with the best interests of the owners or 
shareholders as a group.  
 
Later studies have supported the view that managerial behaviour often results in seeking 
growth rather than shareholder returns. Grinstein and Hribar (2004) investigated CEO 
bonuses for completing merger deals. CEO’s who had more power to influence the 
Board received larger bonuses, but they were related to measures of effort rather than 
deal performance. They also found that CEO’s with more power tended to engage in 
larger deals relative to their own firm’s size. The method of comparing CEO’s power 
was based on four governance factors; 1) whether the CEO and Chairman roles were 
combined or separate, 2) the number of Board members, 3) the ratio of outside to inside 
Board members, and 4) whether the CEO is part of the Board committee that appoints 
new Board members. Wright et al. (2002) found that in firms with active monitoring of 
the CEO, the CEO’s compensation was related to return from mergers, but in firms with 
                                                 
4
 The Managerialism hypothesis is sometimes called the Agency hypothesis. The latter name is based on 
the concept of a firm being a nexus of contracts and the problems that arise from the use of agents with 
differing forms of contract and the associated incentives involved. Managers are viewed as one of the 
groups of agents contracted by the firm where, unless effectively incentivised, they pursue their own best 
interests, which do not necessarily align with those of the shareholders or owners. 
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inactive monitoring CEO compensation was explained by increased firm size from the 
acquisition. The measurement of monitoring in this study was based on 1) the number 
of stock market analysts following the company, 2) the proportion of independent Board 
members, 3) the degree of activist financial institutional ownership, 4) CEO ownership, 
and 5) CEO tenure.  
 
The pursuit of managers’ interests results in managerial costs reallocating value away 
from shareholders to managers. A further effect can take place in mergers, when a target 
firm’s management realises the managerial motives of the bidder firm and negotiates 
better terms for the target firm’s shareholders in return for agreeing to the merger. This 
represents a further reallocation of value to the target firm and possible increased 
managerial rents in the combined firm. Management has more motivation to take such 
actions when management has a low personal stake in the value of the firm, or 
shareholders are fragmented without any one shareholder holding a large part of the 
equity, or for other reasons governance is weak with low external monitoring presence 
by non-executive directors (Desai et al., 2005). Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) and 
Seth et al. (2000) found evidence of Managerialism in their studies in the sub-sample of 
US takeovers that produced negative gains in shareholder value. 
 
The Hubris hypothesis proposed by Roll (1986) suggests that mergers also occur 
because managers mistakenly over-evaluate target firms. In such cases management 
make decisions with excessive over confidence and pride (i.e. hubris), interpreting 
available factual evidence with their own beliefs and pride leading to judgement errors 
in the valuation of the target. This is different to the universal problem of making a 
valuation with incomplete information due to information asymmetry between the 
bidding and target companies, as it goes further by stressing the role of belief based 
opinions about what might be the situation. Roll argues that the takeover premium can 
be considered to be a random value where the mean is the current market value of the 
firm. Although bidding managers can make errors of over-valuation and under-
valuation, the observed error is typically in the same direction of over-valuation. The 
underestimates of valuation are truncated because they are below the current market 
price of the target company and mergers are not pursued by potential bidding firms’ 
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management. Only the overvaluation cases are observed, when the bids are made 
public. The extreme version of the Hubris hypothesis predicts that there are no 
synergistic gains from takeover bids and the entire premium paid to the target firm is a 
transfer from the bidder. This extreme view assumes strong form market efficiency, 
where the stock market price reflects all future value potential. Therefore any premium 
over the market price must represent a valuation error, as the current market price of its 
shares fully reflects the true value of the target firm. Without taking this extreme view, 
the market price can be considered as an average view of the target’s value by the 
capital market and this allows individual bidder valuations to vary above and below the 
market price, depending on individual unique factors perceived by bidders. Assessment 
of the benefits arising from a merger is the key to the bidder’s accurate valuation of the 
target. Considering the incomplete, uncertain and asymmetrical information available, 
together with time pressures on a small number of Managers preparing these valuations, 
errors of valuation, to some degree, will inevitably be made. If the bidder is not pushed 
to the limit of their valuation by the target’s shareholders refusing to sell their shares at 
a lower price, or competitive bidders pushing up the target’s share price, the valuation 
error may be masked. As pressure rises to pay a greater premium for the target’s shares, 
so does the chance of any valuation error becoming public and observable.  
 
The degree to which a firm’s management are allowed to behave in ways that cannot be 
classed as Synergy seeking is dependant on the nature and role of the shareholders as a 
group, the corporate governance structures implemented by the Board of the company, 
and the market for corporate control. Grossman and Hart (1980) described what they 
termed the “free rider” problem. In companies where the shareholding is fragmented 
amongst many small shareholders, these small shareholders may not be prepared to 
invest in research on their company, and rely on following the actions of larger 
shareholders who do invest in research. They become “free riders” receiving the returns 
identified by the large shareholders but without making a contribution to the cost of 
research. This free rider problem can also be a hindrance to the operation of the market 
for corporate control. Small shareholders may not be willing to sell their shares when an 
acquirer seeks to takeover a company, instead wishing to “free ride” on the value 
created by the acquirer. In addition, there is the risk of not being able to purchase all of 
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the shares from small minority shareholders in a take-over. In some jurisdictions there 
are powerful minority shareholder protection rights, which can result in synergistic 
takeovers not being pursued by bidders. The “free rider” problem can therefore result in 
practical imperfections to the operation of the market in corporate control, and hence 
limit one of the factors controlling managerialist behaviour. 
 
No one theory alone gives a complete explanation of merger motives to be found in the 
total population of mergers. For example, Synergy motivated mergers will only be 
found in part of the merger population with non-negative combined gains5, and 
Managerialism motivated cases in the negative combined gains group. Cases motivated 
by Hubris would be predominately found in the non-positive combined returns group, 
however Hubris can be found in the positive combined gains group coexisting with 
Synergy and reducing the gains made. Figure 2-2 shows how the three theories relate to 
each other. Roll (1986) concluded that the Hubris hypothesis could not alone explain 
the motivation for mergers. Seth and Thomas (1994) concluded all three theories of the 
firm will coexist. In the total population of mergers we would therefore expect to find 
evidence of all three motivational theories coexisting to some degree with each other. 
 
Hubris 
Synergy 
Managerialism 
 
 
Positive 
Combined 
Gains 
Negaitive 
Combined 
Gains 
Synergy 
coexisting with 
Hubris 
 
 
Figure 2-2 Logical relationship between Synergy, Hubris and Managerialism theories. 
                                                 
5
 Combined gains are the summed value (i.e. £ or $) gains (positive or negative) for bidder and target 
companies based on the share prices movements. 
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Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) proposed a methodology for distinguishing between 
the motives when they coexisted in a sample, based on the relationship between target 
and combined gains. They argued that this correlation should be positive if Synergy is 
the motive, negative if Managerialism is the motive and zero if Hubris is the motive. 
They concluded from a sample of US mergers between 1963-1988 that Synergy was the 
primary motive in the group of mergers with positive combined gains and coexisted 
with Hubris. In the negative combined gains group Managerialism was the primary 
motive.  Later Seth et al. (2000) developed the methodology proposed by Berkovitch 
and Narayanan to examine bidder motives for cross-border mergers. Their conclusions 
were almost identical to those of Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993). Both Seth et al. 
(2000) and Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) developed a series of propositions for 
abnormal gains made by bidder, target and combined firms during the bids based on 
each of the three management theories of the firm. This approach is discussed further in 
Chapter 5 below, Research Analysis Methods and Data, as the propositions for this 
study are developed. 
 
 
2.7 Summary of established knowledge and existing gaps 
The existing literature refers to research in all of the key interest areas. The literature in 
some areas is more extensive than in others and the position is summarised below in 
each of these areas. The research question “What effect does the regulation of mergers 
by the competition authorities in the UK have on shareholder value and managers’ 
motivations for undertaking mergers?” limits the area of interest. Much of the 
knowledge contained in the existing literature is peripheral to the research question. 
However, while much of the existing literature does not address the research question, it 
does set the subject area in context and provides much of the theoretical and empirical 
underpinning for the research in this thesis. In areas where the existing literature does 
not provide any knowledge to answer the research question directly, we have gaps in the 
existing knowledge which research in this thesis will help to fill. This review also 
identifies other gaps in the knowledge in peripheral areas, which this thesis will not 
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attempt to address directly. Overviews of the existing literature in the key areas of 
interest are now discussed below with referencing to the key literature. 
 
2.7.1 Merger performance 
2.7.1.1 Summary of knowledge 
Existing literature relating to the general performance of mergers is in broad agreement 
and finds that, based on shareholder value, while target company shareholders on 
average receive significant gains, on average bidding and acquiring company 
shareholders suffer losses in value. When profitability and operational performance are 
used as metrics the story is very similar, with acquiring companies suffering reduced 
profitability in the years following the merger. Sudarsanam (2003, ch 4, pp 63-94) 
reviews performance studies. 
 
Research to investigate the relationship between financial aspects of a deal and merger 
success has identified several important relationships: - 
 Hostile bids are more successful than friendly bids (see Sudarsanam and 
Mahate, 2006). 
 Deals paid for in cash are more successful than those involving an exchange of 
target company shares for acquiring company shares (for example, see 
Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2003). 
 The larger the percentage premium paid for the target company the worse the 
subsequent returns for the acquiring company (see Sirower, 1997). 
 Larger premiums are paid in contested deals than in non-contested deals (see 
Sirower, 1997). 
While the above broad findings have strong supporting evidence there is less clarity 
when merger success is assessed using multiple metrics. Performance results differ 
depending on which metric is used. Each metric on its own produces aggregated results 
that broadly agree with the other metrics, but there is less agreement between metrics on 
individual cases (see Schoenberg, 2006). 
 
The Strategic Management literature investigates relationships between strategic options 
and merger success. Most interest centres on the search for evidence of whether mergers 
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between companies that are strategically related are more successful than to mergers of 
non-strategically related companies. While there are strong logical arguments for the 
relatedness hypothesis the empirical evidence is inconclusive (for example, see Rumelt, 
1974; 1982; Bettis, 1981; Christensen and Montgomery, 1981; Montgomery, 1982; 
Palich et al., 2000). 
 
2.7.1.2 Gaps in the knowledge 
This is a well-researched area, mainly because it is central to both the financial 
economics and strategic management disciplines. Understanding of merger performance 
in general and the strategic and financial factors influencing outcomes is well 
documented, as are the effects of post merger integration activity. However there 
remains some doubt about the agreement of assessments of merger success when using 
more than one metric.  
 
2.7.2 Market behaviour and event studies 
2.7.2.1 Summary of knowledge 
Market behaviour appears to be sufficiently rational for the Efficient Market Hypothesis 
to have strong evidence to support at least the weak and semi-strong forms. However 
irrational market behaviour is present and behavioural finance models are being 
developed to gain a better understanding of some market phenomenon, which cannot be 
explained on the basis of rational investor behaviour alone. The EMH is an important 
assumption in event studies and the measurement of abnormal market returns. 
 
Discussions about econometric issues in event studies have yielded the following major 
conclusions: - 
 The use of share price data, which typically has a non-normal statistical 
distribution, particularly when the shares are thinly traded, contravenes some 
key assumptions for using linear regression. However tests using simulation 
models have shown the conventional linear regression model and test statistics 
are well specified, and more complex adjustments or techniques do not produce 
greater statistical power (see Brown and Warner, 1985). 
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 The effect of contemporaneous correlation between residuals can be corrected 
for in the standard error calculation (see Salinger, 1992). 
 
Discussion on event study methodology has been less but can be summarised in the 
following key points (see McWilliams and Siegel, 1997): - 
 Careful choice and justification of the event window is important.  
 Short run announcement returns are less problematic than long run returns.  
 Use of wide event windows in the order of years for long run returns leads to 
low statistical power for the test results.  
 The careful control of confounding events is also important to ensure that 
returns relate only to particular merger announcements, and this can also 
influence the statistical power of long run returns calculated using wide event 
windows. 
 
2.7.2.2 Gaps in the knowledge 
While the existing literature has examined the evidence for the EMH in the weak, semi-
strong and strong forms, and it has extensively developed behavioural finance, there 
seems to be no reference to how various competition regulatory processes might 
influence market efficiency. This is somewhat surprising since regulatory intervention 
may affect investor sentiment and in turn affect the efficiency of the capital market in 
specific cases. 
 
2.7.3 Merger regulation 
2.7.3.1 Summary of knowledge 
The existing literature is largely concerned with whether merger controls are 
economically beneficial, mainly regarding cases that were prohibited. Tests based on 
the movement of competitor share prices at the time of merger and regulatory 
announcements have been examined (see Eckbo, 1983; Stillman, 1983) to identify if the 
merger was judged to be anticompetitive by the capital market. While there is some 
evidence that not all prohibited mergers were judged by the capital market to be 
anticompetitive, there is some doubt about the validity of some of the tests. The 
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announcement of a merger bid may signal that a company is “in play” and even if the 
initial bid fails other suitors may be expected to follow (see Fridolfsson and Stennek, 
2000).  
 
A further research theme has been to look at the shareholder value impact of regulatory 
announcements. The existing literature suggests that alongside the costs to shareholders 
of firms defending anti-trust inquiries, in terms of professional fees and management 
resources, costs may be imposed on shareholders by the uncertainty of regulatory 
outcomes. Wier (1983), Franks and Harris (1993) and Forbes (1994) all observed a cost 
to shareholders of companies going through either the US and UK competition 
regulation processes. This cost arose from abnormal losses incurred on merger decision 
announcements, and in particular shareholders of target companies suffered a significant 
loss when an acquisition was prevented by the regulatory authorities.  
 
2.7.3.2 Gaps in the knowledge 
The existing literature examines shareholder value changes in merger cases from the 
1960’s to the 1980’s. No work has been done since to evaluate if any changes have 
taken place either in the US or UK and whether the earlier results are confirmed or not 
using more recent stock market data. Also, since the 1980’s the UK has gone through a 
period of privatisation of previously nationalised monopolies and has set up dual 
regulatory structures for these industries involving an industry regulator working along 
side the competition regulator. There is an absence of any studies examining if these 
changes to the regulatory structure have coincided with shareholder value effects.  
 
2.7.4 Theories of the firm and merger motivation 
2.7.4.1 Summary of knowledge 
Research on what motivates managers to pursue mergers has attempted to find 
explanations of why such large proportion of mergers are pursued that do not produce 
gains for the acquirer. Three theories of the firm are central to this discussion: -  
 Synergy seeking by managers explains positive returns for acquirers (see 
Penrose, 1959). 
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 Managerialism explains value loss for acquirers (see Jensen and Meckling, 
1976).  
 Hubris explains value loss and value reduction in positive gains for acquirers 
(see Roll, 1986). 
 
Most work on establishing links with poor merger performance focuses on elements of 
Managerialist behaviour drawing on agency theory. Managers, although agents of 
shareholders, may attempt to maximise their own benefits while providing just enough 
profit for shareholders to avoid a challenge, rather than maximising shareholder value. 
 
Evidence of Managerialist behaviour, for example by seeking increased firm size rather 
than greater shareholder value, is most apparent when corporate governance factors 
allow Managers high-levels of power without effective accountability to shareholders.  
Reviewing the research evidence shows the governance factors most likely to allow 
Managerialism are when: - 
 Management have a low level of ownership (for example, see Wright et al., 
2002).  
 Ownership is fragmented by large numbers of small shareholders (for example, 
see Wright et al., 2002).  
 External non-executive board membership is low (see Wright et al., 2002; 
Grinstein and Hribar, 2004; Desai et al., 2005). 
 The CEO has a combined role as chairman (see Grinstein and Hribar, 2004).  
 The CEO sits on the board appointments committee (see Grinstein and Hribar, 
2004).   
 
Managerialism is not allowed to flourish in all companies.  However, value creation can 
still be reduced or value destroyed when management motivation shows Hubris.  In this 
case management have the intent to create shareholder value but overconfident 
behaviour on their part leads to overvaluation and over-payment for the target company. 
A methodology, based on market reaction to merger announcements, has been 
developed to test for the presence of Synergy seeking, Managerialist, or Hubris 
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motivations. Studies in the US (see Berkovitch and Narayanan, 1993; Seth et al., 2000) 
have shown the presence of all three motivations in groups of mergers. 
 
2.7.4.2 Gaps in the knowledge 
The earlier research, by Berkovitch and Narayanan, and Seth et al (BNS), identifying 
managerial motives from stock market responses, has been limited to US merger cases 
only, and the methodology has not been used in any UK studies. With some differences 
between the US and UK approaches to corporate governance, investigation of the US 
findings in the context of the UK would seem important, though there is no evidence of 
such studies. This is particularly important since much of the broader work on 
motivation assumes Managerialist behaviour, rather than Hubris, particularly with 
regard to senior managers. While two earlier US studies found evidence of 
Managerialism, does this also apply to UK management behaviour? 
 
The research methodology used by BNS has not been used to test for different 
perceived motivations associated with decisions of the merger regulation process in 
either the UK or US. Is there any evidence of different motivations or motivational 
mixes associated with mergers allowed by the competition authorities compared to 
those prohibited? 
 
2.8 Conclusions 
The existing literature on mergers in the Financial Economics, Strategic Management 
and Industrial Organisation disciplines is extensive and wide ranging. This literature 
review has covered the main research themes. We now need to draw conclusions about 
the extent to which the existing literature addresses the original research question: - 
 
"What affect does the regulation of mergers by the competition authorities in the 
UK have on shareholder value and managers’ motivations for undertaking 
mergers?" 
 
Considering the shareholder value aspect of the question, research by Wier in the US 
and Frank and Harris, and Forbes in the UK looked particularly at the value impact of 
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regulatory decisions. This work covered mergers from the mid 1960s to around 1990. 
Since that time there have been changes in the UK to: - 
 Stock market rules for making information available to the public more 
promptly and consistently, 
 Corporate Governance rules have developed,  
 In the UK following privatisation of the previously nationalised industries, 
sector specific industry regulatory regimes have been introduced working in 
tandem with the competition regulator in reviewing mergers.  
It would seem that it is now worth examining the shareholder value aspects of merger 
decisions to see if the empirical findings of the earlier work are still applicable, or if the 
situation has changed in any way. 
 
Turning to managers’ motivations for mergers, the existing literature discusses how 
motivations associated with the Synergy seeking hypothesis lead to shareholder value 
creation. Most of the work examining motivation and behaviour related to value 
destruction is focused on the Managerialism hypothesis. Relationships have been found 
between value destruction and governance factors that may suggest Managerialist 
behaviour does take place in companies. Many of these factors are concerned with how 
the CEO relates to the Board and shareholders. 
 
By contrast there has been little research to investigate the role played by Hubris in 
reducing value creation or causing value destruction in mergers. Two studies, both 
covering US mergers, found evidence in stock market perceptions of both Hubris and 
Managerialism being present in value destroying mergers. Research using the 
methodology of these two studies has not been carried out for any UK merger cases, 
and those US cases examined were all completed mergers. There have been no research 
studies using this methodology to examining motives, as perceived by the capital 
market, for merger deals related to the decisions of the competition regulatory process. 
 
Comparing the existing literature to the research question shows gaps in knowledge. In 
terms of the shareholder value effects, the existing research covered cases 15 to 30 years 
ago, and there is a case for examining more recent mergers, especially given changes in 
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the UK industrial and regulatory environment. In the case of Managers’ motivation 
there is a knowledge gap in terms of using the methodology of BNS to examine the 
motivations for UK mergers and the outcome of the regulatory decision process. 
Research covering the gaps in this area would complement the existing literature 
establishing the reasons for value loss in mergers. It would also complement 
understanding of the wider aspects of competition regulation policy, beyond the 
immediate direct effects to competition and social welfare. 
 
In the next chapter we examine the background to merger economics, the process of 
merger deals, and the competition regulation process in the UK, before going on in a 
later chapter to look at the research methodology used in this thesis. 
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3 Mergers and their Regulation in the UK. 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores the broader commercial, economic and regulatory environment in 
which mergers take place in the UK. It first discusses the commercial and business 
reasons that lie behind the pursuit of mergers by firms’ managers, looking at reasons 
and conditions that make some mergers unacceptable for economic and political 
reasons. Some mergers have a strong potential to reduce competition and it may not be 
possible later to unwind their effects if they are allowed to proceed. In order to maintain 
a competitive economic environment, significant government effort has been invested 
over several decades in developing a statutory framework to regulate competition and 
foster fair trade. The chapter looks at the timeline of the introduction of these statutes 
and summarises the effect they have on merger regulation in particular. 
 
The role of the key statutory competition authorities and their relationship with other 
industry specific regulators is explored. This important aspect of merger regulation 
developed during the 1980s and 1990s as privatization of previously nationalised 
industries was driven by the Thatcher and Major Conservative governments from 1979 
to 1997.  
 
Finally the chapter looks at the working of the regulatory process through which 
mergers are regulated in the UK over the research study period. It discusses how a 
merger is screened by the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) and referred for investigation if 
it is suspected of having adverse competition effects. The chapter considers the role of 
the Monopolies and Mergers Commission, latterly the Competition Commission, 
(MMC/CC) in relation to undertaking an inquiry, arriving at a decision on the merger’s 
effects and the form in which it should be allowed, if at all. The scale of the 
investigations by the OFT and MMC/CC are reviewed in relation to all mergers 
completed in the UK over the research study period, from 1989 to 2002. 
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3.2 Business Drivers Leading to Mergers 
Mergers are one of a range of strategic options that managers and the Board of a 
company may pursue. By combining assets of two previously separate and independent 
companies, the new combined entity can be argued to bring future strategic advantages 
to the acquiring company. The resulting benefits and synergies may include: - 
 Increased scale of operations 
 Improved financing options 
 Access to new markets 
 Increased or strengthened product range 
 Acquisition of key or critical fixed assets 
 Acquisition of key or critical intangible assets including intellectual property, 
tacit knowledge and “know-how” 
 Improved management resulting from the “shake up” and subsequent 
reorganisations. 
These benefits and synergies can allow economic value to be created, often by enabling 
significant operational cost savings to be made across the combined operation that were 
not possible when the two separate companies operated independently. 
 
A merger can also combine the customer bases of the two merging companies that 
previously competed. If the merging companies are large and/or have a large share of 
the market this can reduce competitive pressure in the industry. While this appears to be 
a synergistic benefit for the acquirer, the resultant reduction of competition, possibly 
leading to increased prices or reduced service quality, may become a political and 
economic problem for society and the Government. For this reason this particular 
“benefit” has not been added to the list of benefits and synergies above, but we will 
return to this issue several times in this chapter, as it lies at the core of the reason for 
regulation of mergers in the UK. 
 
The benefits and synergies available from merging can increase the value of the new 
combined entity to exceed the sum of the values of the individual assets merged to form 
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the new combined entity. Such a merger creates value for the shareholders. However 
there are costs to such a merger. In addition to the administrative costs and fees paid to 
legal, banking and other professionals for their advice and work, there is the premium 
paid by the acquirer to the shareholders of the target company to convince them to sell 
their holding of shares in the target company. If the additional value created by the 
merger is greater then the costs, fees and premium paid, the remaining value will be 
reflected in the value of the acquiring company. Conversely, if costs exceed the increase 
in value of the combined entity, the resultant loss of value will be reflected in the value 
of the acquiring company. 
 
When a company is listed on a stock exchange and its shares traded on the capital 
market, the market delivers a revaluation of a company very quickly after a value-
changing event is publicly announced. This is referred to as market efficiency, and the 
semi strong form of the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) states that the market price 
quickly and fully reflects the value of all publicly available information. The literature 
on this concept was discussed in Chapter 2 section 2.4 in detail. In practice market 
efficiency means the market will respond to news of a merger taking full account of all 
the public information about the companies involved and revaluing them following the 
announcement. Of course, the capital market may not agree with the view taken by the 
bidding company in their public announcement of the merger, but the market will 
quickly settle on new share prices for the companies involved, and any others in the 
market that may be affected by the merger announcement, such as competitors for 
example.  
 
From this brief description of the economics of a merger, it can be seen that the 
acquirers’ management needs to decide how much value can be created by merging 
assets, and hence how much the acquirer can afford to pay for the target, before the 
merger bid can be made. When the bid is made the capital market quickly responds by 
revaluing the companies, based on the market’s perception and view of the merger bid. 
It is only over time, usually between one and three years after the merger deal is 
completed when the assets have been integrated, that we will know if the merger 
actually delivered the promised benefits and synergies for the acquirer.  
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However, in that intervening period after the merger bid, it is usual for many other 
events to have taken place that affect the acquiring company. These could be in politics, 
the economy, changes in social trends, technological developments, changes to industry 
structure, changes to company strategy and the market place. All of these events may 
have a value impact on the acquiring company. This makes it a complex and difficult 
task to evaluate the contribution of a specific merger to the economic success or failure 
of the acquiring company some years after the original merger took place.  
 
In summary, managers and boards of companies embark on mergers, usually 
proclaiming they are for strategic reasons. They commit to a course of action in the 
hope of creating a future strategic advantage, but which produces an immediate gain or 
loss of shareholder value if the company is listed on a public stock exchange. We saw in 
Chapter 2 the chances of success in a merger based on economic criteria are not 
outstanding, and we will only know if the merger really delivered the promised benefits 
some years after the deal was completed. However, in spite of the operational benefits 
of a merger deal only being realised well into the future, shareholder value changes can 
flow in anticipation almost immediately from the deal announcement. This makes 
mergers a very quick way of changing a company’s prospects and value, making 
mergers attractive to shareholders, particularly of target companies, if the right deal is 
on offer.  
 
3.2.1 Merger Types 
Companies might undertake different types of mergers to obtain particular benefits and 
synergies from their operations. These types are commonly classified as follows: - 
 Vertical mergers combine companies where the target company becomes part 
of a process or operational chain of the acquiring company. It is common for 
vertical mergers to consolidate a supply chain for an acquirer, and can bring 
benefits of supply chain security, as well as other possible cost savings from 
rationalisation of operations. A fuller description of vertical mergers can be 
found in Sudarsanam (2003) Chapter 7. 
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 Horizontal mergers are based on expanding the acquiring company’s access to 
customers in a market, and often involve the merging of direct competitors. 
While these mergers can be shown to produce significant synergies, they give 
rise to concern about the degree to which competition is reduced. Horizontal 
mergers in an industry with a low degree of consolidation can improve 
efficiency without reducing competition, because a large number of companies 
are still able to compete in the industry after the merger. However where 
industries have undergone a significant degree of consolidation already, leaving 
a small number of players, there is a greater danger of unrestricted horizontal 
mergers leading to a monopoly in that industry. For this reason, under certain 
conditions horizontal mergers may attract the attention of the competition 
regulator and be modified or prohibited. A fuller description of horizontal 
mergers and consolidation in fragmented industries can be found in Sudarsanam 
(2003) Chapter 5 and 6. 
 Conglomerate mergers are based on bringing companies in unrelated fields 
under the control of the acquiring company. The companies in such a merger 
usually have little to connect them in the operational sense. The combined 
company is commonly structured on a subsidiary basis with subsidiaries having 
significant degrees of operational autonomy and being held accountable in the 
group on a broad financial basis. Benefits and synergies from such mergers are 
mainly confined to obtaining financial advantages with little scope for 
operational cost savings unless the previous management had been profligate. 
Conglomerate mergers have become less fashionable, and because of the 
difficulty in extracting benefits and synergies from the merger, have been 
discredited for their ability to deliver increased shareholder value. A fuller 
description of conglomerate mergers can be found in Sudarsanam (2003) 
Chapter 8. 
 Cross border mergers are often used by companies to gain access to a new 
geographic market. The act of merging with an existing company in a foreign 
country allows the acquirer’s existing products to be introduced relatively 
quickly into the new market territory. In addition, in a reciprocal sense, it allows 
any products of the target company to be introduced into the acquiring 
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company’s long-established markets. Cross border mergers can open access to 
foreign markets much more quickly and with lower risk of failure than a 
company could achieve by starting a new company in a foreign country and 
growing it organically. Cross border mergers can also open access to new 
sources of supply and services. Interestingly these mergers can fall under the 
competition regulations of more than one country and the regulatory issues can 
be complex. A fuller description of cross border mergers can be found in 
Sudarsanam (2003) Chapter 9. 
 
3.2.2 Concerns about Mergers Reducing Competition 
The drive for companies to carry out mergers is very large. The number of mergers 
continues to grow year-on-year and shows no signs of reducing in the future. If mergers 
were allowed to take place without regulatory control or restriction the consolidation 
process within industries could potentially reach an end point only when an industry 
monopoly position had been reached and all of the smaller competitors have been 
eliminated. This concern could potentially leave the UK without effective competition 
in industries and this underlies policy on UK merger regulation by the competition 
authorities. 
 
While the desire to carry out mergers seems to be insatiable in order to satisfy corporate 
growth and improved financial performance, there are also dangers. If mergers were to 
be allowed to progress without any constraint or regulation it would be extremely 
difficult or even impossible to unwind the combinations later to restore competition. 
Permanent irreversible changes would occur to the national economy. There is a need to 
find a compromise position where mergers are allowed to proceed freely in a 
competitive economy without allowing a point to be reached where effective 
competition becomes substantially reduced by the formation of large companies that 
dominate the market place. 
 
While UK national and EU European merger regulation exists, we do not have an 
international means of regulating the merger activity of multinationals on a global basis. 
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The only control involves each national (or in the case of the EU, regional) regulator, 
but since these regulators work within different national policy structures and regimes, 
the control of competition involving large multinationals operating across national 
borders can be extremely complex and difficult to achieve. 
 
We now look at how the UK merger regulation system has developed to deal with 
concerns about the potential reductions to competition that can be brought about by 
some mergers. 
 
3.3 Development of UK Competition Policy and the Merger 
Regulatory Regime 
This section serves to highlight the key development milestones of UK competition 
policy. Control and regulation of mergers forms part of overall UK competition policy, 
and relevant legislation for the control of mergers occurs in UK Acts of Parliament.  
The section is a very short outline of the subject, mainly presenting the timeline of the 
key legislation involved. A fuller description has been provided by Wilks (1999), which 
comprehensively covers the development of UK competition policy and the Monopolies 
and Mergers Commission. Shorter outlines of this area have also been provided by 
Sudarsanam (2003, see Chapter 17) and Motta  (2004, see Chapter 1, pp11-13). 
 
The earliest effective attempts at regulation of mergers occurred in the USA in 1890 
with the passing of the Sherman Antitrust Act6. It was introduced to help control the 
wave of consolidation taking place in US industry and made it illegal to restrain trade or 
form a monopoly. In 1914 the US Congress passed the Clayton Act, strengthening US 
competition legislation by prohibiting specific business moves that substantially 
lessened competition. Legislation in the UK followed some time later. The earliest UK 
statute aimed at controlling competition issues was the Profiteering Act 1919, to help 
control prices in the recovery period following World War I. However, the main 
                                                 
6
 There was earlier competition regulation in Mexico and Canada, but in neither case was the legislation 
enforced. 
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development of UK competition policy did not begin until 1948, after World War II, 
and development to that policy has continued to the present day. 
 
3.3.1 Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Act 1948 
The first legislation in the UK to deal with concerns around monopolies and the 
reduction of competition was the 1948 Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Act. This 
provided the original framework for setting up the Monopolies Commission (MC) and 
introduced the “public interest” test for assessing monopolies. At this time the UK 
economy was characterised industrially by having a series of nationalised industries, 
effectively state owned monopolies, with strong levels of unionised labour and  private 
sector industrial consolidation, resulting from the depression of the 1930s and wartime 
planning. At that time the rationale for creating monopoly control was to help ensure 
full employment as part of the post-war recovery package. The Monopolies 
Commission did not have any remit relating to merger control under this legislation.. 
 
3.3.2 Related Legislation between 1948 and 1964 
Competition related Acts between 1948 and 1964 were the: - 
 Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Commission Act 1953 
 Restrictive Trades Practices Act (Goods) 1956 
 Resale Prices Act 1964 
These Acts were aimed at strengthening the MC but still did not cover mergers. These 
Acts were repealed as later legislation was introduced. 
 
3.3.3 1965 to 1969 - Monopolies and Mergers Acts 1965 
This legislation provided powers for the first time for the regulation of mergers and 
established a stronger organisation, the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC), 
to carry out the investigatory role and make recommendations to the Government. Cases 
were referred to the MMC by the Secretary of State, which reported back to him with 
recommendations. The MMC continued to use the “public interest” test introduced by 
the 1948 Act.  
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A further piece of legislation, the Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1968, was introduced 
in this period. Both the 1965 and 1968 Acts were later repealed. 
 
3.3.4 Fair Trading Act 1973 
This Act set up the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) as the UK Competition Regulator and 
defined a new relationship with the MMC. The central structure and approach laid down 
by this Act has endured over three decades. Under the Act the OFT screened cases 
causing concern on behalf of the Secretary of State before referral to the MMC. The 
MMC reported back to the OFT with its recommendation for the Secretary of State. 
 
3.3.5 Competition Legislation from 1976 to 1977 
The following Acts were introduced in this period but they had little effect on merger 
regulation policy. 
 Resale Prices Act 1976 
 Restrictive Trade Practices Acts (Services) 1976 and 1977 
 
3.3.6 Competition Act 1980 
This Act provided clearer definitions of anticompetitive behaviour and powers to 
investigate competitive issues across industries, including for the first time the 
nationalised industries. It did not make changes to the policy or process for the 
regulation of mergers. 
 
3.3.7 Privatisation and Other Industry Specific Legislation 1984 to 
1994 
Privatisation of previously nationalised industries took place under the 1979-90 
Thatcher and 1990-97 Major Conservative Governments. The new privatised industry 
structures were established under separate pieces of legislation and industry specific 
regulators were appointed to encourage competition within the monopoly utility 
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industries (initially in telecoms, gas, water, electricity and the railways). Wherever 
possible the regulators positively discriminated in favour of new entrants to the industry 
to stimulate competition. The main relevant Acts were the: - 
 Telecommunications Act 1984 
 Transport Act 1985 
 Airports Act 1986 
 Financial Services Act 1986 
  Gas Act 1986 
 Companies Act 1989 
 Water Act 1989 
 Electricity Act 1989 
 Broadcasting Act 1990 
 Water Industries Act 1991 
 Railways Act 1993 
 Deregulation and Contracting Out Act 1994 
 
The industry specific regulators’ role was to establish conditions for increased 
competition within their industry. However the legislation also required them to work in 
tandem with the OFT and the MMC, as the overall Competition Regulator, in cases of 
mergers in the industries. The MMC was also required to act in an appeal role in cases 
within a privatised industry where there were disputes between the industry specific 
regulator and companies in their industry relating to their operating licence terms and 
conditions.  
 
Some changes occurred later to the original regulatory structures laid down in these 
Acts. For example the Communications Act 2003 set up a new regulator, the Office of 
Communications (OFCOM), to regulate across all UK communications industries, 
including television, radio, telecommunications and wireless communications services. 
This 2003 Act, which came into force after the end of the study period of this research 
and does not have any impact on this study, combined several of the earlier regulators’ 
roles in the communications industries. Under it OFCOM absorbed five previous 
regulators, namely the Broadcasting Standards Commission, the Independent Television 
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Commission, Office of Telecommunications (OFTEL), the Radio Authority and the 
Radiocommunications Agency, bringing about a considerable rationalisation of the 
regulatory structures.  
 
3.3.8 Competition Act 1998 
The Competition Act 1998 introduced changes to align UK competition regulation with 
EU competition legislation (Articles 81 and 82) and introduced some changes to the UK 
merger regulatory regime. The OFT gained increased roles and powers, and the 1998 
Act allowed the OFT to search premises and seize documents in order to improve its 
powers to gain evidence in investigating competition law infringements. It also gained 
the power to impose fines. 
 
The 1998 Act reformed the MMC into a new body, the Competition Commission (CC), 
though its investigative role remained largely unchanged from that of the previous 
MMC. The CC still needed cases to be referred to it from OFT, had an investigatory 
role and made recommendations. The “public interest” test was still used by the CC as 
its basis for deciding if mergers were anti-competitive. 
 
3.3.9 Enterprise Act 2002 
This Act, mainly dealing with changes to Bankruptcy Law, also introduced important 
changes to the responsibilities of the OFT and the CC. The Act gave the OFT the power 
to make referrals directly to the CC and the CC’s decisions in most cases became 
determinative, rather than recommendations to the Minister or Secretary of State, 
removing political influence from merger decisions. In addition the 2002 Act changed 
the “public interest” test used by the CC as the basis of its judgements of competition 
and mergers to the more specific test of a “substantial lessening of competition”.  
 
The period covered by this research ends with the introduction of the 2002 Act in June 
2003, and does not include any cases processed under this 2002 Act.  
 
64 
3.4 The Roles of Office of Fair Trading (OFT), the Monopolies 
and Mergers Commission (MMC) and the Competition 
Commission (CC) 
Section 3.3 above highlighted how the legislative framework developed over about six 
decades to encourage competition in the UK economy. Not all of that period is relevant 
to the research in this thesis and this section outlines the roles and relationships between 
the key players in the regulation of mergers over the shorter period from 1969 to 2003. 
This period covers the existence of the MMC/CC as the investigatory body for 
competition matters from just after its creation by the 1965 Act to the Enterprise Act 
2002. During this time the principles for selecting merger cases qualifying for 
examination and possibly inquiry remained the same in terms of market share or value 
of assets (although the value of assets test was raised to reflect inflation). The “public 
interest” test used by the MMC/CC for judging competition issues also did not change. 
The first part of this period, from 1969 to 1990, was covered by earlier UK researchers 
(see Franks and Harris, 1993; Forbes, 1994),  while the second part of this period, from 
1989 to 2002, is covered by the research in this thesis. The aim of this section of the 
chapter is to summarise the roles of the key regulatory players, highlighting changes for 
each key player over the period from 1989 to 2003. 
 
Essentially the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) and the Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission (MMC), and latterly the Competition Commission (CC), are quite separate 
organisations, though they work closely together, and have evolved to regulate 
competition and mergers in the UK. We now look at the role of each organisation with 
particular attention to mergers, and how they interact. 
 
3.4.1 The Office of Fair Trading 
The Office of Fair Trading is the UK statutory body established under the Fair Trading 
Act 1974, and is part of the Department of Trade and Industry. It began life as a 
Government Department giving support to the Secretary of State, who retained most of 
the legal powers. Its role has evolved to become the designated UK Competition 
Regulator and it has the statutory responsibility to ensure competition, fair trade and 
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consumer protection Acts are enforced. The OFT monitors market and trading 
situations, deals with consumer complaints and if cases over the study period had 
serious causes for concern about their effects on fair-trading and competition, the 
Director General of the OFT could recommend to the Secretary of State the that case be 
referred to the MMC/CC for an inquiry to take place.  
 
With specific regard to mergers during the study period of this research, the OFT 
screened all qualifying mergers to identify cases giving rise to concern on competition 
grounds. The qualifying limits since 1973 have been: - 
 The companies combined have greater than a 25% share of supply, OR, 
 The value of the combined assets exceeds £X. 
The value of £X was revised over the period and was raised from £5m to £15m in 1980; 
to £30m in 1984: to £70m in 1994. Qualifying mergers, exceeding these thresholds, are 
then examined to see if they raise any competition concerns. Those raising concerns are 
recommended to the Secretary of State for referral to the MMC/CC. 
 
3.4.2 The Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC). 
The MMC was established by the Monopolies and Mergers Act 1965. Its primary 
purpose of being an investigative agency remained unchanged over the period to the 
enactment of the Competition Act 1998, when its role transferred to a new body, the 
Competition Commission (CC), on 1st April 1999.  
 
The MMC did not have powers to investigate without a prior reference from a statutory 
body. Cases were referred to it initially directly by the Secretary of State, but later 
acting on the advice of the OFT after its formation by the Fair Trading Act 1974. As 
nationalised industries were privatised its role developed to work in tandem with the 
industry specific regulators, in a system of dual regulation. Under this dual regulatory 
system, the industry specific regulator was solely responsible for stimulating 
competition in the industry, but worked with the OFT on matters of mergers and 
licensing conditions affecting competition that fell under the control of OFT. The MMC 
investigated the overall economic suitability of mergers for the UK and also acted as an 
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appeals body for disputes in the privatised industries on licensing conditions falling 
under the control of the specific industry privatisation Acts. The Secretary of State 
could make referrals to the MMC directly on wider matters than competition, where 
there were concerns on public interest grounds, although normally referrals were made 
only or largely for reasons of competition. 
 
3.4.3 Competition Commission (CC) 
The Competition Commission (CC) was created by the Competition Act 1998 and it 
succeeded the MMC on 1st April 1999. Its role relating to mergers continued from that 
carried on by the MMC under the various statutes after 1965, and its role remained 
investigative. The CC continued to follow the same approach to mergers introduced in 
the FTA 1974, carrying out inquiries into referred cases under the “public interest test” 
and making recommendations to the Minister of State. The Minister could accept, 
modify or reject the Commission’s recommendations.  
 
The Enterprise Act 2002 removed decisions made on competition matters from elected 
politicians and transferred the responsibility to the OFT. Decisions of the CC became 
determinative, no longer simply recommendations to Ministers that could be accepted 
or ignored at Ministerial discretion7. Decisions under the 2002 Act are enforced by the 
OFT.  
 
3.5 The UK Merger Regulatory Process, its Possible Outcomes 
and Interactions with the Capital Market. 
In order to understand the complete regulatory process as applied to a merger, we will 
consider a hypothetical merger of two public companies quoted on a stock market and 
describe what happens at each step in the merger process. We will start this description 
at the conceptual bid preparation stage, progress through the bid announcement, the 
consideration by the OFT and, assuming it is referred to the CC, through the CC inquiry 
stage and decision announcement and finally to close of the bid, or termination if the 
                                                 
7
 Effectively under the 1974 FTA the Minister could accept or reject an adverse finding by the MMC, 
although not a finding that the merger should be permitted. 
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merger is prohibited. In order to keep the description concise and yet include all of the 
regulatory process, this hypothetical bid will be assumed to be non-competitive and be 
recommended for shareholder acceptance by the target company managers. 
 
At each stage we will look at the activities of the managers in the bidding and target 
firms and also at the regulatory activities accompanying the corporate merger activities. 
We will look at the key phases of a merger deal from conception to deal close and then 
examine the interaction with the capital market. 
 
3.5.1 Merger bid preparation  
Key senior individuals in the bidding company management team will be examining 
and comparing possible acquisition targets for strategic suitability and gathering and 
analysing data on possible targets. After one or more targets have been identified as 
suitable, professionals providing financial and legal support would be engaged and 
briefed to begin preparation of prospective bids in detail relating to the legal position 
and possible methods of providing finance for the deals. 
 
It is also during this stage that the first thoughts about the regulatory process are likely 
to be considered by the bidding management team. They may proceed based on their 
own knowledge of the regulatory position, or they may consult a professional adviser 
for an opinion on the likely regulatory outcome, possible issues or concerns, and 
recommendations on how best to approach the situation. It is also possible for the bidder 
management or their lawyers to make a confidential approach to the OFT seeking 
“confidential guidance”. This is usually done after the bidding company has made a 
confidential approach to the target company. However there is scope for 
misunderstanding and misinterpretation of “confidential guidance” from the OFT. This 
can lead to problems if a bidder acts on what they believe to be the advice from OFT 
and find the case is later referred to the MMC/CC. The OFT gives “confidential 
guidance” and they fully support consultation to allow bidders to prepare their bids as 
accurately as possible. However, the OFT is cautious to avoid any possible conflict 
between their guidance given confidentially and any future decisions. This can place the 
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OFT in a difficult position in some cases which are finely balanced on the competition 
issues. Wilks (1999, pp 224 & 228) expands on the subject of confidential guidance in 
more depth. 
 
Once the regulatory position has been understood the bidder management can decide to 
either proceed with the bid, letting the OFT make their waive through or refer decision, 
or take action to resolve any anticipated regulatory issues. It may not be possible to 
actually resolve issues prior to the bid announcement because of commercial 
confidentiality or timescale considerations, but it is possible to negotiate a remedy with 
the OFT in lieu of a referral to the CC. This may be a more suitable approach and allow 
the merger to be completed more quickly. 
 
Once the bidder management have a reasonably sound view of the proposed deal a 
confidential approach is made to the target company at a senior level, usually Chairman 
or CEO. The bidder would inform the target company senior manager of their interest 
and the amount they would be prepared to pay. The target company senior managers 
would take the offer to a target company Board meeting where the offer and the 
response would be decided. It is customary for some haggling to take place around 
details of the deal, the target Board trying to gain the best terms for shareholders and 
possibly for senior managers of the target company. Once the terms have been agreed in 
principle, the target company would usually obtain an independent professional opinion 
on the appropriateness and suitability of the offer before making a recommendation to 
the target company shareholders. For the sake of simplicity, in describing the process 
we will assume the target company agrees to recommend acceptance to their 
shareholders. The deal is then ready for announcement. The rate of progress at this stage 
can be extremely fast and the Stock Exchange rules will dictate that public 
announcements must be made quickly when a company becomes aware of a situation 
that may influence the market price of its stock. 
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3.5.2 Bid announcement and consideration by the OFT for referral 
As soon as the bidder and target senior managers agree that they intend to proceed with 
the deal both public companies need to make a public announcement to the markets. At 
this point the deal not only comes to the attention of investors but also to the attention of 
competitors, the media and the OFT. Notification of the merger to the OFT normally 
takes place on a voluntary basis, and there is no formal requirement to notify the OFT of 
the intended merger. The OFT may receive a complaint from the industry, a competitor, 
customer supplier or other interested party. Once aware of the merger they begin 
collecting information and screening the merger for any concerns about competition, or 
prior to the Enterprise Act 2002, any other relevant matters of public interest. 
 
At this stage competing bids may be made for the target company or other possible 
complications may arise, so the OFT may also need to screen other merger 
combinations based on more than one bidder competing for the target. If the target 
company Board does not believe the offer is sufficient, they can instruct their bankers to 
investigate if there are any other parties that may have an interest. If other interested 
parties are found an auction can result, potentially producing a greater value for the 
target company shareholders.  
 
Another possible complication can result if the target company management rejects the 
offer from the bidder, while the bidder feels the offer is capable and sufficient to 
convince shareholders to sell their shares in the target company. The bidder may then 
decide to make a so-called “hostile bid”, appealing directly to the shareholders of the 
target without seeking agreement from the target company management. Such a hostile 
bid can result in a battle between the target company management and the bidder to 
frustrate the takeover bid and try avoid it being completed. This may result in the bid 
becoming a long acrimonious struggle with many twists and turns by the protagonists.  
 
The OFT collects information about the proposed merger and asks interested parties for 
their comments. If the merger falls within the definition of a qualifying case and the 
OFT considers that the merger appears to have adverse effects under the public interest 
test (now the “substantial lessening of competition” test), the case would be 
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recommended to the Secretary of State for referral to the MMC/CC for an inquiry to be 
held. A public announcement of the Secretary of State’s decision would follow. The 
OFT could also recommend acceptance of any suitable remedies offered by the bidder 
as an alternative to referral. However, the final decision remained that of the Secretary 
of State up to 2003 when the Enterprise Act 2002 came into force. Now the CCs 
decisions are usually determinative and referrals are normally made by the OFT (or the 
dedicated industry regulator for “privatised industries”) rather than the Secretary of 
State. 
 
The end of this phase is marked by either being waived through, or a referral to the 
MMC/CC for an inquiry to be carried out. If the deal is waived through it can proceed 
to completion without risk of further regulatory intervention. However if the deal is 
referred any further commercial progress is halted until the findings and decision of the 
MMC/CC inquiry.   
 
3.5.3 MMC/CC Inquiry and decision announcement 
A MMC/CC inquiry is a tribunal arranged specifically to investigate the referred case 
and its inquiries can range beyond those concerns identified by the OFT at the screening 
stage prior to referral. Central to the MMC/CC process, in its merger investigation role, 
is the case-by-case nature of the inquiry. Each inquiry is treated on its individual merits 
and has a nominated group of Commissioners and a Chairman who are independent of 
the merging firms, have wide experience and also a good knowledge of the industry 
involved. The diagrammatic outline of the process followed by the MMC/CC is shown 
in Figure 3-1. 
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Figure 3-1.  Flow chart of the UK merger referral and inquiry process showing main 
decision events. 
 
The Inquiry collects evidence from many sources and interested parties before coming 
to a decision. The MMC/CC sets about collecting the initial economic data about the 
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case. From this it forms its view of the issues and concerns. Since 2000 these have been 
announced publicly in a Statement of Issues document. The inquiry will hold hearings, 
taking oral and written submissions of evidence from the parties to the merger, 
competitors, customers, suppliers and any other interested parties who may be affected 
by the merge. The Commissioners (known as “Members”) will ask particular questions 
of the interested parties to clarify key aspects of the issues under investigation. They 
may also make site visits when appropriate to help understand the background and 
specific issues of the case.  
 
 
When all of the hearings have been completed and evidence has been collected, it is 
examined against the public interest test. The Members decide if there is evidence of 
adverse effects, and if so can they be neutralised by applying remedies, although prior to 
2002 remedies were a matter for negotiation by the OFT with the company. The 
possible outcomes of this process are shown in Table 3-1.  
 
 
Table 3-1. Possible outcomes following referral of a bid to the MMC/CC. 
 
Decision of the MMC/CC and the type of remedy prescribed Designation 
of the 
outcome  
The bid is found to have no adverse affects  Allowed 
The bid is found to have adverse affects and a remedy is prescribed. The 
remedy is:  
 
                    Behavioural (e.g. price control or other operational undertakings) Behavioural 
remedy 
                    Structural (e.g. divestment of some assets) 
 
Structural 
remedy 
Prohibition of the merger including de-merging if the merger has been 
completed. 
Merger 
prohibited 
 
The bid is abandoned by the bidding company. 
 
Merger laid 
aside 
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When there are no adverse findings the Members will recommend that the merger 
should not be prohibited. If there are adverse effects that can be overcome with either 
behavioural or structural remedies, since 2002 the Members can recommend the case be 
allowed to proceed conditionally, providing the merger parties agree to undertake the 
proposed remedies (previously this was a matter for the OFT and the Secretary of 
State). However, if the Members find adverse effects that in their view cannot be 
effectively remedied without prohibiting the merger, they will recommend that the 
merger is prohibited. The inquiry group prepares a report detailing its findings and its 
decision. The Members of the inquiry panel do not need to agree unanimously with the 
report, and any areas of disagreement will be noted and alternative views recorded when 
agreement is not unanimous. Prior to 2002, the Secretary of State then considered the 
MMC/CC report and announced the final decision. Today the CCs decision is 
determinative. 
 
3.5.4 Deal completion or termination 
Prior to 2002, once the Secretary of State’s decision was announced any undertakings 
required from the parties were sought by the OFT. Providing these were agreed, the 
parties were allowed to complete the outstanding commercial details of the deal. If there 
were no conditions attached to the Secretary of State’s decision the deal could be 
completed without any further regulatory delay. If the deal was prohibited the parties 
involved cancelled their commercial arrangements and remained as separate entities. 
Since 2002 undertakings relating to remedies are negotiated by the CC directly. 
 
In a small number of cases the OFT does not make its decision to refer a case before the 
deal is completed. If the OFT considers the completed deal to have adverse effects it can 
still refer the case to the MMC/CC. In spite of the merger being completed, any 
remedies or prohibition decisions made by the Secretary of State would still need to be 
implemented. Remedies can usually be applied after completion, but a prohibition 
decision would result in the acquirer being forced to unwind the deal. Although 
notification of a merger to the OFT is voluntary in the UK, completion of a deal before 
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the OFT has screened a qualifying case carries risks that a referral may still be ordered 
and remedies with significant economic cost may be imposed as a result. 
 
3.5.5 Interaction with the capital market 
The competition regulatory process for mergers is summarised diagrammatically in 
Figure 3-1 above. As a merger case progresses through the process, it is to be expected 
that the Stock Market takes a view on the probability of possible regulatory outcomes, 
drawing on investors’ and their advisers’ knowledge of competition law, past regulatory 
experience and case specifics (including expert opinion, media comment, rumours, etc). 
For example, the grounds on which a merger might be referred are covered by 
legislation, are well known and past decisions of the MMC/CC are public knowledge.  
 
The starting point for considering the interaction of the regulatory process with capital 
markets is the public announcement of the merger bid. In a simple case, the bidding 
company will usually offer to buy the target at a premium over the market price 
prevailing just before the bid announcement. The market will respond, re-valuing bidder 
and target companies based on the expected economic effects of the merger and the 
probable outcome of the bid. As part of the process, the capital market will take account 
of the possibility of referral to the MMC/CC and will factor in an estimation of the 
probable outcome of an inquiry. After referral, as a case moves through the inquiry 
process the market will re-evaluate the merging companies at each step of the process as 
possible outcomes turn into certainties; for example, the probability of an adverse 
finding becomes 1 when the MMC/CC’s decision is published (prior to that the 
probability lies in the range >0 to <1). If the merger is laid aside8 or abandoned by the 
companies involved part way through the process, the market will also re-value the 
companies based on this outcome.  
 
If the regulatory regime is consistent and well understood by investors, efficient market 
behaviour can be expected to predominate. Investors will estimate the future value of 
                                                 
8
 “Laid aside” is the term used to describe MMC/CC inquiries that are stopped because the bidding party 
withdraws its bid after referral to the MMC/CC. The inquiries are technically “laid aside” and not 
abandoned. 
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the bidder and target companies, taking account of the nature of the proposed merger 
deal and the regulatory uncertainty that surrounds the merger.  
 
By contrast, the regulatory regime may not be so predictable if it is new or its legal 
framework undergoes significant changes, as in the study by Brady and Feinberg (2000) 
of European merger policy reviewed in Chapter 2. Newness and changes in the law are 
accompanied by a lack of case history, making it more difficult for investors to predict 
accurately competition authority behaviour. In this situation, investors have more 
difficulty in assessing the possible regulatory outcome and the impact on the 
fundamental value of the events announced. In this climate of increased uncertainty, 
investors may turn to rumour, belief-based valuations or herd instinct, which may not be 
strongly linked to fundamental value. 
 
3.6 Merger Activity in the UK 
The MMC/CC investigates a small fraction of total UK acquisitions and mergers. Table 
3-2 summarises merger activity over the study period of this research, between 1989 
and 2002. Of a total of 9872 bids reported to the OFT, 3165 met the Fair Trading Act 
qualifying terms (either over 25% of market share for the combination or target assets 
greater than the prevailing limit of £30m, raised to £70m from 1994). The OFT referred 
a total of 156 cases for investigation by the MMC/CC, of which 22 were subsequently 
prohibited outright after the Commission’s inquiry. 
 
As can be seen from Table 3-2 the percentage of mergers referred for inquiries 
represents a small fraction of only 1.6% of all mergers over the period. Of those referred 
a minority of 0.7% were found to have adverse effects with only a fraction of 0.2% 
being prohibited. 
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1989 –2002 
Number 
% of all 
mergers 
All acquisitions and mergers:   
All mergers1 9872 100 
Qualifying cases2 3165 32.1 
Referrals made to CC/ MMC2 156 1.6 
3.6.1 Decisions made by CC / MMC on 
referrals: 
  
Adverse finding3 71 0.7 
No adverse findings3 61 0.6 
Laid aside3 25 0.3 
3.6.2 All decisions made by CC / MMC3 
157 1.6 
3.6.3 Remedies in adverse findings cases 
  
Behavioural3 20 0.2 
Structural3 29 0.3 
Prohibited3 22 0.2 
 
Sources: 
1. Office of Fair Trading: Annual Report: Number of acquisitions of UK companies published in 
Acquisitions and Mergers in the UK (pre 1994 but excludes the financial sector) or First Release (1994 
and later) by the Office of National Statistics. 
2. Office of Fair Trading: Annual Report. 
3. Competition Commission: Website http://www.competition-commission.org.uk/: Inquiries 
  
Table 3-2. Summary of UK acquisitions and mergers activity 1989-2002 and competition 
inquiry decisions. 
 
While the number of mergers referred to the MMC/CC represents a small fraction of all 
mergers in the UK, they represent the enforcement action of merger regulation policy by 
the UK competition authorities. These merger cases form a record of how the UK policy 
was interpreted in practice. They are also the only mergers that have been publicly 
scrutinised, and some of which were modified by remedies or prohibited. It is therefore 
important to understand the wider impact of the regulatory intervention on the economy 
that falls outside of the remit of the UK competition authorities. 
 
3.7  Conclusions 
This chapter has outlined the development of the UK process for regulating mergers to 
maintain competition from its inception to the present day. The development of 
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competition law and specifically merger control is covered, as are the roles of the main 
players and government institutions involved. The chapter has examined each of the 
main steps in a merger deal and discussed the interactions between the regulatory 
process and the capital market. This forms a foundation for the statistical analysis 
undertaken in later chapters. 
 
The chapter shows the UK merger regulation regime has evolved steadily and 
consistently over time with regards to competition policy. However the introduction of 
the privatisation programme of the Thatcher and Major Governments between 1979 and 
1997 introduced a number of industry specific regulators with responsibility for 
stimulating competition within their industries. They worked along side the competition 
regulator on some matters, particularly mergers. This added complexity for some 
industries, and may have made the outcomes of the merger regulatory process more 
difficult to predict for the capital markets. When the regulatory process is stable and 
well understood the capital market should be able to predict the regulatory outcome of 
the process. However, when the regulatory regime is new or has been recently changed 
the ability of the capital markets to predict regulatory outcomes is likely to be reduced 
and capital markets may behave less efficiently, at least initially.  
 
The chapter has also identified that only a small fraction of all mergers in the UK are 
referred for inquiry by the MMC/CC. The small number of referrals indicates the vast 
majority of mergers do not cause competition concerns and are allowed to proceed 
unhindered. In other words the research in this thesis is concerned with a small subset of 
all mergers, i.e. those that are referred for inquiry by the MMC/CC. Nevertheless, these 
mergers are of particular interest because they represent the enforcement action of the 
UK competition authorities, indicating how policy is interpreted in practice. These 
mergers were also subject to public scrutiny and possible modification or prohibition, 
which may have led to wider economic effects outside of the remit of the UK 
competition authorities.  
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4 Research Methodology. 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction and Chapter Overview 
This chapter discusses research paradigms and possible methodologies appropriate for 
investigating the research question identified earlier in Chapter 1. It examines the 
methods, explains the choices made and summarises the chosen methodology. 
 
The chapter starts with a broad examination of the research questions. It then looks at 
the dominant disciplines in this area of research and examines the methodologies and 
paradigms that have become established in this field of research, as well as the 
relationships to other sociological research paradigms. The chapter then explores the 
theories and models used in this area of research before looking at the methodological 
options possible for dealing with the specific research questions. Strengths and 
weaknesses of the options are examined and the final choice explained. 
 
The detailed description of the methods used in the chosen methodology, development 
of the research hypotheses and details of the data used are contained in Chapter 5. 
 
4.2 Outline of research 
The research question was developed in Chapter 1, and to aid the reader it is restated 
here. 
 
What effect does the regulation of mergers by the competition authorities in the 
UK have on shareholder value and managers’ motivations for undertaking 
mergers? 
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Chapter 2 discussed existing literature relevant to the research question in the three 
disciplines of Financial Economics, Strategic Management and Industrial Organisation. 
Gaps were also identified in this literature that were relevant to the research question.  
  
In spite of the large number and value of merger deals, research evidence shows that the 
majority of deals may fail to create shareholder value for the acquiring company. Based 
on measuring share price changes during the deal period, several researchers (for 
example see, Sirower, 1997; Seth, 1990b; Seth et al., 2000; 2002; Berkovitch and 
Narayanan, 1993) have found when acquiring and acquired firms are taken together, 
around 75% of mergers create total shareholder value giving an average return of 7% of 
the combined companies’ values. However, the gains do not divide equally and the 
picture is worst for acquiring firms, where only 50% of deals create value. They have an 
average return of around 0.1%. This contrasts with 95% of mergers creating shareholder 
value for acquired firms, giving an average return of 38%.  
The UK competition regulator, the Office of Fair Trading (OFT), is charged with 
controlling market concentration and competitive behaviour in the interests of 
encouraging fair trade. The original test contained in Section 84 Fair Trading Act 1973 
was based on merged companies not acting against the public interest. The 1973 Act 
states the test as follows: - 
 
“In determining for any purpose to which this section applies whether any particular 
matter operates, or may be expected to operate, against the public interest, the 
Commission shall take into account all matters which appear to them in the particular 
circumstances to be relevant and, among other things, shall have regard to the 
desirability- 
a) of maintaining and promoting effective competition between persons supplying 
goods and services in the United Kingdom; 
b) of promoting the interests of consumers, purchasers and other users of goods and 
services in the United Kingdom in respect of the prices charged for them and in 
respect of  their quality and the variety of the goods and services supplied; 
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c) of promoting, through competition, the reduction of costs and the development 
and use of new techniques and new products, and of facilitating the entry of new 
competitors into existing markets; 
d) of maintaining and promoting the balanced distribution of industry and 
employment in the United Kingdom; and 
e) of maintaining and promoting competitive activity in markets outside the United 
Kingdom on the part of producers of goods, and of suppliers of goods and 
services, in the United Kingdom.” 
(Fair Trading Act 1973, Section 84) 
 
The Enterprise Act 2002 has revised this public interest test to the narrower test of 
whether the merger results in a substantial lessening of competition. Sections 22 and 33 
of the Enterprise Act 2002 cover the duty of the OFT to refer a merger to the 
Competition Commission, and Sections 35 and 36 of the Act state the questions that 
shall be answered by an inquiry. The 2002 Act uses a test based on “substantial 
lessening of competition” for assessing the competition impact of mergers, and for 
example, Section 35, subsection 1, of the 2002 Act states: - 
 
“35. Questions to be decided in relation to completed mergers 
 
(1) Subject to subsections (6) and (7) and section 127(3), the Commission shall, on a 
reference under section 22, decide the following questions- 
a) whether a relevant merger situation has been created; and 
b) if so, whether the creation of that situation has resulted, or may be expected to 
result, in a substantial lessening of competition within any market or markets in 
the United Kingdom for goods or services.” 
(Enterprise Act 2002, Section 35) 
 
Although the process involves referral to, and investigation by, the Competition 
Commission for mergers causing concern on competition grounds to the OFT, the 
regulator does not have a remit or responsibility for share price issues or impacts. The 
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research in this thesis investigates any consequential impact that the competition 
regulatory process and decisions may have had on share value in mergers. 
 
The research investigates interactions between management, shareholders and 
government (representing the interests of customers) during company mergers. In 
particular it identifies factors linked to shareholder value creation in mergers and 
investigates differences between mergers referred for investigation on competition 
grounds and non-referred mergers. It also investigates management motivations for 
these mergers and compares the motivations between groups based on the decisions of 
the regulatory inquiry.  
 
The present UK regulatory regime prohibits any mergers significantly reducing 
competition. This should remove, in theory at least, management motivation for 
mergers based on significantly increasing market power. In addition, it is possible that 
increased pre-announcement scrutiny when bids are being prepared, the possibility of 
post-announcement referral, and the possibility of a subsequent regulatory inquiry will 
modify motivation in favour of shareholder value creation motives. 
 
4.3 Dominant Discipline 
The area of research investigating the interaction of public policy and the financial 
behaviour of capital markets and investors falls largely within the discipline of 
Financial Economics. However there is some overlap between Financial Economics, 
Strategic Management and Industrial Organisation Economics. Research examining 
questions directly applicable to the improvement of management behaviour and 
performance in their choice of strategic options for a firm falls in the strategic 
management discipline. Industrial Organisation is concerned with the relationships 
between performance, industry structure and deployment of assets within the industry. 
Mergers impact on the structure, concentration of power and use of assets within an 
industry. When, as in the case of this research, judgements about performance are based 
on financial factors, the disciplines begin to merger. This research sits in overlapping 
areas of these disciplines and the relationship is depicted in Figure 4-1 below.  
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Research in this thesis 
Industrial 
Organisation 
Financial 
Economics 
Strategic 
Management 
 
Figure 4-1 Relationship of research in this thesis to key disciplines 
 
 
Ryan et al. (2002, Chapter 2) discusses the dominant methodology of financial research. 
There is a clear recognition in this discipline of a distinct existence of numerical models 
as abstract theoretical descriptions of reality. These models are developed through a 
process of exhaustive rigorous refinement and validation. 
 
A fundamental tenet of financial economics is the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH). 
It forms a fundamental assumption in research on behaviour and modelling of the 
capital markets, although it has been open to challenge (for example, see Shiller, 1989; 
2001; Schleifer, 2000). Key work on the EMH was carried out by Fama (for example, 
see Fama et al., 1969; Fama, 1970; 1991; 1998) and is discussed in Chapter 2. Much of 
the modelling used in Financial Economics is developed using statistical and 
econometric theory. Event study analysis was initially developed to investigate the 
EMH (see Fama et al., 1969), and is based on forming a model of the capital market, 
which indicates normal returns over time due to normal market activity. This model is 
then used to investigate specific events and identify any shareholder abnormal returns, 
which actually occurred at or during the event. 
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Mainstream finance and economics research is grounded in the positivist philosophical 
tradition. The discussions in the literature on the EMH also demonstrate the challenges 
to the theory. Shiller (1989; 2001) and Schleifer (2000) discuss aspects of irrational 
investor behaviour in the development of behavioural finance in an attempt to overcome 
and explain some market phenomena which can not be explained by the EMH alone. 
This testing follows the philosophy introduced by Karl Popper (1959) in The Logic of 
Scientific Discovery.  
 
Popper’s principle of falsification essentially proposed that any theory is tested against 
empirical findings in order to demonstrate it is incorrect, by testing hypotheses 
developed from the theory against observed data. If the hypotheses are rejected by the 
evidence of the data the theory may need re-examination. However since the absence of 
evidence is not evidence of absence, it is impossible to prove a theory is false. This 
process of falsification does not therefore prove a theory to be false but merely adds 
some doubt about its universal applicability. In practice within the research discipline, 
when doubt begins to form about a theory and limitations are observed, modified 
versions or new theories are formed by inductive reasoning from the empirical data, 
which then in turn become tested through hypothetico-deductive examination of further 
empirical findings. Theory is then constantly being developed and evolved. 
 
4.4 The Sociological Paradigm 
The research in this thesis is based on traditional approaches used in the Industrial 
Organisation, Finance and Economics disciplines. Burrell and Morgan (2001) propose 
four paradigms (Functionalist, Interpretative, Radical Humanist and Radical 
Structuralist) in categorising social science research. The four paradigms are based 
around two dimensions. The first dimension categorises the approach the researcher 
takes towards society, at one extreme being concerned with regulation and control of 
order in society, and at the other extreme being concerned with conflicts and 
inequalities in society and potential for radical change. Burrell and Morgan (2001) 
identify this dimension by the two extremes of “sociology of regulation” and the 
“sociology of radical change”. The second dimension proposed by Burrell and Morgan 
84 
(2001) is identified as subjectivity or objectivity of the research. Ryan et al.(2002, pg. 
39 "Taxonomy of accounting research") discuss this dimension and conclude that it 
consists of four distinct but related elements: assumptions about ontology, 
epistemology, human nature and methodology. These four elements are collapsed by 
Burrell and Morgan to the one proposed dimension of subjectivity to objectivity, to 
simplify discussion.   
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Figure 4-2 Sociological Paradigms 
 
The area of research investigated by this thesis is about the sociology of regulation and 
has an objective approach. The dominant paradigm used in this research is firmly in the 
Functionalist paradigm. The research follows in the tradition of trying to understand the 
nature of the regulated behaviour of business activity within society. The approach 
being used is rooted in sociological positivism. Burrell and Morgan describe the 
functionalist paradigm as being characterised by a concern for providing explanations of 
the: - 
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 Status quo,  
 Social order,  
 Consensus,  
 Social integration,  
 Solidarity,  
 Needs satisfaction and  
 Actuality.  
The approach to these concerns is from a standpoint that tends to be realist, positivist, 
determinist and nomothetic. 
 
4.5 Theories and Models Used in this Area of Research 
The research in this thesis is founded on several theoretical areas. The research and its 
associated theories divide into two sub-areas. The first is concerned with measurements 
of shareholder value changes during the merger deal and the regulatory process of the 
competition policy that was described in Chapter 3. The second sub-area is that related 
to explaining managerial motivations for undertaking mergers. Both sections of the 
research also depend on numerical models as a representation of reality, and statistical 
theory to draw inferences from the raw data and to assess the statistical significance of 
results and the degree to which generalisations can be made. 
 
4.5.1 Theories and Models used relating to Shareholder Value 
measurement 
The Oxford Compact English Dictionary (OED, 1996) gives three definitions of the 
meaning of the word “value” as used in the term Shareholder Value.  
 The worth, desirability, or utility of a thing, or the qualities on which these 
depend. 
 Worth as estimated. 
 The amount for which a thing can be exchanged in the open market. 
These definitions immediately lead us to the concept of worth related to what someone 
will pay for the item, in this case a share in the company. This is a readily available 
measure of value at almost any time, if the company is quoted and traded on a public 
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stock exchange. An alternative approach is to use the “worth as estimated” definition to 
measure value, and invariably these valuation estimates are based on profitability 
measures available from published statutory accounts of the company. From the outset 
we have two approaches to measuring value, one based on the market price of shares 
and the other based on estimates from accounting data. 
 
Research studies in this area of assessing company value changes have been produced 
by, for example, Lubatkin (1983), Seth (1990a; 1990b), Seth et al. (2000) and 
Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993), Forbes (1994), and Franks and Harris (1986; 1993). 
Except for Lubatkin (1983), the method for measuring shareholder value creation is 
based on market share prices and event study techniques, which is underpinned by the 
EMH. The EMH states prices always “fully reflect” information that is available to 
investors in an efficient market. Much has been written about the EMH since the mid 
1960s. While many of these writers have challenged and tested the EMH, none has 
managed to provide a better hypothesis. Fama, instrumental in the development of the 
EMH, has made several reviews (1970; 1991; 1998) and concluded that in spite of 
challenges, no significant evidence has yet been found to refute the EMH and no better 
replacement has been found. However Fama (1998) does conclude that the evidence is 
less clearly in favour of the hypothesis when looking at long term returns. The EMH is 
now generally accepted within finance and accounting as the basis on which market 
based measurements can be made.  
 
However, the EMH alone is not able to provide a complete explanation of certain 
financial market phenomena. One major area that challenges the EMH is behavioural 
finance. This area of study is founded on the assumption that real investors are not 
completely rational in their market behaviour at all times, and the degree to which 
investors behave irrationally can change over time, and they can be influenced by 
general market sentiment and wider prevailing economic factors. While this approach 
has been able to explain certain financial phenomena not explicable by EMH alone, it 
remains difficult to assess the degree of irrational investor behaviour taking place at any 
one time. These concepts are explored more fully by Schleifer (2000) and Shiller (1989; 
2001). 
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The alternative to measuring company value using market-based measures, founded on 
the EMH and event study methodology, is to use accounting based measurements of the 
company. Early researchers (for example see, Lubatkin, 1983; Meeks, 1977; Chiplin 
and Wright, 1988) used accounting data. However, the main problems with accounting 
data based measurements are as follows: - 
 The publicly filed accounting statements are prepared for trading periods 
covering the financial year adopted by the company for the preparation of its 
accounts. This period may start at any month of the year, which may not be 
closely aligned with the period being studied. It also may change in length when 
a company either decides to change its accounting year or to cease trading. It can 
vary, by choice of the company, between periods of 6 to 18 months in years 
when a year-end change is implemented. Because companies can select their 
year start dates, there is no guarantee that the reporting periods for two 
companies in a study will coincide. Adjustments, to resolve the start date and 
year length issues, may need to be applied to filed accounts to allow companies 
to be studied over comparable periods. In addition, the duration of the study 
period may not be an integer number of years, resulting in the need for 
estimating a part year performance. These limitations can result in an inability to 
obtain measurements over a time period that matches the duration of the 
particular event being studied, or complex adjustments being needed to each 
company’s accounting data to ensure comparability between companies. 
 The publicly filed company accounts report on the company’s trading 
performance usually over an accounting year. This accounting year can include 
many events that are unconnected with the study, so called confounding events. 
The inclusion of these confounding events can create difficulties when trying to 
isolate the event being studied. For example, when a company makes several 
acquisitions within one accounting year it may be impossible to isolate the 
contribution made of any one of the acquisitions from the overall performance.  
 The differences between various company accounting policies and the various 
differences in national accounting standards lead to difficulties in interpreting 
the results.  
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The use of market price asset values has largely replaced accounting data techniques in 
the area of measuring the affects of time-bounded events. There is evidence that the 
capital market evaluates management decisions based on expected long-term cash flow 
as discussed by Barney (1988, p73), rather than on short term accounting measures. For 
this reason event studies give a forward-looking valuation, in contrast to the historic 
view of performance provided by accounting data. However, while event study has 
methodological strengths, it remains an opinion of the capital market about the 
company, and hence is limited to use when studying publicly quoted companies. 
Accounting based information is a company-based, internal opinion of the trading 
period being reported, usually one year and can be applied to any company, whether 
quoted on a stock market or not. The research in this thesis is concerned with publicly 
quoted companies and specific time bounded events to which event studies are suited . 
 
4.5.2 Theories and Models of the Firm Underlying the Managerial 
Motivation Hypotheses 
A second area of theory that underpins the research relates to the various theories of the 
firm from economics, particularly Industrial Organisation economics. Theories of the 
firm offer theoretical frameworks in which to consider effects and influences acting on 
the firm’s performance. The second part of the research question (see para 4.2) seeks to 
investigate explanations of why managers pursue mergers as a course of strategic 
action, when there is a risk of not delivering benefits in terms of shareholder value. The 
question leads the researcher to investigate Management’s role and behaviour when 
pursuing mergers. 
 
A firm’s Management initiates and executes mergers, not shareholders, unless managers 
hold significant quantities of shares in the firm. If a significant number of mergers fail 
to deliver shareholder gains, then we can conclude that management is failing to achieve 
the expected gains it earlier announced due to either: - 
 Culpable failures (e.g. error prone valuation and implementation failures), or,  
 Agent-principal relationship issues (e.g. management has alternative objectives, 
possibly covert, to that of creating shareholder value). 
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Theories of the firm offer different frameworks, linked to key assumptions and 
management heuristics, with which to explore firm performance. Certain theories can 
each provide an exploratory framework for both shareholder gains and losses, but no 
one theory can explain all gains and losses. 
 
A useful review of several theories of the firm was carried out by Seth and Thomas 
(1994). Their paper discuses seven theories and indicates the orientation and processes 
of discovery (positive or normative and inductive or deductive) of each. Seth and 
Thomas (1994 pp 186-8) go on to discuss whether one integrated theory of the firm is 
needed, but conclude: 
 
“In conclusion we feel it is unproductive for strategy researchers to seek a single 
theory of the firm to serve as a framework for all research in the area. Given the 
nature of the field, which is necessarily integrative across the functional areas of 
business, the answer does not lie in embracing one theory and rejecting all others. 
Such a route is likely to lead to premature closure and could choke off the 
development of potentially rich avenues of investigation. Rather the answer lies in 
developing an intimate knowledge of the different theories and their underlying 
assumptions, and using these to develop a multi-dimensional approach to 
strategic management research.” (Seth and Thomas, 1994, p 188) 
 
This research follows the multi-disciplinary thread and selects theories of the firm that 
could be used in a complementary way to provide possible explanations of observed 
phenomena.  
 
This research uses two motivation hypotheses drawn from two theories of the firm. A 
third motivation hypothesis is based on a modification to one of the original theories. 
The first, the Synergy hypothesis, assumes that the principle management heuristic is to 
seek profitable growth opportunities. This hypothesis is underpinned by the neoclassical 
economic theory of the firm discussed, for example, by Penrose (1959)  
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The second, the Managerialism hypothesis, attempts to explain managers’ pursuit of 
mergers that fail to produce growth in firm value. This assumes that the principal 
management heuristic is the maximisation of management’s self-interests. It is 
underpinned by the work of Jensen and Meckling (1976) in developing an agency 
theory of the firm. Agency theory views the firm as a nexus of contracts between 
stakeholders who each negotiate to maximise their self-interest. Whether the concept of 
maximisation, per se, is considered realistic depends on whether stakeholders are 
considered to be constrained by bounded rationality. Where bounded rationality exists 
the concept of maximisation is replaced by one of satisficing. Since in a state of 
bounded rationality it is not possible to know when an optimal maximum position has 
been reached, due to limitations of finite information availability, the subject simply 
continues following self interest until they becomes personally satisfied, after which 
time attention turns to other goals. However, whichever view is taken, the heuristic of 
each stakeholder is to increase their self-interest. Such theories of the firm, involving 
management heuristics based on the pursuit of self-interest, have previously been used 
by researchers investigating possible reasons for poor returns from mergers. This area of 
theory has taken a central position in research into corporate governance, management 
behaviour and underperformance in mergers. Several researchers (for example see, 
Grinstein and Hribar, 2004; Wright et al., 2002; Desai et al., 2005) have carried out 
work based on this hypothesis in one form or another and established links between the 
acquisition of Managerial benefits, seeking growth rather than shareholder value, and 
poor merger performance. 
 
However, Roll (1986) found that these two hypotheses alone, Synergy and 
Managerialism, could not explain all empirical findings in merger studies. He proposed 
a third motivation hypothesis, the Hubris hypothesis. This assumes that Managers are 
initially motivated by creating shareholder value through mergers, but make mistakes 
due to excessive pride or arrogance when carrying out the valuation of bids. 
Underestimates of synergy usually result in low bids that fail. Alternatively, 
overestimates result in high bid prices and the deal goes ahead. The bidding company’s 
Management discovers the error when it is too late to withdraw from the deal or after 
the deal closes. All other behaviour by the bidding company’s Management during the 
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merger deal is consistent with the intention of creating shareholder value. This approach 
was first used by Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) in their seminal paper on mergers, 
and later adopted by Seth et al. (2000). 
 
4.5.3 Numerical Models and Statistical Theory 
The third area of theory relevant to the research reported in this thesis is the massive 
area of statistical and econometric theory. This area of theory is concerned with the 
techniques for identifying patterns and models in empirical quantitative data. Theory is 
based on data being drawn from random samples and the results allow for the degree of 
statistical significance to be established. This is usually expressed as the probability of 
the result being observed by chance in the data being tested. Based on acceptably low 
probabilities of results being observed by chance, results can be generalised on the 
assumption the experiment can be repeated by other researchers at another time with 
other empirical data to reach the same conclusions. 
 
Fama et al. (1969) first introduced event study methodology as a method of measuring 
share price changes. It has now grown into a major research tool in finance for 
examining market efficiency and financial behaviour. It has also become a tool of 
choice for economics and strategy researchers when examining regulatory issues (for 
example see, Duso et al., 2003; Brady and Feinberg, 2000; Eckbo, 1983; Stillman, 
1983; Dnes and Seaton, 1999). A brief overview of event study models is given by 
Sudarsanam (2003, p. 90). His overview outlines the possible versions or models that 
can be used to study stock prices and discusses abnormal returns. 
 
Sudarsanam (2003, p. 90) identifies seven possible models for the price of a stock 
traded in a market. These range from a simple mean return model, giving a constant 
return for a particular stock over time, to increasingly complex models requiring 
increased data and computational power. Models with high-end requirements for data 
and computational power are those that model the individual stock price against a 
portfolio of chosen stocks with defined similar characteristics. Models with intermediate 
data and computational requirements are based on modelling an individual stock price 
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against a market index. They include the market-adjusted model, the market model, and 
the capital asset pricing model. Discussion about the detailed choice of the event study 
model used in my research, and the calculation of the abnormal returns, follows later in 
Chapter 5. 
 
4.6 Discussion of Alternative Research Approaches. 
The research in this thesis covers two areas, the first concerned with the evaluation of 
shareholder returns arising from mergers that go through regulatory control. The second 
is concerned with the motivation of the managers in pursuing mergers and whether 
motivational changes are related to the likelihood of regulatory intervention.  
 
The first area is rooted in numerical analysis, and two alternative approaches exist: 
either using market-based data with event study methodology or using accounting based 
measures. These two options have been discussed above in “Theories Used in this area 
of Research”. After considering both approaches the decision was taken to study 
discrete time-bounded events in publicly quoted companies using market based event 
study methodology. One reason was the superiority of stock market data compared to 
accounting measures of performance. Stock market data gives a forward looking 
valuation which is not affected by accounting period, accounting policy and national 
accounting standards differences which make comparisons complex. This is dealt with 
in more detail in section4.6.1 below. 
 
Investigating management motivation has a wider range of alternatives. While the EMH 
is based on the concept of rational investor behaviour, which takes account of all 
available information for a company, many challenges to the EMH have questioned 
how well this rational assumption fits actual investor behaviour. Man is not necessarily 
entirely rational, making some decisions that do not fall into the framework of 
rationality, such as out of malice or dogma. Individuals may seek limited information 
and act on it selectively depending on their preconceptions. An example is behaviour in 
an auction when bidders can over pay to win and are “blessed with the winner’s curse”. 
Whilst the rational man concept can be neatly fitted into a hypothetico-deductive 
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research framework, the behaviour of real man is less straightforward to hypothesise. It 
can be argued that a more subjective research approach could be used to gather 
information and insights about how real man functions in certain environments. This 
has an influence on the methodology selected, and ethno-methodology or 
phenomenology would be possible approaches. These fall into the interpretive paradigm 
in the Burrell and Morgan classification above. While it is possible to pursue separate 
elements of the merger research in different paradigms at different times, Burrell and 
Morgan argue this cannot be done simultaneously. This is because of mutually 
exclusive ontological and epistemological considerations, not permitting the researcher 
to draw consistent conclusions. An important issue in this respect relates to the 
objectivity versus subjectivity of the methodology. While the research in this thesis falls 
within the Functionalist Paradigm and is based on positivistic numerical analysis of 
models which are considered to represent reality, a move to an unstructured interview 
based methodology, relying on inductive reasoning approaches, would shift the research 
to a subjective basis and into the Interpretive Paradigm. This raises fundamental 
philosophical issues of whether reality is represented by numerical data and statistical 
models, or by interpreted perceptions based on an interviewer’s dialogue with 
managers. These two ontological positions are mutually exclusive in the same research, 
though the results of separate studies can both add to knowledge of the same research 
area.  
 
In addition to these philosophical considerations, some practical considerations also 
exist. The research in this thesis has not used interview data because of the likely 
inaccuracy of Managers’ responses and recollections some time after events, even if 
sufficient Managers who were originally involved in the mergers could be found and 
agree to take part. These issue are dealt with in more detail in section 4.6.2 below.    
 
4.6.1 Possible Research Methodology for Investigating Shareholder 
Value 
The part of the research question relating to shareholder value was developed in Chapter 
1 and discussed in relation to the relevant literature in Chapter 2. The research question 
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is restated in para 4.2 of this chapter, the first part relates directly to measurement of 
shareholder value. The research question is quantitative in nature and the subject area 
has a positivistic research tradition in the areas of IO, Finance and Strategy. 
Quantitative methods suitable for dealing with these questions are either based on 
accounting data from company financial report and accounts statements, or based on 
capital market data of the traded price of shares for the companies being studied. In 
section 4.6 above it was indicated that event study using capital market data was the 
chosen approach in this thesis. This choice is now examined and justified in more depth.  
 
The accounting-data approach would define shareholder value differently from the 
capital market data approach. Figure 4-3 shows the relationship between the two 
sources of data and possible groups of value measures. In accounting-data studies the 
definition of shareholder value can be expressed as balance sheet asset values or related 
to cash flow and profitability. They refer to historical performance of the company over 
the accounting period. The accounting data approach is based on a view of value 
generated from within the company. This value is developed within the context of 
national accounting standards, modified by the accounting polices chosen by individual 
companies. This leads to many differences of treatment of costs and revenues in the 
preparation of accounting statements. While company accounts are valid for statutory 
financial reporting purposes, there are issues of comparability of data arising from the 
application of various judgements associated with accounting policies made by 
individual companies. 
 
In the capital market value approach, event study methods allow the calculation of 
abnormal returns for a specific time bounded event period based on market value 
changes only. Because the EMH assumes the market price reflects all publicly available 
information about the company, the market price reflects the future prospects of the 
company and represents a forward-looking valuation. This valuation represents the 
collective views of investors in the capital market taking account of all publicly 
available information, and is independent of the views of bidder and target company 
Management. Use of market based data means that the companies being studied by 
event studies need to be listed on publicly quoted stock exchanges. 
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Some value metric ratios, which can be proxies for value, use a combination of 
accounting and market data, for example, market to book ratio. Such value metrics 
inevitably contain a mixture of historic and forward-looking value data. While these 
value metrics allow the value of a firm to be studied over time, differences between 
companies are much more difficult to interpret and understand. For these reasons the 
use of value metrics has not been adopted in the research for this thesis and will not be 
discussed further.  
 
 
 
 
Shareholder value 
questions 
Market 
based data 
Accounting 
based data 
Event study 
abnormal returns 
Profitability 
and 
cash flow 
Balance 
sheet 
assets 
Value 
metrics 
 
Figure 4-3 Alternative sources of value measures. 
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Value Measurement Period of Measurement / 
Basis of Valuation 
Relationship to 
Shareholder Value 
Event Study Abnormal 
Returns 
Daily / forward looking Direct (based on market 
value)  
Value Metrics Market price daily / 
forward looking 
Accounting data annually / 
historical view 
Proxies for Shareholder 
Value 
Profitability & Cash Flow Annually / historical view 
modified with estimates of 
future performance 
Proxies for Shareholder 
Value 
Balance Sheet Assets Annually / historical view Direct (based on 
accounting value) 
 
Table 4-1 Key features of possible value measurements 
 
While there is a choice between using accounting data or market data, both approaches 
have their strengths and weaknesses. The key features of possible value measurements 
are shown in Table 4-1. The strength of the event study approach is greatest when the 
research is examining specific time bounded events, particularly those with a relatively 
short event window, when dates can be identified precisely. The event study has 
become the technique of choice for events that, for example, can occur when 
researching the impact of earnings or dividend changes, moves of key senior managers, 
regulatory changes or in corporate control events. 
 
However, event studies using market data have some weaknesses. The market price for 
a company may be affected by news of any event affecting that company. Such events 
can be, for example, routine company announcements about performance, dividend 
payments, and changes to strategy or senior personnel. Other news that may affect a 
company’s share price can be related to the industry, legal or regulatory changes or 
particular news about a competitor, while news of the general economy will also be 
reflected. “News” is used above in the context of “publicly announced new factual 
information”. However, the news media also publishes opinions, rumours and 
speculation. Some of these items are generated by the media themselves, while other 
items are the result of “off the record”, non-attributable, comments from (possibly) 
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informed sources, that fall short in some way of being “publicly announced new factual 
information”. The capital market is influenced to some extent by such opinions, 
rumours and speculation. However in the research in this thesis the above definition of 
news will be used for assessing announcements of events. Opinion, rumour and 
speculation are ignored for identifying event days. The market price effects of opinions, 
rumours and speculation will be considered to be part of the random noise within the 
data. The validity of this approach is assessed by testing the sensitivity of results to 
changes in the event window, and this is reported in the presentation of the results in 
Chapter 6. 
 
When using accounting data techniques, shortcomings are most serious when 
considering specific events and isolating them from other events occurring in the chosen 
event windows. This shortcoming applies irrespective of the duration of the event 
window, whether it is in the order of days or weeks. In practice, the nature of 
accounting-data periods typically of one year means that they contain numerous events 
between accounting samples, which can contain many confounding events for which 
corrections are difficult, if not practically impossible. 
 
While event study seems to be the most direct method for this research, it does have 
limitations. Firstly, event windows need to be short to eliminate the effect of 
confounding events and to increase statistical power. In merger related studies, the 
period being examined usually extends from deal announcement to deal close, though 
some studies include a one or two year post-deal period for the acquirer. This normally 
requires a long event window. An alternative approach to one long event window for 
the deal period is to sum the effects for each individual relevant event making up the 
whole deal period. This is possible because a publicly quoted company is required to 
announce to the capital markets key events that may be price affecting. Beyond deal 
close, it is unlikely there would be any announcements other than routine financial 
performance results announced for the combined company. The whole period of the 
integration of the two companies would be an internal event with little public statement 
to mark progress. For this reason is not possible to examine the post-merger 
performance using the same event techniques as for the pre-merger deal. While the 
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event window could be opened for the whole of the post-merger period being examined, 
the problem of confounding events would be introduced. The research literature (for 
example see, Barber and Lyon, 1997; Lyon et al., 1999; Kothari and Warner, 1997) 
shows differences of opinion about how long term abnormal returns should be 
calculated and used, and the relative role and importance of using Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns compared to Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns9.  
 
In order to use an approach that relies on summation of the abnormal returns for specific 
events at each stage of the deal process, each publicly announced step in the merger deal 
must be identified. This includes each commercial step in the deal (e.g. bid 
announcement and any bid revisions), the regulatory steps (e.g. referral and decision 
announcements by the competition authorities), and announcements by other bidders 
when multiple bids are involved (e.g. competitive bids if an auction develops).  
 
To summarise, the methodology chosen uses event study methods to determine 
abnormal returns for relevant event announcement days. The event studies use statistical 
regression analysis to calculate a market model of a company’s share price changes 
compared to the index for the market on which the shares are quoted, over the same 
time period (called the estimation period). The abnormal returns are calculated as the 
difference between the changes in the market price on the event day and the change 
calculated by the market model on the same day. The statistical errors calculated from 
the regression analysis are then used to calculate the statistical significance of the 
calculated abnormal return. Event days are then summated to form a cumulative 
abnormal return for the merger deal or for specific stages in the deal process. 
 
4.6.2 Possible Research Methodologies for Investigating Managerial 
Motivations for Mergers. 
To investigate managerial motives for mergers, two broad approaches can be taken. A 
direct approach can be followed, which asks Managers responsible for executing merger 
                                                 
9
 Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) is the summation of the daily (or monthly) abnormal returns over 
the event period. Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns are the return on a buy and hold investment less the 
return on a buy and hold investment in a control investment or portfolio. 
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bids what drove them to pursue their strategies. Alternatively we can take an indirect 
approach and look at how the merger was judged by interested observers not directly 
connected with the execution of merger deals. One group of interested observers, the 
investment community, is represented by the capital market. Investors’ collective 
judgements and responses are indicated by share price movements. An alternative 
source of judgemental views by interested external parties would be the views of media 
business correspondents, which could be taken from media archives of published press 
comment at the time of the merger and subsequently. The broad options and their 
relationship to each other are shown in generalised form in Figure 4-4. 
 
Motivation 
question 
Direct methods using views 
of managers 
Indirect methods using third 
party views 
Interview 
managers 
Questionnaire 
study  
Market data 
producing 
abnormal 
returns to test 
hypotheses 
Case study 
based on 
business 
media 
reports 
 
Figure 4-4 Relationship of Options for investigating Managerial Motivations for Mergers. 
 
 
The broad options can be developed further. Two quantitative methods could be used. 
One method could be based on a questionnaire sample of senior Managers and senior 
institutional investors experienced in mergers. This could be a deductive approach, 
collecting empirical data about behaviour and beliefs relating to mergers to test 
hypotheses about existing theories of the firm. A second option could be to test 
hypotheses relating to various motivational hypotheses, based on data collected from 
event studies. The data used to test hypotheses would be shareholder gains and loses in 
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mergers and how they divide between bidder and target companies’ shareholders. This 
is a hypothetico-deductive approach. 
 
It would also be possible to use a qualitative method in an inductive approach by 
collecting information and views from senior Managers and senior institutional 
investors experienced in mergers, about what motivated Managers to pursue mergers. 
This could be done through interviews or through a questionnaire, perhaps using open-
ended questions. The analysis would involve extracting the key themes from the data, 
and examining them for points of agreement and disagreement between the Manager 
and shareholder groups. This method has been used by Clarke et al. (1998) to 
investigate the effects of competition regulation on competition following mergers. 
 
 
 
Motivational Assessment 
Method 
Time Data was Produced 
Relative to the Merger 
Events 
Sociological Paradigm 
(based on Burrell and Morgan, 
2001) 
Interview managers 4 to 15 years after mergers 
event 
Interpretive 
Questionnaire study 4 to 15 years after mergers 
event 
Functionalist 
Market data ARs At the time Functionalist 
Cases studies on media 
reports. 
At the time Interpretive 
 
Table 4-2 Key features of possible motivational assessment methods 
 
While this approach could yield rich motivational insights, it is difficult to determine 
the degree of post-event rationalisation occurring in the minds of the respondents 
following merger completion. For example, it could be argued that a manager would be 
unlikely to admit to pursuing a merger for personal gains, or making valuation mistakes, 
and would be even more unlikely to admit any personal motivations or mistakes if the 
merger had been perceived as a failure by shareholders. Managers can also “redefine 
success” after an event has taken place and the outcome is known. For example, at the 
time of a merger the stated motive could have been to increase shareholder wealth, but 
when the event subsequently failed to achieve the expected increase emphasis of 
motivational explanations might shift to increased size and revenue growth. While this 
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could be part of a wider definition of shareholder value, it is loosely linked with 
shareholder value measured only by market capitalisation, which of course might appear 
later. The only way to avoid this post event rationalisation would be to conduct the 
interviews or surveys very early in the bid process. The practical difficulties of gaining 
access to key managers in the middle of a merger deal should not be underestimated and 
it is likely it could be extremely difficult to achieve a good survey response rate or gain 
interview time. Therefore to avoid the particular difficulties of interview or survey data 
in the research for this thesis, it was decided to use an event study based on market data.  
 
4.6.3 Influences of the Merger and Regulatory Processes on choice 
of Methodology 
Chapter 3 discusses the process of merging companies and the relevant decision points 
in the UK competition regulation process, between referral of a merger cases to the 
competition authorities and their final decision. As a merger case progresses through the 
process, it is to be expected that the stock market takes a frequently revised view on the 
probability of possible regulatory outcomes, drawing on investors’ and their advisers’ 
knowledge of competition law, past regulatory experience and case specifics (including 
expert opinion, media comment, rumours, etc). For example, the grounds on which a 
merger might be referred are covered by legislation and are well known and past 
decisions of the MMC/CC are public knowledge. Between 1989 and 2003 a total of 
9872 bids were reported to the OFT, 3165 met the Fair Trading Act qualifying terms 
(either over a 25% market share for the combination, or target assets greater than the 
prevailing limit of £30m, later raised to £70m10). The OFT referred a total of 156 cases 
for investigation by the MMC/CC, of which 22 were subsequently prohibited outright 
after the Commission’s inquiry. 
 
The starting point for the process is the announcement of the merger bid. In a simple 
case, the bidding company will usually offer to buy the target at a premium over the 
market price of the shares prevailing just before the bid announcement. The market will 
respond, re-valuing bidder and target companies based on the expected economic effects 
                                                 
10
 Since the Enterprise Act 2002 the qualifying limit test is based on turnover, compared with the asset 
value test under the Fair Trading Act 1973.  
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of the merger and the probable outcome of the bid. As part of the process, the capital 
market will take account of the possibility of referral to the MMC/CC and will factor in 
an estimation of the probable outcome of an inquiry. After a referral takes place, as a 
case moves through the inquiry process, the market will re-evaluate the merging 
companies at each step of the process as possible outcomes turn into certainties. For 
example, the probability of an adverse finding becomes 1 when the MMC/CC’s 
decision is published (prior to that the probability lies in the range >0 <1). If the merger 
is laid aside (i.e. stopped because the bidder withdrew its bid after referral) or 
abandoned by the companies involved part way through the process, the market will 
also re-value the companies based on this outcome.  
 
In order to understand the impact of the stages of the regulatory process the research 
methods chosen need to be able to isolate the effects of each stage of the bidding and 
regulatory processes and assess value changes which occur at each step. Only the event 
study approach can yield information about the effect of very specific event 
announcements, although each event needs to be identified accurately by date. The 
practicability of identifying key event dates accurately depends on availability of 
searchable archived press releases and press reports, and identification of possible 
confounding events within the event windows of interest. 
 
Searchable computer based archives of press releases and reports are now available for 
reports from as early as the late 1960s or early 1970s, though the numbers of archived 
items increases significantly during the 1990s as articles were then captured in digital 
format from the outset, rather than needing retrospective entry from paper archives. On 
30 September 1991 the London Stock Exchange established its own Regulatory News 
Service (RNS), to help ensure a reliable and repeatable process was in place to deliver 
announcements about listed companies to the media in a standardised and consistent 
manner. The uniformity and standardisation of press releases from the RNS allows 
improved searching for information on companies. Prior to the introduction of the RNS, 
press releases were less uniform in content and style, making it more difficult to identify 
events and any confounding issues. 
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With modern computer searchable data archives it is possible to identify the exact date 
of the announcements of events for the companies scheduled in my research. The 
quality of information improved with the introduction of the RNS. The resulting ability 
to identify event dates precisely allows event study to be carried out with short 
windows. The event window needs to be increased if less reliable data is used to ensure 
the actual date was captured. Using accurate announcement dates gives a very precise 
method of measuring abnormal gains following an event announcement and hence of 
tracking gains through a multistage process as investigated in this research. 
 
4.6.4 Chosen Methodology 
The research methodology in this thesis follows in the tradition of research in finance, 
using event study for measurement of returns to shareholders. These shareholder returns 
are measured through the merger deal process and possible inquiry for cases that are 
referred to the MMC/CC. 
This methodology has the following key strengths: - 
 It gives a direct measurement of market value changes as experienced by 
shareholders. 
 It allows precise measurement for clearly identified time bounded events. 
 
However event study methodology has some limitations: - 
 It can only be applied to cases where both the bidder and target companies are 
listed on a public stock exchange. 
 It is most accurate for short event windows. 
 It requires a significant period of data before the event to allow the accurate 
modelling of the share price behaviour. 
 
Event study analysis provides the basic measurement of shareholder value changes. 
However to examine the research question in this thesis further analysis and hypothesis 
testing was undertaken: - 
• By examining qualifying mergers for gains and losses at each stage of the 
merger deal process, the impact of the regulatory process steps was evaluated. 
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• A sample of non-referred mergers was compared with the referred cases to 
identify if any significant differences in gains and the distribution of gains. 
• A series of specific hypotheses was formed about expected share price 
movements under each of the three motivational hypotheses. This allowed 
testing to examine empirical data on each merger case for evidence of varying 
managerial motivations. Hypotheses are tested for evidence of three 
motivational theories based on value creation, managerialism and hubris. 
 
The methodology in this thesis follows a positivistic approach using hypothetico-
deductive methods. The hypotheses used for testing are developed, and details of the 
data sources and event study method adopted are discussed later in Chapter 5. 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined alternative methodologies for investigating the research 
question and justified the methodology adopted.  
 
Market based event studies have been chosen over accounting data studies to measure 
company shareholder value changes because: - 
 Event studies measure shareholder value changes directly for specific time 
bounded events, such as bid announcements and steps in the regulatory process. 
 Event studies give a forward-looking valuation of a specific event taking all 
publicly available information into account. 
 Event study measurements represent the collective views of capital market 
investors about the value of the information released in an event announcement, 
and provide valuations independent of the bidder and target company 
Managements’ opinions and valuations. 
Accounting data studies have been rejected for the following reasons: - 
 Accounting data is available from statutory filed accounts and for a accounting 
year period adopted by each company. These periods may not coincide for 
company comparisons. 
 Valuations represent an historic view 
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 It is difficult to correct for variations between company accounts due to 
differences in individual company accounting policies. 
 Value changes determined from accounting data reflect performance over the 
accounting period and include many confounding events not directly related to 
the events being studied. It is not possible to associate value changes with 
specific short duration events. 
 
For studying Managerial motivation a methodology using market-based data relating to 
mergers has been chosen over the collection of data directly from Managers involved in 
the merger events, for the following reasons: - 
 The market based data method represents market investors’ collective view of 
the merger and is in that sense a reasonably objective third party opinion of 
events. 
 Finding the managers historically involved in the mergers and securing their 
agreement to participate would have produced a patchy study of the specific 
mergers involved in the regulation process. 
 Accuracy and reliability of responses from Managers involved in the specific 
mergers was expected to be poor due to fading memories over the intervening 
time, post event rationalisation, and possibly not admitting to the true motives at 
the time. This applies to whether data is collected from managers by interview 
or questionnaire. 
 
In summary, the methodology chosen for this thesis uses an event study of market based 
data and tests of hypotheses for both the study of shareholder value and Managers’ 
motivations. Details of the methods used and the formulation of the hypotheses and 
tests are further discussed in Chapter 5. 
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5 Research Analysis: Method and Data. 
 
 
 
 
5.1 Overview of the Chapter 
This chapter develops the chosen methodology discussed in Chapter 4. It describes the 
details of the event study method chosen, the nature and sources of the empirical data 
used in this research, and the development of the hypotheses to be tested relating to both 
shareholder gains and management motivation. 
 
5.2 Event Study Methods 
Event study methods will be used to evaluate abnormal gains in both the shareholder 
value and management motivations parts of the research. These gains then form the data 
for tests of the hypotheses. This section discusses the detailed approach used to 
calculate the gains and assess their statistical significance. Discussion of the use of this 
abnormal return data for hypothesis testing is dealt with later, in section 5.5 below.  
 
5.2.1 Overview of Event Methods as Applied to this Research 
Event studies have been used over several decades to estimate stock market returns for 
companies arising from an event, and also for testing the Efficient Market Hypothesis, 
that the capital market efficiently incorporates new information. Early users of events 
studies were the researchers investigating wealth changes in response to events, and 
those investigating operation of the capital markets. In particular a notable early use of 
event studies was the documented by Fama et al (1969). A conventional event study 
approach is used in the research in this thesis to estimate the abnormal returns occurring 
as a result of event announcements from stock market data.  
 
107 
A number of models are available to generate normal returns for a security. These 
normal returns represent the changes to the value of a security when related to changes 
in a reference portfolio or market index at times when the event being studied is not 
occurring. This gives a benchmark value for the security. Sudarsanam (2003, pg 90-92) 
describes seven benchmark models, listed as follows: - 
1. Capital Asset Pricing Model 
2. Mean Adjusted Model 
3. Market Adjusted Model 
4. Market Model 
5. French and Fama Three Factor Model 
6. Reference Portfolio 
7. Matching with Control Firms on Specific Firm Characteristics 
 
These benchmark models have been devised to suit specific uses in financial studies. 
There is a trade off between the suitability of the models for generating the normal 
returns for specific purposes. The amount of data required and work involved in 
calculating the models varies. A choice of model is needed that provides a model fit for 
purpose and is reasonably efficient in terms of data and computational requirements. Of 
these models the most commonly used is the Market Model. This provides a 
straightforward approach with reasonable estimating power for normal returns, and the 
Market Model has been chosen for use in this research. This widely used model also 
allows ready comparability with other research results without the need to take any 
special methodological issues into account (for example issues such as selection criteria 
for reference portfolios). 
 
In this research a market model was estimated by regressing each company’s daily share 
price changes (bidder and target) against daily changes in the major index for the stock 
exchange on which the companies were quoted, i.e. the FTSE All Share index for UK 
listed companies. The model estimation period was from one calendar year before the 
bid announcement to two days before the final event. Event window days were excluded 
from the estimation of the market model. The event study model is summarised in 
Figure 5-1 showing the relationship between the event time line, the estimation period 
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and the event windows used. This is a generalised model for the regulatory process. 
However in some cases this generalised order of events will not be followed. For 
example in a few cases the deal was closed before the case was referred. In these cases 
the order of events will not affect the method of calculating the abnormal returns, 
though the result may need special interpretation at a later stage. 
 
Figure 5-1 Relationship between timeline, estimation period and event windows 
 
The final event in the merger case was either taken as the date of the completion of the 
merger deal in the Stock Market (either formal close of deal or the deal declared 
unconditional) or abandonment or prohibition of the bid. However, in a few cases the 
merger deal was completed before the case was referred. In such cases the final event is 
the last related event after the case was referred. In some cases this could have included 
events related to the MMC/CC decision itself and any Structural Remedies required of 
the bidder by the MMC/CC. However in such cases the target company may be delisted 
before the MMC/CC inquiry decision is known, and so target company abnormal 
returns may not be detectable. 
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The model uses event windows of three days when calculating abnormal returns. The 
detail of the model is now discussed in more depth below. 
 
5.2.2 The Choice of Regression Method for Estimation of the Market 
Model 
The market model for each company is estimated by regressing changes in the daily 
share price against the corresponding changes in the daily stock market index chosen for 
the model. In this research the index is a major index for the stock market on which the 
company is listed. Linear regression has been used for estimating the market model. 
 
The statistical nature of the share price time series data, including the individual 
company share prices and the market indices, need some consideration. Share prices 
change as a results of buying and selling activity in the capital market. The share price 
at any time reflects the price struck for the last deal. Based on the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis, this price in turn has quickly reflected the latest information available to the 
markets about that company’s trading position and future prospects. This information 
arrives with the traders from press releases, analysts’ briefings, and media reports about 
the company, industry, market or the economy. The nature of the information content 
varies and affects the degree of the price change. Share price changes consist of many 
small changes and a smaller number of very large changes. The large changes usually 
occur when new information has a large impact on the company, whereas the smaller 
changes usually reflect minor adjustments to price in response to news that has little 
differential impact on the firm or industry. 
 
The capital market trading drives prices in a way that results in neither the variance of 
the share price nor the variance in the change in the share price being normally 
distributed. The share price time series exhibits trends over time, and the change in 
share price (i.e. the first difference of the share price) is not normally distributed (i.e. it 
is not a Gaussian distribution). The changes in share price can have a skewed 
distribution when a trend is present in the share price time series, and the distribution is 
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characterised by having a high degree of kurtosis. For shares that are traded heavily, the 
variance of the daily share price changes approaches a more normal distribution, but for 
thinly traded shares the variance distribution can be distinctly non-normal. 
 
All share price data have the same characteristics and present a challenge to using 
regression techniques and care is needed to avoid the nature of this data violating the 
basic assumptions on which statistical regression is based. For Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) regression the main assumptions underlying the method are that: - 
 The regression residuals are not correlated with each other (i.e. no 
autocorrelation) 
 The variance of the regression residuals is constant (i.e. homoskedastic) 
 The regression residuals are normally distributed. 
Meeting these assumptions requires some consideration. 
 
In this research the regression of the first difference of the daily share price data ensures 
data is substantially free of autocorrelation. Durbin-Watson test results are checked for 
each regression to identify any cases where autocorrelation is present in the residuals. 
Corrections can be used for heteroskedasticity when using OLS. Providing there is no 
autocorrelation in the residuals, the regression coefficients will be reliable.  
 
On the calculation of statically errors, work by Salinger (1992) has recommended 
corrections be made when regressing companies with synchronised event dates. This 
correction takes account of contemporaneous and intertemporal correlation, and this is 
discussed in section 5.2.7. 
 
Overall OLS regression provides a basic tool to estimate a market model. It will identify 
abnormal returns in merger cases when they occur. Whilst producing a very basic model 
of market price behaviour and hence normal returns, it is in common use for event 
studies. The market model used in this research was implemented using the Eviews 
econometric software package for the time series analysis work. For more general 
statistical use the S-Plus software package was used. Extensive use was also made of 
111 
the Microsoft Excel software for general computational work and creating databases for 
each merger case. 
 
5.2.3 Calculation of Abnormal Returns 
For each bidder and target company the market model was estimated as follows: 
 itmtimiit RR εβα ++=  
where itR  represents the return on security i on day t, iα  is a constant, mtR  represents 
the return on the market portfolio for day t,  imβ  is the regression coefficient of the 
relationship between security i and the market index, and itε  represents a random error 
term. Dummy values were used to remove event window days from the estimation 
regression.  
 
The abnormal return is the difference between the actual return and the expected return, 
and for any security, i, at time t, ARit, is: 
( )mtimiitit RRAR βα +−=  
 
The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for event windows was calculated by summing 
the daily abnormal returns: 
∑=
T
itiT ARCAR
0
 
 
where CARiT is the cumulative abnormal return for security i over event window T. 
 
Average cumulative abnormal returns (ACAR) across n firms is:  
                          
n
CAR
ACAR
n
i
it∑
=
=
1
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5.2.4 Choice of Estimation Period 
The abnormal returns are calculated from the market model as a percentage return over 
the event window, expressed as a percentage of the share price two days before the 
initial bid announcement. The estimation period is the number of (daily) observational 
data pairs used for this regression. The event window is the number of (daily) 
observations used for calculating the abnormal return (AR) for the event, given by the 
difference between the actual stock price movement and the forecast from the market 
model. This is shown diagrammatically in Figure 5-1 
 
The estimation period was chosen so that the market model would reflect the variable 
period between the initial bid and the final event, which can be up to a year in some 
cases. When a case is referred to the MMC/CC the deal process is halted until the 
inquiry decision is announced and this can introduce a variable time element into the 
process, delaying the final outcome of the bid by several months compared to a deal 
which is not referred.  
 
The choice of one year before the initial deal announcement reduces the effects of 
seasonality by ensuring always at least a full year’s data is used in the estimation of 
normal returns. It also provides a reasonably large sample of data pairs for the 
regression. In practice this gives estimation periods for cases ranging from 270 to 779 
working days, with a mean of 401 days. 
 
The choice of the estimation period should also reflect a relevant state of the market. An 
increase of the estimation period introduces earlier trading periods, which are less likely 
to be representative of current market conditions. Conversely, as the estimation period 
is reduced, while it can become more representative of the conditions prevailing during 
the merger deal, it leads to a reduced amount of data for the regression of the market 
model causing estimation errors to increase. 
 
When these points were weighed, the estimation period of one year before the initial bid 
date to two days before deal close, excluding all relevant bid events, was chosen as the 
estimation period for this research. 
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To confirm the choice was reasonable a sensitivity analysis was carried out on the 
empirical data. This is discussed below, in section 5.2.8. 
 
5.2.5 Choice of Event Window Width 
Release of any price sensitive information about a prospective merger bid is tightly 
controlled under the listing rules of the stock exchange on which a company is quoted 
and under national legislation of the country in which the particular stock exchange is 
located. While the details of the rules may differ from one stock exchange to another, 
the stock exchange listing rules and legislation try to ensure that announcement of price 
sensitive information is made available simultaneously to all parties operating in the 
market. In practice this attempts to ensure that all traders and investors are treated 
equally, and no one party is able to trade advantageously from information that is not 
publicly available (i.e. no insider trading). However, these rules may not be followed or 
enforced as rigorously in some markets as in others, for example, in some of the newer 
and smaller stock markets where rules are still maturing. Nevertheless, it is assumed in 
this research that there is a universal principle that trading is based on publicly and 
costlessly available information, which is made public to all traders simultaneously, and 
any insider trading has negligible effect on market prices. The UK has a well-developed 
stock market and strict laws against insider trading. 
 
In an ideal efficient market, where trading only took place when new information was 
publicly announced, all abnormal gains should occur in a very short period following 
the announcement. Empirical evidence from research studies suggests that the response 
to an announcement is fully incorporated into the price within the day of the 
announcement (see Fama, 1991, pg 1601). In this case we need only consider the 
abnormal gain on the day of the announcement. However in real markets sometimes 
there is anticipation of an announcement in the form of rumours, and in some cases the 
speed of adjustment of the price to an announcement may run into the following day, 
for example if the announcement is made late in a day. To consider the effect of a 
regulatory or bid announcement on the share price on the day of the announcement only 
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would exclude any effect on share prices resulting from lead effects (rumours, stock 
market anticipation of the announcement content) and lag effects (time for the market to 
assimilate the full likely effect on the share price of the announcement).  
 
The event windows were therefore set at three days because this period should 
encompass immediate lead and lag effects, while restricting the possibility of including 
share price changes resulting from events exogenous to the regulatory process. Setting a 
longer event window risks introducing effects on the share price that are independent of 
the announcement or what are known as “confounding” events in event studies. In the 
research reported in this thesis abnormal return is calculated taking the period from one 
day before the bid announcement to one day afterwards. The sensitivity analysis of 
event window width and estimation period is discussed in more detail in section 5.2.8. 
  
5.2.6 Relevant Events Included for Analysis 
All event windows were examined for confounding events occurring around the event 
period. In most cases event windows were clear of other potentially price sensitive 
announcements. In some cases, for example where a company was involved in multiple 
bids or other major company activities were ongoing, events sometimes overlapped. In 
such cases a judgement was made on the basis of whether the overlapping event was 
related to the merger being examined or not. If the event was considered to be related, it 
would be included in the abnormal return calculation, otherwise it was excluded. 
 
In the cases of the events used for studying managerial motivation, to allow all the cases 
to be examined in a consistent manner and to allow comparisons between the various 
groups, the event study window was limited to cover the initial bid period prior to a 
regulatory decision. Abnormal returns were only measured for merger related events 
between the day before the initial bid day, and two days before the announcement day 
of the decision that the merger would either be waived through by the OFT or referred 
to the MMC/CC. No events were considered outside this window because events from 
the waive through / referral decision onwards have differing impacts on each merger, 
depending on the decision made. The motivation of managers planning and preparing 
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merger bids will have influenced the construction and nature of their initial bid, and any 
signs of motivation will be present at the initial bid stage. By only looking at events 
before the waived through or referral decision, all the cases are examined at the same 
stage of the regulatory process. Investors will have formed a view of the merits of each 
merger, taking account of uncertainty about the remaining steps of the process.  
 
5.2.7 Statistical Errors and Descriptive Statistics 
Statistical significance testing for the ARs and CARs has been discussed in depth in 
Salinger (1992). Salinger discusses the impact of the residuals of both companies in a 
merger case being correlated in merger event studies regressions. The paper discusses 
the error that contemporaneous and inter-temporal correlation can introduce and 
proposes a correction for variance of the CAR, which is given by: 
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where T and U are the lengths of the event window and estimation periods respectively, 
2σ is the variance of itε , mr  and ( )mrVar  are the mean and variance of the market 
return over the estimation period, and Tmr 0  is the continuously compounded market 
return over the event window. 
 
The test statistic used is t = CAR/ Var (CAR). When the degrees of freedom are large 
(e.g. greater than 200) this approximates to a normal distribution and Ztv =∞→ , where v 
is the degrees of freedom. 
 
When n firms are averaged the test statistic for the averaged group is calculated as: 
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where iZ  is the Z statistic for individual firms, and n is the number of firms in the 
group. 
 
5.2.8 Sensitivity of Returns to Changes in Estimation Period and 
Event Window Width 
To consider the effect of a regulatory or bid announcement on the share price on the day 
of the announcement only would exclude any effect on share prices resulting from lead 
effects (rumours, stock market anticipation of the announcement content) and lag effects 
(time for the market to assimilate the full likely effect on the share price of the 
announcement). The event window was pragmatically set to a three-day period, from 
one day before the event through to one day after the event.  However, sensitivity 
analysis was undertaken to see if the results were affected by altering the event window 
duration and estimation period. The effect of varying the event window has the most 
obvious effect on the calculated abnormal return (AR). The sensitivity analysis 
modelled the effect of changing the event periods from D-30 days through to D+30 days 
on the statistical significance of the AR calculated for the event window. The effect of 
changing the estimation period impacts on the statistical error arising from the 
regression. This imposes an error on the forecast and hence the AR. Increasing the 
estimation period reduces the error, but can introduce data from a period not relevant to 
the event window being measured. Estimation periods of less than one year may be 
biased by seasonality effects. The estimation period used in the research uses daily 
stock price data from one year before the initial bid to the close of deal (or 
abandonment) excluding event window days. In practice this gives estimation periods 
for cases ranging of from 270 to 779 working days with a mean of 401 days. Sensitivity 
analysis was conducted by reducing the estimation period to 260, 130 and 65 working 
days representing one year, six months and three months. The results of the sensitivity 
analysis are presented later in Chapter 6. 
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5.3 The choice of the merger cases studied 
A total of 63 merger cases between 1989 and 2003 were examined using stock market 
data and event study techniques. All cases were considered by the OFT. To be suitable 
for the event study analysis, both bidder and target firms had to be quoted on a public 
stock exchange with daily share price information available from DataStream for a 
period one year before the bid-to-bid close. This meant that a number of mergers 
considered by the OFT and some referred to the MMC/CC could not be included. The 
data set consisted of merger cases referred to the MMC/CC during the study period, 
namely 44 cases in all, of which 21 were completed and 23 were not. In addition, a 
matched stratified sample of 19 cases waived through by the OFT was included. The 
waived through group of 19 cases11 was chosen to be of a similar size to the referred 
competed (21 cases) and the referred not completed (23 cases) groups. The waved 
through group was stratified on the basis of time to match the number of qualifying 
merger cases in each year of the period studied. The mergers included in this study are 
detailed in Table 5-1. 
 
In some cases competitive bids for the same target were considered by the MMC/CC. 
These may have been on the basis of either one or both bidders being referred to the 
Commission. In all cases of multiple bidders, separate cases were analysed for each 
bidder.  
 
 “Waived through” mergers are those mergers in the study which were not referred to 
the MMC/CC by the OFT. They represent those mergers considered by the OFT, but 
where they concluded that there were insufficient concerns to warrant further 
investigation on competition grounds. As there is no publicly available, definitive 
database of UK mergers, to generate the sample of “waived through” cases, random 
dates were generated within a range covering the study period. Media databases of 
financial press articles, press releases and media newswires were then searched by date 
for suitable cases. The London Stock Exchange has published Press Releases through its 
Regulatory News Service (RNS) since 30 September 1991 to ensure listed company 
                                                 
11
 The plan was to have a group of 20 cases, but this was reduced to 19 when the group was stratified as a 
result of rounding to integer numbers of cases in each year. 
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announcements are treated consistently and communicated promptly to the financial 
markets. Prior to that date communications were less formalised. RNS press releases 
have several standard forms, which can be used as key search words. Prior to 1991 
general searches of the financial press and media newswires were used to identify cases.  
 
 
To allow the cases to be examined for motivations in a consistent manner and to allow 
comparisons between the various regulatory decision groups, the event study window 
was limited for this part of the research to cover the initial bid period prior to a 
regulatory decision being announced. Abnormal returns were only measured for merger 
related events between the day before the initial bid day, and two days before the 
announcement day of the decision that the merger would either be waived through by 
the OFT or referred to the MMC/CC. No events were considered outside this window 
because events from the waive through / referral decision onwards have differing 
impacts on each merger depending on the decision made. The motivation of Managers 
planning and preparing merger bids will have influenced the construction and nature of 
their initial bid, and any signs of motivation will be present at the initial bid stage. By 
only looking at events before the waived through or referral decision, all the cases are 
examined at the same stage of the regulatory process. Investors will have formed a view 
of the merits of each merger, taking account of uncertainty about the remaining steps of 
the process.  
 
5.4 Sources of Data 
In this thesis event study techniques are used to examine 63 merger cases classified as 
Qualifying Cases under the prevailing legislation, some of which were referred to the 
MMC/CC for Inquiry between 1989 and 2003. The remainder were Waived Through by 
the competition regulator (i.e. the OFT or the DTI). The basis of inclusion in the 
research was that both the bidder and target companies were listed on a public stock 
exchange for at least one year before the announcement of the bid. This ensured that 
share price data and announcements were available for the required period, as all of this 
data are not available for private and unquoted companies. 
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Bidder Target Bid date  Bidder Target Bid date 
 
  
 
 
Waived through cases   Referred completed cases  
Priest Marians Hldgs Local London Grp 21-Feb-89 GEC  Plessey 16-Nov-88 
GEC  Mettro-Cammell 26-May-89 Siemens  Plessey 16-Nov-88 
TT Group Crystalate 30-Mar-90 Coats Viyella  Tootal 12-May-89 
Ass British Foods  British Sugar 06-Jul-90 Atlas Copco  Desoutter 09-Aug-89 
Whitbread  Grand Metropolitan 31-Oct-91 Blue Circle  Myson 02-Aug-89 
HSBC  Midland Bank 17-Mar-92 Lloyds Chem  Macarthy 16-Aug-91 
Albert Fisher  Hunter Saphir 21-Jan-93 Hillsdown  Asstd British Foods 16-Sep-91 
Booker Marine  Harvester Intnl. 19-Oct-94 Allied Lyons  Carlsberg 22-Oct-91 
Badgerline  GRT 04-Apr-95 Service Corp Int  Plansbrook Group 02-Sep-94 
United News & Media  Blenheim 15-Oct-96 GEC  VSEL 28-Oct-94 
Scottish Media Group  Grampian TV 10-Jun-97 Lyonaise  Northumbria Water 06-Mar-95 
Texas Utilities  Energy Group 03-Feb-98 GEHE  Lloyds Chemists 07-Feb-96 
Wassall  TLG 10-Sep-98 Robert Wiseman  Scottish Pride 03-Jun-96 
IMI  Polypipe 15-Apr-99 P&O  Stena 03-Oct-96 
WH Smith  Hodder Headline 24-May-99 Tomkins  Kerry 17-Jan-98 
British Energy  National Power 17-Nov-99 Vivendi  BSkyB 07-Jun-99 
Silentnight  Cornwell Parker 25-Sep-00 NTL  C&W Communications 19-Jul-99 
Dairycrest  Uniq 29-Sep-02 Reed Elsevier  Harcourt General 27-Oct-00 
Celltech  Oxford Glycosciences 26-Feb-03 Granada  United News & Media 08-Feb-00 
    
Group4Falk  Wackenhut Corporation 08-Mar-02 
Laid aside cases   Carlton  Granada 16-Oct-02 
Tate & Lyle  Berisford 19-Mar-90    
Glynwed Int  Alumasc Grp 20-Apr-90 Prohibited cases  
Vishay  Crystalate 03-May-90 Kingfisher  Dixons 06-Dec-89 
Tarmac  Steetley 02-Dec-91 Tate & Lyle  British Sugar 07-Sep-90 
Lloyds  Midland 28-Apr-92 PowerGen  Midlands Electricity 18-Sep-95 
Whitbread  Allied Domecq 04-May-99 National Power  Southern Electricity 02-Oct-95 
Hilton Grp  BSkyB 12-Jul-01 General Utilities  Mid Kent Holding 21-Dec-95 
    SAUR  Mid Kent Holdings 21-Dec-95 
Allowed not completed cases   Wessex Water  South West Water 06-Mar-96 
Yale Valor  Myson 21-Jul-89 Severn Trent  South West Water 21-Mar-96 
Unichem  Macarthy 11-Jul-91 BSkyB  Manchester United 07-Sep-98 
British Aerospace  VSEL 12-Oct-94 Lloyds-TSB  Abbey National 05-Dec-00 
Unichem  Lloyds Chemists 18-Jan-96    
Pacificorp  Energy Group 11-Jun-97    
Carlton  United News & Media 26-Nov-99    
 
Table 5-1 Merger cases included in this research 
 
Firstly, for each company included in the research the dates were collected for all 
publicly announced events relevant to the merger bid and any associated regulatory 
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steps. Secondly, daily closing share price data were collected for each company for the 
period from one year before the merger was announced through to the close of the deal 
or its abandonment. Finally, for each company, the major daily closing stock exchange 
index for the exchange on which the particular company was quoted was obtained. 
These market indices were obtained for a period to match the period used for the 
company share price data (one year before the merger was announced, to the close of 
the deal or its abandonment). 
 
Dates for events were found from company, Competition Commission and Stock 
Exchange press releases when available, and from The Financial Times and Wall Street 
Journal when original press releases were not available. In the latter case event dates 
were confirmed from at least two media sources.  
 
Factiva was used as the searchable computer data archive to find relevant event 
announcements for each merger case. Key dates for the cases referred to the MMC/CC 
were obtained from the MMC/CC case reports, available on the Competition 
Commission website. These dates were then used to carry out an exhaustive search for 
each company to collect information on all relevant events. This search aimed to 
identify the actual bid announcement date, any subsequent revised bid dates, any 
competitive bidders and their bid dates, any announcements by the competition 
regulator, announcements of referral and inquiry decisions, any announcements of 
agreements between the bidder companies and the regulators, and the deal close. Where 
possible original press releases were obtained. When original press releases could not be 
found, the event date was confirmed from at least two newspaper reports.  
 
For merger cases in the late 1980’s caution was needed when interpreting newspaper 
reports to ensure that they were based on actual announced facts released from genuine 
sources, rather than rumours or speculation. On 30th. September 1991 the London Stock 
Exchange introduced its own Regulatory News Service (RNS) to handle all finance 
related public announcements for its listed companies. This news service improved the 
reliability and uniformity of company announcements. The result is that searches for 
events after the RNS was introduced are much more effective. While the RNS produces 
121 
a wide range of routine data, particularly for companies where a merger bid has been 
announced, the clear categorisation of press release headings allows for very efficient 
key word searches. When searching for events pre RNS, the searches need to cover a 
wider source of press releases, and with the lack of uniformity of style and headings key 
word searches were longer and possibly not as exhaustive as those in the post RNS 
period. However the archives covering the late 1980’s were good enough, when 
combined with extra search effort and reasonable caution, to yield the key events in the 
merger case history. 
 
Daily company closing share prices and market indices were obtained from DataStream. 
Cases were also categorised as falling into the ‘privatised industries’ or into the ‘other 
industries’ category. Privatised Industries were industries in which previously State 
owned monopoly utilities had been privatised and industry specific regulators appointed 
to ensure competition was maintained in the industry. New entrants were encouraged 
and fostered by the industry regulator in order to allow them to become established 
competitors. These industry specific regulators were in addition to the overall 
competition regulation carried out by the OFT, but acted in tandem with the OFT on 
certain matters such as mergers and disputes on licence terms. The merger outcome, the 
regulatory decision by the competition authorities and whether the merger involved any 
competitive bidding were also collected for each case. Press releases and MMC/CC 
Inquiry Reports were used to identify these data items. 
 
5.5 Development of the Research Hypotheses 
This section develops the hypotheses relating to investor behaviour and managerial 
motivation. Each set of hypotheses is considered separately and is intended to be tested 
against abnormal returns data calculated using the methods described above. 
 
5.5.1 Hypotheses Related to the Pricing of Shares by the Capital 
Market 
If the regulatory regime is consistent and well understood by investors, efficient market 
behaviour can be expected to predominate. Investors will estimate the future value of 
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the bidder and target companies, taking account of the nature of the proposed merger 
deal and the regulatory uncertainty that surrounds the merger. Efficient market 
behaviour in this discussion is intended to mean prices will respond quickly to new 
information and be linked to the fundamental value implicit in the announcement or 
regulatory “event”. The fundamental value can be considered to be the NPV of the 
benefit (or detriment) arising from the event. 
 
By contrast, the regulatory regime may not be so predictable if it is new or its legal 
framework undergoes significant changes, as in the study by Brady and Feinberg (2000) 
of European merger policy reviewed above. Newness and changes are accompanied by 
a lack of case history, making it more difficult for investors to predict accurately 
competition authority behaviour. In this situation, investors have more difficulty in 
assessing the possible regulatory outcome and the impact on the fundamental value of 
the events announced. In this climate of increased uncertainty, investors may turn to 
rumour, belief-based valuations or herd instinct, which may not be strongly linked to 
fundamental value. 
 
There is ongoing debate about whether capital markets behave efficiently or not. A 
considerable amount of work has taken place to support the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis (EMH), as discussed in Fama (1969; 1998; 1991; 1970). However, there has 
also been a strong challenge to the EMH view, in the form of a development of an 
understanding of inefficient markets and behavioural finance. An overview of the 
subject area is given in Shiller (1989; 2001) and in Schleifer (2000). In this literature, 
the EMH does not appear to offer an adequate explanation of some commonly observed 
features of stock markets, particularly market volatility and the phenomenon of market 
bubbles, when prices become detached from the underlying fundamental values for a 
period before falling back. However, the analysis in this thesis simply requires that 
share prices reflect investors’ current views of competition policy outcomes.  
 
The study period in this paper - 1989 to 2002 - represents a period when the UK 
competition regime was relatively stable and well understood. Therefore, we would 
expect evidence in the mergers studied to support the proposition that the market 
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behaved efficiently. However, there is a sub-set of the cases in the study that includes 
some newly privatised industries, where the regulatory regime was new and involved 
sector-specific industry regulators as well as the MMC/CC. In these industries the OFT, 
the MMC/CC and the industry regulators could all play a part in deciding the outcome 
of any proposed merger. These ‘privatisation’ merger cases therefore entered relatively 
untested territory regarding the inter-working between industry regulators and the 
competition regulator in the study period. Another cause of additional uncertainty 
involved how structural changes in the privatised industries, resulting from mergers, 
might be viewed by government and to what degree government might intervene in 
competition decisions, for example by bringing pressure to bear on the sector regulators. 
For these reasons, the ‘privatisation’ sub-sample can be considered to be covered by a 
new regulatory regime with no or very little case history. Greater difficulty on the part 
of investors in understanding and valuing any merger events might therefore be 
expected and so we might expect to find some evidence of different market behaviour in 
this sub group. A further factor that might have impacted on the way the stock market 
responded to some mergers lies in the large numbers of small shareholders who 
purchased shares in privatised companies at the time of their privatisation. Such 
shareholders may lack the understanding of competition law and practice held by more 
seasoned investors and those with access to specialist advice.  
 
To test for such effects, for part of the analysis the merger cases studied were split into 
two sub-groupings. The first contains the cases involving companies in what we term 
the ‘privatised industries’ and the second contains all the other mergers studied, which 
is termed the ‘other industries’ panel. The propositions to be tested relate to how well 
market prices reflect the underlying value of the merger events on the companies, and 
are as follows. 
 
Proposition 1. In merger cases where the deal is prohibited by the regulator or 
abandoned by the companies, the value change arising from bid specific events to the 
target company, from bid announcement to bid abandoned, is expected to be zero. 
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This proposition follows from the fact that, leaving aside the de minimis costs to 
companies (in relation to their values) of taking part in MMC/CC inquiries, because the 
merger is not completed the competition regime should have no effect on the 
fundamental value of companies, as reflected in their share prices. In effect, following 
the failed merger the fundamental value of the target company is restored to what it was 
immediately before the bid (ignoring, of course, other factors impacting on the share 
price since the bid was announced unrelated to the bid, such as tax changes or changes 
in the competitive environment). This is because any economic advantages resulting 
from the merger factored into the share price by investors in the target company at the 
time of the merger bid is removed once the bid is prevented or abandoned.  
 
However, it is possible that a merger bid puts a target firm ‘in play’ by attracting 
attention to it as a potential takeover target. The management may be ‘shaken up’ and 
the City may speculate on further bids. If such considerations affect the share price after 
a prohibition or abandonment of the original bid, then the proposition might not hold 
true. In this case, the abnormal return results will not be consistent with the proposition. 
 
 
 
Proposition 2. In merger cases where the deal is allowed (but not conditionally 
allowed) the value change arising from bid specific events to the target company from 
bid to deal close is greater than zero. 
 
This proposition is valid because the share prices of target companies tend to rise in 
merger bids due to the bid premium required to induce investors to sell their shares in 
the target to the bidder. When the merger is permitted by the competition authorities, 
this gain is not offset by a counter move in the share price (as in the case of prohibited 
and abandoned bids). 
 
Both propositions are applied to target companies only for two reasons. Firstly, the 
value of the bid to target company shareholders is driven by the bid premium and is 
usually positive in value. When the bid is withdrawn due to prohibition or 
abandonment, the value to target company shareholders disappears. This argument does 
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not apply to the bidder company, where the value to its shareholders is based on the 
difference between benefits from the bid and the cost of the bid, including the premium 
paid, as viewed by the capital market. This may be positive, negative or zero depending 
on the circumstances and the views taken by the capital market. For an in depth 
discussion of these issues and the effect of the amount of the premium paid, see Sirower 
(1997). Secondly, target company returns are larger and statistically more significant 
than returns for bidder companies. Excluding bidder companies from the tests reduces 
the problem of interpreting statistically non-significant results as being either zero or 
having some other value. In addition, in this stage of the analysis, cases in which the 
deal was finalised before referral to the MMC/CC are excluded. The value of the target 
company cannot be tracked by the share price after the deal closure and its delisting.  
 
The propositions are not formulated to deal with cases where a conditionally allowed 
decision is announced. In these cases the conditions attached to the deal, such as 
behavioural remedies, can be complex and may not have been applied before in that 
format, making it difficult to estimate the value impact on the deal. This could affect 
efficient market behaviour, as fundamental values become less clear, and so these cases 
have not been tested. 
 
5.5.2 Hypotheses Relating to Managerial Motivation for Mergers 
The semi-strong version of the Efficient Market Hypothesis indicates when an event is 
publicly announced the capital market will quickly assess the new information and it 
will become fully and quickly reflected in share prices. This applies to merger deals and 
the capital market will be looking at the value of the announced deal for both the bidder 
and the target company. The capital market investors will review the claims of the 
bidder against any public knowledge of the involved companies, and taking their own 
research into account. In particular they would scrutinise the price being offered for the 
target, and any statements of benefits, savings and other synergistic gains claimed by 
the bidder. The capital market will then take a view on the value of the offer to both the 
target and bidder companies. Prices will adjust as trading takes place to reflect the 
capital market’s view of the merger deal. In this way, the capital market is passing a 
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judgement on the deal that has been announced within a short time of the 
announcement. It assesses both the bidder and target on the basis of the capital market’s 
valuation of the combination, and the market will also adjust the share prices of 
competitors in response to the deal. 
 
The view of the capital market about the merger bid may or may not be in accordance 
with the case made by the management of the bidder company. While the capital market 
will closely reflect the premium announced by the bidder for the target, greater 
differences of views may be found on other aspects of the announced deal. In particular 
differing views may emerge about the benefits and savings realisable in the combined 
firm. If the capital market is not persuaded by the bidder’s case, it will discount savings 
and benefits claimed by the bidder. However it is unlikely that the capital market would 
be more optimistic than the bidder about the value of the realisable synergies. In 
practice, the bidder’s share price will reflect the market’s view of the value of the 
synergies available to pay the cost of the premium offered by the bidder for the target 
company shares.  
 
The method used in this research for identifying management motivation relies on the 
share price record, and the associated price changes in response to announcements. This 
allows the various views taken by the capital market to deals to be classified. In outline 
terms, if management was driven by value seeking motives and creation of shareholder 
value, the capital market would expect the deal to deliver value for both bidder and 
target company shareholders. This is based on the theory of the firm proposed by 
Penrose (1959). If value goes to the target company shareholders with zero value 
creation or value destruction for shareholders of the bidding company, the capital 
market will have judged the deal to be driven by other motives than shareholder value 
creation. This could be classified as either Hubris or Managerialism. 
 
When merger deals are driven by managerialist motives, management pursues the deal 
to maximise management’s utility in the form of rewards, payments and benefits to a 
point judged to be just acceptable to shareholders. This is based on a different theory of 
the firm proposed by Jensen and Meckling (1976). For example, deals can pursue 
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growth without creating value. Such deals can have the effect of increasing management 
salaries and bonuses, and the reason given to shareholders for the merger is to increase 
market share, which can be used to convince some shareholders of the deal’s merits. In 
this way, any value created from synergies by the combination is diverted to increasing 
managerial rents and may be denied to shareholders. It is assumed that value is either 
not created or it is destroyed when deals are driven by managerialist motives. For this 
reason Managerialism can be present in deals which do not provide shareholder value 
creation. 
 
Merger deals can be considered to be driven by Hubris when genuine valuation errors 
occur, but pride or arrogance drives the deal forward. This view of corporate takeovers 
was proposed by Roll (1986). Under these circumstances, over valuation errors appear 
in announced deals, because under valuations are likely to result in the merger being 
terminated before being announced. As a result Hubris is observable as over payment 
and will reduce the realisable value of the synergy. If the valuation error is great 
enough, Hubris can result in value destruction for the bidder. As a result Hubris can be 
present in deals providing either value creation or value destruction for the combined 
firm. 
 
Dividing the merger cases into positive or negative gains groups based on the combined 
value of the merged companies allows the first step in categorising motivation. The 
positive combined gains group will contain merger cases driven either by synergy 
seeking alone or in combination with cases driven by hubris. In the negative combined 
gains group we will have cases driven by either hubris or managerialist motives. The 
next stage of the categorisation examines these subgroups for further clues identifying 
differences between synergy seeking, hubris and managerialist motives. 
 
If the mergers in the positive combined gains group were driven by synergy seeking 
alone, we would expect a positive correlation between target company gains and bidder 
company gains. However if hubris had driven the mergers we would not expect a 
positive correlation between target and bidder company gains because of the random 
nature of the errors made. We would also expect to find a different relationship between 
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target and bidder gains when we subdivide the group further into positive and negative 
bidder gains sub groups. If synergy had driven the mergers then we would expect the 
same relationship between target and bidder gains in the two subgroups. However if 
Hubris had played a part along with synergy in the mergers, we would expect the cases 
where the bidder gain was negative to contain a greater proportion cases driven by 
hubris and the positive bidder gains subgroup a greater proportion of cases driven by 
synergy seeking.  To allow us to classify the positive combined group as driven by 
synergy seeking alone or synergy seeking plus hubris, we first divide the group into 
positive and negative bidder gains sub groups. We then examine the relationship 
between the target and bidder company gains in both sub groups to see if it is the same 
or different, allowing us to identify if hubris is present or not in the positive combined 
gains group. 
 
In the negative combined gains group we expect merger cases driven by either hubris or 
managerialist motives. In cases driven by managerialism, management tries to extract 
value for the merger for their own utility. As a result we expect non-positive value gains 
for the combined company. The deals are not seeking to create shareholder value. They 
divert value away from shareholders to management resulting in value destruction. 
When a target company senses that the bidder is driven by managerialist motives, it is to 
be expected that it will also try to extract value for the target management during the 
negotiations. For example this might be enhancement of arrangements for target 
company management in return for agreeing to recommend the takeover to target 
shareholders. As value is not being created in the deal and existing value is being 
diverted towards the target management we expect that there will be a negative 
relationship between target gains and combined gains. However, if the mergers in the 
negative combined gains groups are driven by hubris we would not expect a relationship 
between target gains and combined gains in view of the random valuation errors 
involved. 
 
The categorisation of motivations discussed above is summarised diagrammatically in 
Figure 5-2. This forms the basis on which the detailed hypotheses are constructed in the 
following sections, 5.5.2.1 to5.5.2.3. 
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Negative 
combined 
gains 
Positive 
combined 
gains 
Synergy driven cases Synergy & Hubris driven cases 
 
Hubris driven cases Managerialist driven cases 
relationship of target gains 
to bidder gains is the same 
between the +ve & -ve 
bidder gains subgroups 
relationship of target gains 
to bidder gains differs 
between the +ve & -ve 
bidder gains subgroups 
-ve relationship between 
target and combined 
gains 
no relationship 
between target and 
combined gains 
 
Figure 5-2 Summary of motivation categorisation based on share price patterns 
 
The method described above uses event study techniques, allowing testing for all 
motivations that may be present in each group of merger cases analysed. The approach 
is based on earlier work by Berkovitch & Narayanan (1993) and Seth et al. (2000). The 
cases examined are those mergers waived through by the OFT or referred to the 
MMC/CC. Earlier work by Seth et al. (2000) and Berkovitch & Narayanan (1993) dealt 
with completed US mergers from bid to close. Their technique has been modified to 
include cases when the merger was not completed or was prohibited, by limiting the 
event window to cover only the initial bid period prior to any regulatory decision. In 
studying the effects of competition policy it is essential to include abandoned and 
prohibited mergers, as well as those that were completed.  
 
By taking the initial bid period only into account in this analysis, this research avoids 
the problem of interpretation and classification when motivations possibly change as a 
deal proceeds. For example when a competitive bidder enters, an auction game begins 
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where the bidders in turn make increased offers for the target until only one bidder is 
left, and thus wins. While a bidder may have originally entered into the deal seeking 
synergistic gains, the gains would decrease under competitive bidding conditions. If the 
bidder keeps bidding until his offer is greater than the gains he can realise in order to 
win the auction, he will over pay for the target and the combined assets will suffer some 
value destruction. This is known by economists as the “winner’s curse”, where the 
auction is won but the winning bidder paid more for the asset than it is worth to him. It 
is difficult to speculate on the reasons why a bidder may do this. They might have made 
a valuation error, or the bidder might have become carried away with the excitement of 
the competition in the auction and just concentrated on winning. While it is possible to 
categorise the valuation error as hubris, it is not clear whether focusing alone on 
winning is best classified as hubris or managerialism. The use of the initial bid period 
only eliminates this problem, as the effects of an auction are removed. Both bidders are 
simply judged on their initial bids. Sirower (1997) discusses this issue of classification 
of motivation, and adopts a method of analysis which relates to the level of premium 
paid, avoiding the need to make such judgements. While he identified over payment as 
an issue, he is not able to suggest what motivated the overpayment. Concentration on 
the initial bid allows an insight into the original motivation of management before any 
complications of auctions or regulatory decisions are considered. 
 
Three types of test were used to provide evidence of motivation, namely: 
1. Average gains for bidder, target and the total gains for the combined (merged) 
firm were calculated. 
2. The proportion of cases having positive gains being different to those expected 
by chance was identified. 
3. The relationship between bidder and target gains and between target and 
combined gains was investigated. 
 
Groups of mergers, based on final regulatory decisions, were examined using these 
three tests. In addition the groups were divided into positive and negative combined 
gains subgroups and re-examined using the tests. This allowed a closer examination of 
the positive and negative subgroups. It revealed information that allowed Hubris to be 
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differentiated from Synergy in the positive combined gains group and Managerialism in 
the negative combined gains group. 
 
For all the cases the gains were calculated based on the abnormal returns from the day 
before the initial bid to two days before the referral/waive through announcement, 
taking only bid related events into account.  
 
5.5.2.1 Hypotheses derived when the motivation is Synergy alone 
As the Synergy hypothesis involves creation of wealth by combining the two firms, we 
would expect the target firm to capture some of the gains. This is based on the theory of 
the firm proposed by Penrose (1959). We would expect a positive relationship between 
target gains and combined gains. The value gain available for the bidder will depend on 
the level of competition for the target firm, but we would not expect bidders to continue 
with their bid if the premium required by the target was greater than the value created, 
which would result in transfer of value from bidder firm to target. We would expect a 
non-negative relationship between target and bidder gains. On average we expect 
positive combined gains, positive target gains, and non-negative gains for bidders. The 
proportion of cases with positive combined gains should be higher than expected by 
chance. These expectations are summarised as:  
 
H1. Where mergers are primarily motivated by Synergy, in the full group of mergers in 
the data base the expected outcomes are: 
a) there will be positive combined gains on average in mergers 
b) there will be non-negative gains to bidders 
c) there will be positive gains on average to targets 
d) the proportion of mergers with positive combined gains will be higher than 
expected by chance 
e) there will be non-negative correlation between target gains and bidder gains 
f) there will be a positive correlation between target gains and combined gains. 
 
H2. Mergers with positive combined gains are motivated by Synergy. Therefore, for the 
positive subgroup of mergers the expected outcomes are: 
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a) there will be positive gains on average to bidders 
b) there will be positive gains on average to targets 
c) there will be a positive relationship between target gains and bidder gains and no 
difference in this relationship between  
 the sub group of bidders with positive gains and, 
 the sub group of bidders with negative gains. 
 
5.5.2.2 Hypotheses derived when the motivation is Hubris 
Roll (1986) proposed the Hubris hypothesis of corporate takeovers. Since this proposes 
that mergers entail nothing more than a transfer of value from the bidder to the target, 
there should be no correlation between combined gains and other sources of gains. 
Similarly, there should be no association between gains to bidders and other sources of 
gains. Hence, the following hypotheses apply: 
 
H3. Where mergers are primarily motivated by Hubris, in the full group of mergers in 
the data base the expected outcomes are: 
a) there will be zero combined gains on average in mergers 
b) there will be negative gains on average to bidders 
c) there will be positive gains on average to targets 
d) the proportion of mergers with positive combined gains will be equal to that 
expected by chance 
e) there will be a negative relationship between target gains and bidder gains 
f) there will be no relationship between target gains and combined gains. 
 
Since Synergy and Hubris could coexist and give a positive return, we further divide the 
mergers into additional sub groups of positive and negative bidder gains. If Synergy is 
present alone, the relationship between target gains and bidder gains should be the same 
in both the positive and negative bidder gains subgroup. However, if Synergy and 
Hubris coexist then we would expect the positive bidder gains subgroup to show a 
positive relationship between target gains and bidder gains, while the negative subgroup 
would show a significantly different negative target gains to bidder gains relationship. 
Therefore: 
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H4. Mergers with positive gains when the target and bidder companies gains are 
combined are motivated by Synergy and Hubris coexisting. Therefore, for the positive 
sub group of mergers in the data base the expected outcomes are: 
a) there will be positive gains on average to bidders when Synergy dominates the 
group of cases 
b) there will be non-positive gains on average to bidders when Hubris dominates 
the group of cases 
c) there will be positive gains on average to targets 
d) there will be a non-positive relationship between target gains and bidder gains 
and: - 
 a positive relationship between target gains and bidder gains for the sub 
group of bidders with positive gains and,  
 a significantly different negative relationship between target gains and 
bidder gains for the sub group of bidders with negative gains. 
 
H5. Mergers with negative combined gains from target and bidder companies are 
motivated by Hubris. Therefore, for the negative sub sample of mergers: 
a) there will be negative gains on average to bidders 
b) there will be positive gains on average to targets 
c) there will be no relationship between target gains and combined gains. 
 
5.5.2.3 Hypotheses derived when the motivation is Managerialism 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) proposed an alternative theory of the firm based on 
managerial behaviour. Where mergers are motivated primarily by Managerialism, we 
would expect value to be destroyed by the bidder management extracting value from 
their shareholders. In addition, the target management can be expected to try to extract 
value from the bidder shareholders by seeking to agree terms in the interests of the 
target management, leading to an expected negative relationship between target and 
combined gains. This differentiates Managerialism from Hubris because, not having 
such a relationship with the target management where Hubris is present, there will be no 
relationship between target and combined gains. We also expect that there will be a 
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negative relationship between target company gains and the bidder company gains. The 
association should be stronger than that with combined gains since under 
Managerialism combined losses arise and wealth is transferred from bidders to targets.  
 
H6. Where mergers are primarily motivated by Managerialism, for the full group of 
mergers in the database the expected outcomes are: 
a) there will be negative gains on average in mergers 
b) there will be negative gains on average to bidders 
c) there will be positive gains on average to the targets 
d) the proportion of mergers with negative combined gains will be higher than that 
expected by chance 
e) there will be a negative relationship between target gains  and bidder gains 
f) there will be a negative relationship between target gains and combined gains. 
 
H7. Mergers with negative combined gains from bidder and target companies are 
motivated by Managerialism. Therefore, for the negative combined gains sub-sample of 
mergers: 
a) there will be negative gains on average to bidders 
b) there will be positive gains on average to targets 
c) there will be a negative relationship between target gains and combined gains. 
 
5.5.2.4 Summary of hypotheses for all motivations 
A summary of the expected relationships as set out in the Hypotheses H1 to H7 above is 
provided in Figure 5-2. This table shows the interpretation placed on the results of each 
test on each of the subgroups of mergers within the database. The table lists the tests 
used as A to P. These letters are used to assist discussion of the results in following 
chapters. 
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  Expectations from motivation theory 
 
Hypothetical element Sy
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 All the cases     
A combined gains on average +ve zero  -ve 
B bidder gains on average non -ve -ve  -ve 
C target gains on average * +ve +ve  +ve 
D proportion of cases with +ve combined gains >50% 50%  <50% 
E relationship between target gains and bidder gains non -ve -ve  -ve 
F relationship between target gains and combined gains +ve zero  -ve 
      
      
 Positive combined returns subgroup of all the cases     
G bidder gains on average  +ve  +ve**  
H target gains on average * +ve  +ve  
I proportion of cases with +ve bidder gains >50%  50%  
 relationship between target gains and bidder gains     
J all positive combined gains cases +ve  non +ve  
K positive bidder gains subgroup same as neg  non -ve  
L negative bidder gains subgroup same as pos  -ve  
M relationship between target gains and combined gains +ve  zero  
      
      
 Negative combined returns subgroup of all the cases     
N bidder gains on average *  -ve  -ve 
O target gains on average *  +ve  +ve 
P relationship between target gains and combined gains  zero  -ve 
      
 * Indicates a non-differentiating parameter  
** Can be zero or negative if Hubris cases dominate the group 
Combined returns are the returns to the bidder and target 
companies together 
 
Table 5-2 Summary of expectations from motivation theories 
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Figure 5-3 below shows how the data groups are sub divided for testing based on the 
hypotheses H1 to H7.  
 
All merger cases in group. 
Test for synergy, hubris  and managerialism . 
Negative combined gains cases. 
Test for hubris  and managerialism in negative 
combined gains subgroup. 
Positive combined gains cases. 
Test for synergy and synergy + hubris in 
positive combined gains  
Positive bidder gains sub group. 
Further tests  for synergy and synergy + hubris 
Negative bidder gains sub group. 
Further tests  for synergy and synergy + hubris 
 
Figure 5-3 Sub-division of groups by returns for hypothesis testing 
 
The groupings of mergers based on the decisions of the competition authorities are 
summarised in Figure 5-4 below. 
 
Al l  c a s es  
(6 3 ) 
W a ive d  th ro u g h 
c a s es  
(1 9 ) 
R e fe rre d 
c o m ple te d  cas es  
(2 1 ) 
Al lo w e d  n o t 
co m ple te d  cas es  
(6 ) 
P ro h ib i ted 
c a s es  
(1 0 ) 
L a id  as id e  c as es  
(7 ) 
 
Figure 5-4 Relationship of groupings based on regulatory outcome 
 
5.6 Conclusions 
This chapter has described the chosen methods for processing the data in this research. 
It has covered the details of the data collection, sample selection, and the event study 
method used to measure shareholder value changes. It has also discussed the 
formulation of the hypotheses used in the study of both the shareholder value and the 
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Managerial motivation aspects of the research, and their relationship to the merger 
regulation process.  
 
Results of the analysis are presented in Chapters 6 and 7 covering the shareholder value 
and Managerial motivation aspects of the research question, respectively. 
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6 Results Relating to Shareholder Value. 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents results for the shareholder value changes resulting from the 50 
cases referred to the MMC/CC examined between 1989 and 2002. The objective of this 
chapter is to present results, identifying differences in returns to shareholders arising 
under different regulatory decision outcomes and to compare these for consistency with 
earlier research findings. The chapter also reports the findings of the analysis into the 
sensitivity of the abnormal returns to changes in the estimation period and event 
window used to determine the abnormal returns on announcements. This sensitivity 
analysis covers cases discussed in this chapter and waived through cases used elsewhere 
in this study. 
 
Results for bidding and target companies are summarised by regulatory outcome (i.e. 
waived through, allowed, conditionally allowed, laid aside, or prohibited) and further 
summarised by industry regulation (i.e. whether an industry has an additional industry 
specific regulator, or not, in addition to the competition regulator).  
 
Firstly the abnormal returns arising in each of the 50 merger cases studied between 
1989 and 2002 are established and presented. Differences are found between the returns 
for different regulatory decision outcomes, and also between industries with industry 
specific regulators, called “privatised industries” for convenience, and industries 
without, referred to in this thesis as “other industries”. Results are then further tested 
against two Propositions relating to market behaviour, which were developed in Chapter 
5 (see section 5.5.1). These Propositions test the abnormal returns occurring over the 
merger specific events to assess if the market reacted to the merger events in a way that 
was consistent with an informationally efficient market. When a merger case was 
prohibited the overall gain for a target company is expected to be zero, while the gain 
when the merger is allowed is expected to be greater than zero. The formulation of the 
Propositions and the tests used were described in Chapter 5. The results of these tests 
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show a significant difference in market behaviour between industries with an industry 
specific regulator compared to industries without.  
 
Possible reasons are discussed for differences in the value gains measured, compared to 
earlier research, and between the results for privatised and other industry groupings  are 
discussed later in Chapter 8. 
 
The sensitivity analysis examines the robustness of the abnormal returns measured and 
concludes that the three-day event window and the one-year-plus-deal estimation 
periods are suitable for the measurement of the abnormal returns. The evidence from 
this sensitivity analysis shows the that three-day event window (i.e. D-1 to D+1) 
captured the days that were consecutively statistically significant. Days further from the 
announcement day (i.e. D-30 to D-2 and D+2 to D+30) were largely insignificant 
statistically. The sensitivity analysis also shows the estimation period was suitable to 
allow results for the smallest subgroups to be assessed statistically.  
 
The chapter concludes with a summary of findings from the results. 
 
6.2 Shareholder Returns 
The results of shareholder returns are presented in summary in Table 6-1. Section A of 
Table 6-1 summarises the abnormal return results for all of the mergers studied, 
irrespective of the OFT decision on a referral and the outcome of a MMC/CC inquiry. 
As can be seen, target company returns were greater than bidder company returns. 
Returns for the “other industries” group were greater than for the “privatised industries” 
group.  
 
Taking all the cases together, a small positive but statistically non-significant overall 
gain to shareholders of 1.0% for the bidder companies was measured. This compares to 
a much larger and statistically significant gain of 14.3% for shareholders of the target 
companies. The finding that target company shareholders benefit most during mergers 
is consistent with much of the earlier merger literature (Sudarsanam, 2003, chapter 4). 
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On announcement by the OFT of a merger being referred to the MMC/CC, cases 
showed an average statistically significant return of –0.5% and –3.5% for bidder and 
target companies respectively. This is in broad agreement with the findings of Franks 
and Harris (1993) of –1% (non-significant) and –8% (significant) for bidder and target 
companies respectively. 
 
6.2.1 Shareholder Returns by industry Grouping 
Comparing industry groupings, section A of Table 6-1 shows that the overall results for 
bidder company cases in the ‘privatised industries’ grouping is a small loss (-2.9%), 
which is statistically significant at the 1% level, compared to a small but not statistically 
significant gain of 2.2% in the ‘other industries’ grouping. By comparison target 
companies in both groups made significant positive returns of 8.3% and 16.2% for the 
‘privatised’ and ‘other’ groups, respectively (both statistically significant at the 1% 
level). Overall returns for companies in the “privatised industries” group were lower 
than the “other industries” group. 
 
6.2.2 Shareholder Returns by Regulatory Decision 
In section B of Table 6-1 cases are grouped by the regulatory decisions of the OFT 
(“waived through”) and MMC/CC (the other cases considered by the OFT, i.e. which 
were referred to the MMC/CC, and were then later “allowed”, “conditionally allowed” 
or “prohibited”). In addition, the results when mergers were “laid aside” (abandoned) 
are included. Again shareholders of target companies do better than shareholders of 
bidder companies, irrespective of the inquiry decision. For bidders, taking all cases 
together, conditionally allowed cases showed the greatest return (7.1%) while 
prohibited cases showed the lowest  (-6.7%), both being statistically significant. Overall 
bidder returns for other outcomes were small (-1.8% to 1.4%) and not statistically 
significant.  
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Table 6-1. Summary of the Abnormal Returns 
 
   Bidder companies Target companies 
   
Overall 
CAR 
Referral 
CAR 
Decision 
CAR 
Overall 
CAR 
Referral 
CAR 
Decision 
CAR 
   
      Cases analysed by Privatised or Other Industry - section A 
    
   
      
  All cases CAR % 1.0 -0.5 0.3 14.3 -3.5 -0.3 
  (50 bidder, 37 target companies) z -1.08 -1.76 -1.05 14.80 -12.47 0.95 
     *   *** ***   
         
  Privatised Industry cases CAR % -2.9 -2.2 -0.4 8.3 -2.2 -7.1 
  (12 bidder, 9 target companies) z -2.66 -3.66 -1.65 5.39 -3.44 -12.11 
   *** *** * *** *** *** 
         
  Other Industry cases CAR % 2.2 0.1 0.5 16.2 -3.9 2.0 
  (38 bidder, 28 target companies) z 0.25 0.06 -0.28 13.95 -12.83 5.90 
      
      *** *** *** 
   
      Cases analysed by regulatory decision - section B 
    
   
      Allowed               
  All cases CAR % -1.8 -0.4 0.4 20.7 -9.4 5.1 
  (11 bidder, 7 target companies) z -0.87 -0.65 0.14 15.67 -22.76 11.93 
        *** *** *** 
             
  Privatised Industry cases CAR % 5.2 -3.0 2.6 8.4 4.3 -6.0 
  (2 bidder, 1 target companies) z 0.54 -1.54 1.56 0.64 0.72 -1.63 
             
  Other Industry cases CAR % -3.3 0.2 -0.1 22.8 -12.2 7.3 
  (9 bidder, 6 target companies) z -1.22 0.00 -0.58 15.57 -23.41 12.83 
        *** *** *** 
Conditionally Allowed           
  All cases CAR % 7.1 0.2 0.9 16.4 -1.6 4.7 
  (17 bidder, 14 target companies) z 1.90 0.39 -0.21 6.52 -1.62 3.15 
  
  *   ***  *** 
  
           
  Privatised Industry cases CAR % 3.6 -0.3 0.2 6.2 -1.7 0.1 
  (2 bidder, 2 target companies) z 0.70 0.04 0.20 2.82 0.03 0.29 
  
      ***    
  
           
  Other Industry cases CAR % 7.5 0.3 1.0 18.2 -1.6 5.5 
  (15 bidder, 12 target companies) z 1.53 0.25 0.02 5.90 -1.76 3.28 
    
    *** * *** 
Laid aside           
  All cases CAR % 1.4 -0.1 1.1 6.6 -1.6 -8.1 
  (7 bidder, 4 target companies) z 0.26 0.14 0.63 1.37 -2.94 -3.18 
 
      *** *** 
  
           
  Privatised Industry cases CAR % - - - - - - 
  (0 bidder, 0 target companies) z - - - - - - 
  
           
  Other Industry cases CAR % 1.4 -0.1 1.1 6.6 -1.6 -8.1 
  (7 bidder, 4 target companies) z 0.26 0.14 0.63 1.37 -2.94 -3.18 
 
      *** *** 
Prohibited        
  All cases CAR % -6.7 -2.0 -1.0 4.8 -3.2 -8.9 
  (10 bidder, 7 target companies) z -4.30 -3.32 -2.66 2.95 -3.54 -14.28 
  
  *** *** *** *** *** *** 
  
           
  Privatised Industry cases CAR % -6.5 -2.8 -1.7 5.4 -3.0 -12.6 
  (7 bidder, 5 target companies) z -3.80 -3.98 -3.38 2.95 -3.25 -17.00 
  
  *** *** *** *** ** *** 
  
        
  Other Industry cases CAR % -7.1 0.1 0.5 3.2 -3.6 0.4 
  (3 bidder, 2 target companies) z -2.05 0.03 0.30 0.85 -1.49 0.16 
    **        
Waived through           
  All cases CAR % 1.4 -0.4 -0.7 18.5 -3.6 -2.7 
  (5 bidder, 5 target companies) z 0.54 -0.43 -0.66 7.29 -1.81 0.17 
  
      *** *   
  
           
  Privatised Industry cases CAR % -6.5 -0.0 1.6 27.1 -5.5 5.2 
  (1 bidder, 1 target company) z -0.90 -0.01 0.73 4.95 -3.81 2.93 
  
      *** *** *** 
 
        
  Other Industry cases CAR % 3.4 -0.5 -1.2 16.4 -3.1 -4.6 
  (4 bidder, 4 target companies) z 1.06 -0.48 -1.10 5.67 -0.12 -1.65 
   
   ***  * 
 * significant at the 10% level  ** significant at the 5% level *** significant at the 1% level 
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For target companies, returns were greater than for bidder companies and statistically 
significant for all decisions except laid aside cases. Highest returns for target companies 
were for allowed cases (20.7%) and the least was for prohibited cases (4.8%). Not 
surprisingly, prohibited outcomes gave the worst returns for both bidder and target 
companies, and the pattern was repeated when cases were divided into industry groups. 
The effect of a decision prohibiting mergers is explained in more detail below in 
sections 6.2.2.1 and 6.2.2.2. 
 
6.2.2.1 Effect of Prohibition on Target Companies 
The finding of a negative abnormal return for target companies on the announcement of 
a merger prohibition decision broadly agrees with the findings in the studies by Wier 
(1983), Franks and Harris (1993) and Forbes (1994). Particularly interesting are the 
abnormal returns where target companies are from the privatised (sector specific 
regulated) industries. Where a prohibition decision was announced following a 
MMC/CC inquiry, companies in these industries displayed the greatest negative 
abnormal returns of any decision announcement. Target companies in privatised 
industries returned a large statistically significant 12.6% loss. However, target 
companies in the other industries group returned a 0.4% (non-significant) gain in the 
case of prohibition announcements (see Table 6-1, section B, prohibited results, 
“Decision CAR”).  This significant difference in returns between the two industry 
groups for prohibition announcements can indicate that the capital market was better 
able to predict the prohibition in the other industry group than in the privatised group.  
 
This research finds a difference between returns for other industries (i.e. a return not 
statistically different to zero) and the findings of Franks and Harris (1993) and Forbes 
(1994) (i.e. a statistically significant negative return). This indicates a possible 
improvement in the capital market’s ability to predict outcomes between the 1965-1990 
earlier study period and the period from 1989 to 2002 in this research. Neither Franks 
and Harris (1993) nor Forbes (1994) included any of the early privatisation mergers in 
their sample, and so their findings can be directly compared with the other industry 
findings in this research. 
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However, a finding of negative returns on the announcement of a prohibition decision 
does not alone provide a sufficiently accurate picture of the overall effects of a 
competition inquiry. When we consider the overall return for target companies in cases 
with prohibited decisions, the return is 4.8% and this is made up of a statistically 
significant 5.4% return for the privatised industry group of firms and a 3.2% non-
significant return for the ‘other industries’ category (Table 6-1, section B, prohibited 
results, “Overall CAR”). This finding is therefore greatly influenced by the privatised 
industry cases and is not consistent with the results in Wier (1983). She found an 
abnormal loss to shareholders of target companies due to prohibition resulting from 
competition inquiries and argued that the result is an additional cost of defending an 
anti-trust action in addition to normal legal and professional costs incurred. However 
our study broadly agrees with Franks and Harris (1993),  finding a significant gain of 
9% to target company shareholders in prohibited cases over the whole bid and inquiry 
period. This study indicates that there is no additional cost to target company 
shareholders when the regulatory process is taken as a whole, namely from 
announcement of a merger bid, through referral to the MMC/CC, to the inquiry decision 
prohibiting the merger. Especially when the privatised industry cases are excluded, the 
abnormal return is small and not statistically significant. 
 
6.2.2.2 Effect of Prohibition on Bidder Companies 
By contrast, bidder company shareholders experienced a significant loss in prohibited 
cases. Table 6-1 section B “prohibited” shows the overall bidder loss of -6.7% was 
experienced equally in both the “privatised” and “other” industry groups (-6.5% and -
7.1% respectively), all abnormal returns are statistically significant at the 5% level or 
better. Interestingly, this overall loss to bidder company shareholders in prohibited cases 
agrees with the figure of -6% in Franks and Harris (1993), though their result was not 
statistically significant. 
 
6.2.2.3 Effect of Decisions Allowing Mergers to Proceed  
Other results in Table 6-1 covering decisions to allow the mergers to proceed, that is to 
say the “allowed”, “conditionally allowed” and “waived through” results, are also of 
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interest. The abnormal returns to bidder and target companies show slightly different 
patterns. In the case of all mergers (privatised and ‘other industries’ together), for target 
companies the greatest returns were where there was an “allowed” decision (20.7%). 
Bidder returns were highest for “conditionally allowed” cases (7.1%), the two other 
decision groups show only small, statistically non significant returns. Again this is in 
broad agreement with Franks and Harris (1993) which showed mergers allowed to 
proceed had returns for target and bidder companies of 38% and 6%, respectively, over 
the whole bid and inquiry period. 
 
6.2.2.4 Effect of “Laid Aside” Decisions 
Where merger cases are “laid aside” (i.e. parties agree not to proceed or the merger is 
abandoned), early gains from the bid are followed by losses on referral and on being 
laid aside, resulting in no significant overall gains or losses for bidders or targets. There 
were no merger cases in this research from the privatised industries that were laid aside. 
Earlier research in Franks and Harris (1993) only reported returns on bid and referral for 
laid aside cases and did not report the return when the laid aside decision was 
announced, nor on the overall return for merger cases which were laid aside. 
 
6.3 Market Behaviour in Regulated Industries compared with 
Non-regulated Industries 
While Table 6-1 shows some differences between the returns for “privatised” and 
“other” industries, it is not possible to examine if market mispricing, due to a reduction 
of market efficiency, was a factor in those differences. Therefore, our study examines 
this directly by testing target companies’ returns against Propositions 1 and 2 described 
earlier in Chapter 5, which are restated here for convenience: - 
Proposition 1. In merger cases where the deal is prohibited by the regulator or 
abandoned by the companies, the value change arising from bid specific events 
to the target company, from bid announcement to bid abandoned, is expected to 
be zero. 
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Proposition 2. In merger cases where the deal is allowed (but not conditionally 
allowed) the value change arising from bid specific events to the target company 
from bid to deal close is greater than zero. 
Table 6-2 shows the results of the direct tests of Propositions 1 and 2.  
 
In these tests any abnormal return results not significant at the 5% level (two tailed) are 
interpreted as being equivalent to zero, in an attempt to ensure that any differences we 
find are statistically robust. The cases are again grouped into ‘privatised’ and ‘other 
industries’ categories. It can be seen that there is a much higher number of cases with a 
false result in the ‘privatised’ group. In order to test if the difference between the two 
industry groups is statistically significant, the results in Table 6-2 are summarised in a 
contingency table, Table 6-3. Applying Fisher’s exact test to the contingency table 
indicates the difference between the two groups is statistically significant at the 10% 
level. From this finding we can conclude that the market behaviour in the ‘others’ 
grouping is more consistent with our Propositions, based on an efficient, well-informed 
capital market responding to merger inquiries, than is the case for the ‘privatised’ group 
of mergers. 
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Table 6-2. Results of tests for propositions 1 and 2. 
 
  
Case (bidder - target) 
Total target 
abnormal 
returns %* Z 
 
Proposition1 
For 
Prohibited 
and Laid 
Aside cases 
target, AR=0 
(Z>1.96) 
 Proposition 2 
For Allowed 
and Waived 
Thro’ cases 
target, AR>0 
(Z>1.96) 
Privatised Industries     
     
Allowed     
NTL - C&W Communications 10.2% 0.68  False 
     
Prohibited     
BSkyB - Manchester United 21.4% 3.94 False  
General Utilities / SAUR - Mid Kent Holding 3.6% 1.01 True  
Wessex Water - South West Water 8.8% 2.30 False  
PowerGen - Midlands Electricity -0.8% -0.10 True  
National Power - Southern Electricity 2.1% 0.36 True  
     
Waived through     
Texas Utilities - Energy Group 28.3% 4.72  True 
     
     
Other Industries 
    
     
Allowed     
GEC - VSEL 31.7% 3.96  True 
Lloyds Chem - Macarthy 31.1% 4.50  True 
Atlas Copco - Desoutter 82.1% 22.93  True 
Blue Circle - Myson 38.3% 7.21  True 
     
Laid aside     
Tate & Lyle - Berisford 7.7% 0.83 True  
Glynwed Int - Alumasc Grp 2.9% 0.50 True  
Hilton Grp - BSkyB 17.5% 1.71 True  
Whitbread - Allied Domecq 14.9% 1.31 True  
     
Prohibited     
Lloyds-TSB - Abbey National -6.8% -0.71 True  
Kingfisher - Dixons 16.6% 2.01 False  
     
Waived through     
Redland - Steetley 70.4% 4.57  True 
HSBC - Midland 73.6% 6.11  True 
TT - Crystalate 37.9% 2.04  True 
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Table 6-3. Summary of Table 6-2 Results’ for Propositions 1 & 2 
 
True or False results Privatised 
Industries 
Other 
Industries 
Total 
TRUE 4 12 16 
FALSE 3 1 4 
Total 13 7 20 
p- value = 0.101 (two sided test) 
The difference between the ‘Other Industries’ and the ‘Privatised Industries’ groups 
is significant at the 10% level using Fisher’s Exact Test.  
 
 
Merger cases involving ‘privatised’ industries occurred during the 1990s; in particular, 
there were three proposed mergers in both the water industry12 and in the electricity 
sector and two in communications. During this period investors’ experience of how the 
competition authorities would respond to mergers in these sectors remained limited 
because there were few, if any, previous cases from which to draw lessons. It is to be 
expected, therefore, that investors would have had more difficulty in accurately 
assessing the likely impact of regulatory outcomes at each stage of the mergers 
involving water, electricity and communications companies. Moreover, the 
communications, water and electricity industries had their own, additional, sector-
specific regulators, which can be expected to have added to regulatory uncertainty at the 
time of mergers. The sector regulators police competition policy alongside the 
MMC/CC and are important in recommending referrals of mergers to the MMC/CC. 
After referral they provide evidence to the Commission. The sector-specific regulators 
were mainly young in the 1990s13 and at the time no one knew how far the regulators 
would allow the industrial structure established in water and electricity at privatisation 
                                                 
12
 One of which was conditionally allowed and is therefore not included in table 5. 
13
 The communications sector has had one industry regulator in the UK, Ofcom, since Dec 2003. In the 
1980s and 1990s telecommunications had a new regulator, Oftel, while broadcasting and certain other 
fields of communications had their own dedicated regulators with longer histories. The Communications 
Act 2003 merged the Independent Television Commission, Independent Radio Authority, Radio 
Communications Agency and the Oftel into the Ofcom to regulate all communication and independent 
(i.e. non-BBC) radio and television broadcasting. Prior to this regulatory merging some industries (e.g. 
cable television and satellite broadcasters) had two industry specific regulators (one for communications 
and one for broadcast media) in addition to the OFT acting as a concurrent competition regulator.  
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to be changed. The government also took a special interest in mergers involving 
communications companies because of concerns about media ownership.  The findings 
are consistent with the view that less efficient market pricing of shares may have 
occurred in the case of mergers in these sectors as views in the stock market changed 
about the possible outcomes while the regulatory process relating to mergers was 
underway.  
 
A further factor may have influenced market behaviour, which relates to the degree of 
non-institutional shareholding in privatised companies. At privatisation, the government 
had an objective of increasing the number of private shareholders in the UK and used 
the flotation of former state-owned industries to help achieve this aim. A large degree of 
equity held by individual private investors may have reduced the effectiveness of 
arbitrage traders in the capital market. At the same time, the behaviour of private 
shareholders may have been driven more by shareholder sentiment than by rational 
decisions based on fundamental value. With a combination of these factors we might 
expect a high degree of non-institutional shareholding to reduce market efficiency, in 
the sense of share prices being less linked to the underlying economic value brought 
about by the proposed mergers.  
 
6.4 Sensitivity of Abnormal Returns to Variations in Event 
Window Width and Market Model Estimation Period 
We now examine the effects of changes to two methodological variables, event window 
duration and estimation period, on the measurement of abnormal returns calculated from 
the market model. These two variables and the choices involved were discussed and 
justified in detail in Chapter 5 Section 5.2. These sensitivity tests reported here examine 
the dependency of the results reported earlier in this chapter, and later in Chapter 7, on 
changes to the two methodological variables, event window width and market model 
estimation period.  
 
The market model is determined using OLS regression of a company’s daily share price 
against a market index. The estimation period is the number of (daily) observational 
data pairs used for this regression. The event window is the number of (daily) 
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observations used for calculating the abnormal return (AR) for the event, calculated by 
the difference between the actual stock price movement and the forecast from the 
market model regression equation. The method is discussed fully in Chapter 5. 
 
The effect of varying the event window has the most obvious effect on the calculated 
AR. The event window in this research was set to a three-day period from one day 
before the event (D-1) through to one day after the event (D+1). This was justified in 
Chapter 5 as a suitable method of measuring the short-run announcement returns 
required by this research. This window, when used with a precise identification of the 
event day, allows other non-related events to be effectively excluded from the AR 
calculation. In this research these confounding events have been filtered out and the AR 
for a completed merger from bid to deal close consists of the sum of a number relevant 
three-day event windows throughout the deal process. A balance exists between 
capturing all the daily ARs relevant to a particular event, and excluding those of the 
adjacent confounding events. This sensitivity analysis models the effect of changing 
event periods from D-30 days through to D+30 days on the statistical significance of the 
AR calculated for the event window. 
 
The effect of changing the estimation period impacts on the statistical error arising from 
the regression calculation. This imposes an error on the forecast and hence the AR. 
Increasing the estimation period reduces the error, but can introduce data from a period 
not relevant to the event window being measured. Estimation periods of less than one 
year may be biased by seasonality effects. A balance is therefore required between using 
sufficient data points to give an error allowing statistically significant results, without 
including data from non-relevant periods. The basis of estimation used in this paper is to 
take data from one year before the initial bid announcement through to the final 
announcement of deal close or abandonment, excluding all event window days from the 
estimation of the market model. This sensitivity analysis looks at the effect of reducing 
the estimation period on the statistical significance of the AR calculated for a constant 
event window of D-1 to D+1. 
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6.4.1 Event Window Width Variation 
While considering changes to the width of the event window, the estimation of the 
market model has been fixed to that employed in the research, a period of one year 
before the initial bid date through to the deal close or abandonment excluding all event 
days. To assess the effect of changing the window width, the ARs and z statistics were 
calculated for all (bidder and target) companies in all cases for 30 days before the initial 
bid announcement through to 30 after the initial bid announcement. The initial bid 
announcement has been chosen, as then all of the merger cases in the sample will be 
included. This contrasts with other events, such as inquiry outcome announcements, 
where due to differences in the regulatory stages, some cases may not be involved. 
 
For the 61-day period (D-30 through to D+30) the percentage daily average cumulative 
abnormal return (ACAR) has been calculated together with the Z statistic, for each of 
the days. These two figures indicate the magnitude and statistical significance of each 
day’s contribution to the ACAR for various widths of the event window. 
 
Share prices quickly adjust to all unanticipated new information. Anticipation of an 
announcement will be apparent when statistically significant ARs occur in days before 
the event announcement. Similarly any lag in markets reacting to new information will 
be apparent as statistically significant ARs in days following the announcement. Any 
ARs arising from events not related to the timing of the event announcement being 
measured are assumed to be randomly distributed around the event day, and not 
correlated. These confounding events should therefore not add to the statistical 
significance of ARs on days other than the event announcement day, D (i.e. the only 
correlated day for all cases).  
 
6.4.2 Market Model Estimation Period Variation 
The estimation period used in this research uses daily stock price data from one year 
before the initial bid to the close of deal (or abandonment) excluding event window 
days. In practice this gives estimation periods for cases ranging of from 270 to 779 
working days with a mean of 401 days. Sensitivity analysis was conducted by reducing 
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the estimation period to 260, 130 and 65 working days, representing one year, six 
months and three months. 
 
The principal impact of changes to the estimation period is on the standard error of the 
regression and hence the standard error of the market model forecast, which varies 
inversely with the square root of the number of estimation points. Hence, reducing the 
estimation period to one-quarter doubles the statistical error. The effects on standard 
error of the AR were calculated for varying estimation periods on target and bidder 
company ARs for each case. The event window of D-1 through to D+1 days for the 
initial bid announcement was used for the AR and z statistic calculation, as used in 
section 6.4.1 for the event window sensitivity tests.  
 
6.4.3 Results of Sensitivity Analysis for Event Window Width 
Firstly, considering event window width, the AR, SE and z statistic were calculated for 
all companies and combined for the group over the period D-30 working days through 
to D+30 working days, where D is the day of the initial bid announcement. The daily 
ACAR percentages for all companies are shown in Figure 6-1 and the corresponding z 
statistics are shown in Figure 6-2. 
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Figure 6-1.  Daily ACAR (%) about event day - all cases on initial bid announcement 
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Figure 6-2. Z statistics of daily ACAR about event day - all cases on initial bid announcement. 
 
The z statistics for the daily ACAR were 5.7, 23.2 and 2.5 respectively for event days 
D-1, D, and D+1 respectively showing AR’s on these days were significant through the 
group. For the three days combined the ACAR was 5.74% and the z statistic was 18.23. 
 
However outside the range D-1 to D+1 there was little evidence of consecutive days 
when the results were significant. The days when the z statistic was greater than 1.96 
(significance level of 0.05) are shown in Table 6-4. In the range D-30 to D-20 the z 
statistics range from a minimum of 0.06 to a maximum of 2.96, with a mean z of 1.11. 
On 6 days (D-23, D-21, D-15, D-10, D-9, D-4) z was greater than 1.96. For D+2 to 
D+30 the z statistics range from a minimum of 0.08 to a maximum of 2.55, with a mean 
z of 0.78. On only two days (D+7, D+8) z was greater than 1.96. In other words, there is 
no particular pattern of significant z values outside of the window D-1 to D+1 and 
therefore it would be difficult to find a logical thread supported by the data to justify 
widening the event window beyond 3 days.  
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Day ACAR (%) z statistic 
D-23 0.528 2.684
D-21 0.512 2.699
D-15 0.378 2.025
D-10 0.385 2.043
D-9 0.396 2.116
D-4 0.553 2.962
D-1 1.046 5.684
D 4.259 23.186
D+1 0.438 2.463
D+7 0.389 2.177
D+8 0.458 2.550
 
Table 6-4. Days relative to the event day when the ACAR was significant (i.e. z statistic > 1.96). 
 
Widening the window by adding non-statistically significant AR days lowers the 
significance of the cumulative AR for the whole wider window. Also widening the 
event window beyond the three-day window used, introduces ARs that may result from 
confounding events (i.e. announcements not specifically related to the merger process). 
By widening the window, the ability to discriminate against these confounding results is 
reduced. Even with a three-day event window it is difficult with large companies to 
eliminate confounding events because they can frequently make announcements on 
consecutive days and overlap the event window. This sensitivity analysis over-estimates 
the influence of the days from D-30 to D-2 and D+2 to D+30 because it includes all 
ARs for these days, whether or not they are related to the event being studied or are 
confounding events. In practice, days during these periods will contain both 
announcements relevant to the whole merger, such as counter bids in competitive 
situations or referral announcements, and confounding events such as trading results, 
product or marketing announcements.  
 
On balance for the event window width, daily ARs outside the three-day event window 
are unlikely to be statistically significant and, if added to widen the window, will reduce 
the overall z statistic for the whole window period. Widening of the event window from 
three days also reduces the ability of the method to discriminate against announcements 
relating to confounding events. 
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6.4.4 Results of Sensitivity Analysis for Estimation Period 
Table 6-5 shows the effect of reduced estimation periods on the z statistics for 
cumulative ARs related to the initial bid announcement for all cases combined based on 
a three days event window measurement. The z statistic for the three-day period is 
estimated from section 6.4.3 above. 
 
 
Estimation period Estimation days Z statistic for 3 
day event window 
– all 63 cases 
Z statistic for 3 
day event window 
– only 6 cases 
1 year plus deal Mean = 401 
(270 to 779) 
18.2 5.6 
1 year 260 14.7 4.5 
6 months 130 10.4 3.2 
3 months 65 7.3 2.3 
 
Table 6-5. Effect of estimation period on AR statistical significance for a three-day event window: 
bidder and target companies combined. 
 
The z statistics for the AR from the full 63 cases are shown in column 3 of Table 6-5. 
As the smallest subgroup used in analysis is six cases, the z statistics of this subgroup 
would be expected to fall by a factor of 
6
63
, or 3.24. This would reduce the z statistics 
for the six cases subgroup to those shown in column 4 of Table 6-5. The three-month 
period is approaching the limit of acceptability if we consider the lowest useful z is 
1.96.  
 
Although we could reduce the estimation period to as short as three months, the 
significance of results would be reduced. This would be particularly apparent with 
bidder company results, which as a group have lower z statistics than the target 
company group, and also in small sub groups. The reduction in statistical significance 
would make the interpretation of results less clear. 
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6.4.5 Conclusions from the Sensitivity Analysis Results 
While the event window could be widened, the resulting z statistics would be reduced, 
and the ability to discriminate against confounding events would be considerably 
reduced as the event window width was increased. The three-day event window uses the 
period when each of the adjacent consecutive event days have z statistics which are 
greater than 1.96 (i.e. each day is significant at the 5% level). As can be seen from 
Figure 6-2, no event window period greater than three days has such a characteristic. 
 
Reducing the length of the estimation period reduces the z statistics of the ARs. While a 
shorter estimation period could be used, a period as short as three months is 
approaching the lower limit of acceptability when the size of subgroups is considered. 
The chosen estimation period of a year plus the deal period (excluding event days) 
maximises the z statistics particularly for small subgroup analysis and bidder results, 
which are the most challenging results to obtain. The approach allows the number of 
estimation days to be maximised without taking data from more than a year before the 
first event. This means that the market model is based on data covering a period more 
relevant to the events being studied. Shortening the period would increase the relevance 
of the data for the market model at the expense of reducing the z statistics of the AR 
results. 
 
This sensitivity analysis has shown that, on balance, the choice of a three-day event 
window allows capture of the announcement abnormal returns while permitting good 
rejection of close-lying confounding events. The one-year plus deal estimation period is 
consistent with the relevant data in this analysis providing a market model that allows 
the analysis of subgroups to produce statistically significant results as confirmed by this 
sensitivity analysis.  
 
6.5 Conclusions 
This chapter presented results of shareholder value occurring in mergers under differing 
conditions of regulatory outcome, and in industries with and without an industry 
specific regulator. The results find that overall: - 
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• Shareholders of target companies benefited from larger gains than those of bidder 
companies, which is consistent with much of the earlier research literature (e.g. see 
Sudarsanam, 2003, chapter 4). 
 
Results for the individual referral and decision announcement steps in the regulatory 
process showed that: - 
• When a merger case is referred by the OFT to the MMC/CC, both bidder and target 
companies experience a statistically significant negative abnormal return at the time 
of the referral. Statistically significant returns of –0.5% and –3.5% respectively were 
measured and are broadly in agreement with earlier research findings by (Franks and 
Harris, 1993) of  -1% (non-significant) and –8% (significant) for bidder and target 
respectively. 
• When a decision is announced on a referred merger case, on average there is no 
abnormal loss or gain. However, when cases are allowed, both bidder and target 
companies experience statistically significant positive abnormal returns, but in the 
case of a prohibited decision statistically significant negative abnormal returns were 
experienced by both the target and bidding companies at the decision 
announcement. This agrees with earlier research findings (see Franks and Harris, 
1993). 
 
Results taken over the complete cycle of events in the regulatory process (taken over the 
whole merger period, including cumulative abnormal returns for all merger specific 
events from bid to prohibition announcement) showed that: - 
• Where mergers were allowed by the competition authorities, bidding companies 
showed a small non-significant return, while target companies showed a large 
statistically significant positive return. Similarly, where mergers were conditionally 
allowed, both bidding and target companies showed a statistically significant 
positive return. This is consistent with earlier research (see Franks and Harris, 
1993). 
• Where merger cases were laid aside, losses were experienced by bidder and target 
companies on referral and being laid aside, cancelling out gains made on the bid 
announcement. Overall, on average, bidding and target companies did not make 
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significant abnormal returns in laid aside merger cases taking the period from the 
announcement of the proposed merger to its abandonment. Research reported by 
Franks and Harris (1993) did not specifically address gains or losses on cases being 
laid aside, but only on bid and referral, where it was in broad agreement.  
• For mergers prohibited by the competition authorities, bidding companies, on 
average, experienced a statistically significant negative overall abnormal return, 
while targets experienced a statistically significant overall positive return. This is at 
variance with some earlier research findings by Wier (1983), but in agreement with 
Franks and Harris (1993) who found  a similar pattern.  
 
The pattern of returns for mergers in industries with an additional industry specific 
regulator (referred to as “privatised industries” for convenience) differed to those 
without an industry regulator (referred to as “other industries”). Key differences were: - 
• In allowed or conditionally allowed cases, target companies in privatised industries 
experienced lower returns than those in other industries, while there was no 
difference between the bidder companies returns in both industry groups.  
• In prohibited cases, target companies in privatised industries experienced larger 
positive returns than target companies in other industries, while there was no 
difference between the bidder companies’ returns in both industry groups.  
• Testing the returns of target companies with two propositions based on rational 
market behaviour showed a significant difference between the privatised and other 
industry groups. The market reaction for the privatised group was less rational than 
for the market response for the other Industry group. 
Findings about differences in shareholder returns between privatised and other industry 
groups involved in mergers do not appear to have been researched previously. 
 
Sensitivity tests were carried out to assess the robustness of the choices for two key 
methodological variables, namely event window width and estimation period. The tests 
showed: - 
 The three-day event window width (D-1 to D+1) used in the research was 
appropriate for the measurement of the short run announcement returns 
associated with the steps in the regulatory process. 
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 The estimation period of one year plus the deal period used in the research was 
suitable for estimation of the market model, and allowed statistical inferences to 
be drawn from sub groups of the data set. 
 
Chapter 7 completes the presentation of the results, by explaining the findings for the 
study of managerial motivations. A further discussion of these results and their 
differences is covered later in Chapter 8. The conclusions for government policy and 
managerial decisions are explored also in Chapter 8. 
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7 Results on Management Motivations for Mergers. 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter reports on the results relating to Managements’ motivations for carrying 
out mergers as perceived by the financial markets. Based on the discussions in Chapter 
5 Methods and Data, section 5.5, the expectations from the motivation theories are 
shown in Table 5-2, which is repeated in this chapter as Table 7-1 for convenience of 
reference in the following discussion. The expectations shown in this table are 
compared with the actual results measured by the tests used to assess which motivations 
the financial markets perceived were present. The results relate to the period covering 
deal announcement and other deal related announcements up to, but not including, the 
first announcement by the Competition Regulator. 
  
The results are discussed in three parts. Firstly, the results for all of the merger cases 
taken together are examined for market perceptions of Synergy, Hubris or 
Managerialism motivations by comparing the results in Table 7-2 with the 
corresponding lines in the summary of expectations in Table 7-1. Next, cases with 
positive combined firm gains are similarly examined to distinguish between Synergy 
and Hubris in Table 7-3. Finally, only cases with negative combined firm gains are 
examined to distinguish between Hubris and Managerialism, in Table 7-4. All of the 
results are summarised in Table 7-5 conveniently allowing comparisons between cases 
grouped by regulatory decision.  
 
This chapter finds that differences in motivations, perceived by financial markets, exist 
between groups of mergers with different regulatory outcomes. Mergers that were 
ultimately waived through by the competition regulator without being referred to the 
MMC/CC for inquiry are dominated by perceptions of Synergy. For mergers referred to 
the MMC/CC for Inquiry, the financial markets perceived an increased presence of 
Hubris. The perception of Hubris, and Synergy coexisting with Hubris, increased to be 
the highest level measured in the group of cases that were ultimately prohibited. The  
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Table 7-1 Summary of expectations from motivation theories 
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 All the cases     
A combined gains on average 
+ve 
(P1a) 
Zero 
(P3a)  
-ve 
(P6a) 
B bidder gains on average 
non –ve 
(P1b) 
-ve 
(P3b) 
 
-ve 
(P6b) 
C target gains on average * 
+ve 
(P1c) 
+ve 
(P3c)  
+ve 
(P6b) 
D proportion of cases with +ve combined gains 
>50% 
(P1d) 
50% 
(P3d)  
<50% 
(P6b) 
E relationship between target gains and bidder gains 
non –ve 
(P1e) 
-ve 
(P3e)  
-ve 
(P6b) 
F relationship between target gains and combined gains 
+ve 
(P1f) 
Zero 
(P3f)  
-ve 
(P6b) 
      
 Positive combined returns subgroup of all the cases     
G bidder gains on average  
+ve 
(P2a)  
+ve** 
(P4a+b)  
H target gains on average * 
+ve 
(P2b)  
+ve 
(P4c)  
I proportion of cases with +ve bidder gains 
>50% 
(P2c)  
50% 
(P4c)  
 relationships between target gains and bidder gains (P2d)  (P4c)  
J all positive combined gains cases +ve  non +ve  
K positive bidder gains subgroup same as neg  non -ve  
L negative bidder gains subgroup same as pos  -ve  
M relationship between target gains and combined gains 
+ve 
(P2e)  
Zero 
(P4c)  
      
 Negative combined returns subgroup of all the cases     
N bidder gains on average *  
-ve 
(P5a)  
-ve 
(P7a) 
O target gains on average *  
+ve 
(P5b)  
+ve 
(P7b) 
P relationship between target gains and combined gains  
Zero 
(P5c)  
-ve 
(P7c) 
      
 * Indicates a non-differentiating test  
** Can be zero or negative if Hubris cases dominate the group 
Combined returns are the returns to the bidder and target companies together 
Test propositions (see Chapter 5) are referred to as  (Pxy) 
  
161 
results are compared on a normalised basis for each regulatory outcome and displayed 
graphically for comparison. 
 
The results of the tests indicate only weak evidence of market perceptions of 
Managerialism. This is in contrast to earlier motivation research using similar 
methodology carried out in the USA (see Berkovitch and Narayanan, 1993; Seth et al., 
2000). 
 
7.2 Results for All Merger Cases Taken Together: Synergy, 
Hubris or Managerialism? 
By taking all merger cases together within each regulatory grouping, we are able to 
obtain an overall view of market perceptions of the merger. This allows the first 
assessment of whether Synergy, Hubris and Managerialism were considered to be 
present as motives for the mergers by investors. Table 7-2 lines A to F provides the 
descriptive statistics for the tests on all of the merger cases included in the study, and 
relates to lines A to F in Table 7-1 for comparison with expectations, and to Table 7-5 
lines A to F for a summary of the motivations found. 
 
7.2.1 Results for the Combined Firms 
The results (Table 7-2 line A) show significant positive combined gains except for the 
group of mergers that were “prohibited” after referral to the MMC/CC. The 
“prohibited” grouping showed a small non-significant gain. From our expectations 
(Table 7-1 line A), these results indicate that the “waived through”, “referred 
completed”, “laid aside”14, and “allowed not completed” groups showed market 
perceptions of Synergy. The “prohibited” group showed evidence of Hubris. Although 
the result for the prohibited group had a positive sign, the coefficient value is low and 
the result was statistically insignificant at the 10% level or better, and hence statistically 
indistinguishable from zero. This interpretation is summarised in Table 7-5 line A. 
                                                 
14
 “Laid aside” is the term used by the competition authorities for mergers which are abandoned after a 
referral to the MMC/CC. 
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Table 7-2. Test results for all merger cases studied 
   Referred not completed 
Tests W
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All the cases 
 
     
A. combined gains on average (%) 3.2 3.5 0.4 6.2 9.4
p 0.000 0.002 0.317 0.009 0.000
sig *** *** ns *** ***
      
B. bidder gains on average (%) -0.2 2.0 -3.7 0.9 -1.6
p 0.917 0.387 0.000 0.929 0.764
sig ns ns *** ns ns
      
C. target gains on average (see note 1)  (%) 16.4 19.3 17.2 23.4 35.1
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
sig *** *** *** *** ***
      
D. proportion of cases with +ve combined gains (%) 63.2 81.0 50.0 100.0 83.3
(see note 2)                                                          p 0.359 0.007 1.000 0.016 0.219
sig ns *** ns ** ns
      
E. relationship between target gains and bidder gains  (β) 0.60 -0.26 1.49 -0.87 0.32
p 0.370 0.711 0.405 0.394 0.111
sig ns ns ns ns ns
      
F. relationship between target and combined gains  (β) 1.57 1.20 2.84 -0.23 0.86
p 0.014 0.172 0.001 0.896 0.279
sig ** ns *** ns ns
number of cases 19 21 10 7 6
      
Note 1. This test does not differentiate between motivations 
 
Note 2. Binomial test for 50% ratio 
 
*** = significant at the 0.01% level 
**   = significant at the 0.05% level 
ns    = not statistically significant at the 0.1% level 
 
7.2.2 Bidder Company Results 
Bidder company gains (Table 7-2 line B) were smaller and non-significant for all of the 
merger groups except for the “prohibited” group, which showed a significant loss of 
3.7%. Comparing these results with our expectations (Table 7-1 line B) again indicates 
that investors perceive Synergy predominates in all of the merger groupings, except for 
those cases that were eventually prohibited. The “prohibited” cases indicated 
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perceptions of Hubris or Managerialism. These motivation results are summarised in 
Table 7-5 line B.  
 
7.2.3 Target Company Returns 
Target company returns (Table 7-2 line C) were all significantly positive, ranging from 
gains of 16% to 35%. However, as a positive return is expected for all motivations 
(Table 7-1 line C), this test does not differentiate between motives and will not be 
considered further. 
 
7.2.4 Proportion of Cases with Positive Gains 
The proportion of cases with positive combined gains (Table 7-2 line D) is significantly 
greater than that which might arise by chance (i.e. significantly greater than 50% using a 
Binomial test) for “referred completed” and the “laid aside” groups. The proportion of 
positive gains equal to those expected by chance (i.e. not significantly different to 50%) 
was found in the “waived through”, “prohibited” and “allowed not completed” 
groupings. Comparing these results with expectations (Table 7-1 line D) indicates a 
perception by investors of Synergy in “referred completed” and “laid aside” groups, and 
Hubris is indicated in the “waived through”, “prohibited” and “allowed not completed” 
groups. None of the groups were significantly less than 50% and hence there was no 
indication of investor perception that Managerialism dominated. These results are 
summarised in Table 7-5 line D. 
 
7.2.5 Relationships of Target to Bidder and Combined Gains 
The relationship between target and bidder gains (Table 7-2 line E) was not significant 
(i.e. statistically indistinguishable from a zero result) for any of the groups of mergers. 
Comparing this result to our expectations (Table 7-1 line E) indicates evidence of a 
perception of Synergy in all groups.  
 
The relationship between target and combined gains (Table 7-2 line F) is significantly 
positive for the “waived through” and “prohibited” groups, indicating Synergy when 
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compared to expectations (Table 7-1 line F). The “referred completed”, “laid aside” and 
“allowed not completed” groups did not show a significant relationship, indicating 
Hubris when compared to expectations (Table 7-1 line F).  
 
These results are summarised in Table 7-5 lines E and F. 
 
7.2.6 Summary of Test Results for All Cases Examined Together 
From the summary of motivation results in Table 7-5 below, evidence of Synergy is 
clearly present. However, there is also evidence of perceptions of Hubris as a merger 
motivation. Only the “prohibited” group of mergers showed any indications that 
Managerialism was the perceived motive, though this is weak. 
 
Each decision group recorded either Synergy or Hubris for all five differentiating tests, 
except in one test for one group (Table 7-5 line B column “prohibited”), which could 
have had a Hubris or a Managerialism (or both) interpreted result. The “waived 
through”, “referred completed”, and “laid aside” groups each had four Synergy and one 
Hubris results, “allowed not completed” three Synergy and two Hubris results, while 
“prohibited” had two Synergy two Hubris and one Hubris or Managerialism result. 
 
We now examine the results for groupings of positive and negative combined gains 
merger cases in more detail. The positive combined gains group is examined to 
determine the balance of Synergy and Hubris present in value creating mergers, while 
the negative combined gains group is examined to determine the balance of Hubris and 
Managerialism in value destroying mergers.  
 
7.3 Results for Positive Combined Gains: Synergy v Hubris? 
The Synergy Hypothesis proposes that mergers will only take place if value is created 
by the merger, as indicated by positive combined gains for the bidder and target 
companies. When mergers are motivated by Synergy in the presence of Hubris, 
valuation errors are made which reduce these combined gains. By examining only cases 
with positive combined gains, all cases will involve Synergy as a motivation. However, 
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it is possible to test for evidence of Synergy alone and Synergy in the presence of 
Hubris. The differentiating tests can be seen from lines G, I, J, K, L, and M. Table 7-3 
gives the results for the positive combined gains cases, again grouped by regulatory 
decision.  
 
From the expectations in Table 7-1, we expect bidder gains to be positive when 
motivated by Synergy alone and by Synergy in the presence of Hubris. However, if the 
Hubris cases are dominant in this positive combined group, bidder gains can fall to zero 
or be negative.  
 
7.3.1 Bidder Company Returns 
Our results for bidder gains (Table 7-3 line G) indicate a significant positive gain for 
“waived through” and “referred completed” cases, and a non-positive gain (i.e. 
statistically non-significant or significantly positive) for “prohibited”, “laid aside” and 
“allowed not completed” mergers. Comparing these findings with our expectations 
(Table 7-1 line G), we can conclude that investors perceived that Synergy alone or 
Synergy in the presence of a minority of Hubris cases motivated the “waived through” 
and “referred completed” groups. However, stronger evidence of perceptions of Hubris 
dominating in mergers existed in the “prohibited”, “laid aside” and “allowed not 
completed” groupings. The “waived through” and “referred completed” groups have 
been categorised as motivated by Synergy. The “prohibited”, “laid aside” and “allowed 
not completed” groups, which also demonstrated evidence of Hubris, have been 
categorised as Synergy coexisting with Hubris. These motivation results are 
summarised in Table 7-5 line G. 
 
7.3.2 Target Company Returns 
Target gains (Table 7-3 line H) are significantly positive for all of the merger groupings, 
ranging from almost 22% to 38% and this agrees with expectations (Table 7-1 line H). 
However this test does not allow us to differentiate between Synergy and Hubris 
because all motivations are expected to produce the same outcome of positive target 
returns. Therefore, this result will not be considered further. 
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Table 7-3. Test results for positive combined firm (bidder plus target firm) 
returns. 
   Referred not completed 
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Positive combined returns subgroup  
 
     
G. bidder gains on average (see note 1)  (%) 3.2 3.9 -2.1 0.9 2.0
p 0.002 0.015 0.072 0.929 0.147
sig *** ** * ns ns
      
H. target gains on average (see note 2)  (%) 22.3 21.8 28.9 23.4 38.0
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
sig *** *** *** *** ***
      
I. proportion of cases with +ve bidder gains  (%) 83.3 76.5 40.0 71.4 60.0
(see note 3)                                                           p 0.039 0.049 1.000 0.453 1.000
sig ** ** ns ns ns
      
relationships between target and bidder gains  (β)      
J.                                       all positive combined gains cases 0.17 -0.90 0.65 -0.87 -0.27
p 0.841 0.281 0.600 0.394 0.871
sig ns ns ns ns ns
     
K.                                          positive bidder gains subgroup 1.14 -0.29 6.06 -0.18 4.57
p 0.284 0.703 0.356 0.934 0.019
sig ns ns ns ns **
number of positive bidder gains cases 9 13 2 5 3
     
L.                                          negative bidder gains subgroup -2.10 -10.90 -0.78 -1.58 -5.34
p 0.282 0.033 0.391 0.709 0.013
sig ns ** ns ns **
number of negative bidder gains cases 3 4 3 2 2
     
M. relationship between target and combined gains  (β) 1.44 0.80 1.17 -0.23 0.99
p 0.146 0.474 0.322 0.896 0.437
sig ns ns ns ns ns
  
number of all positive combined gains cases 12 17 5 7 5
      
Note 1. This test only differentiates if Hubris cases are dominant in the group 
 
Note 2. This test does not differentiate between motivations  
 
Note 3. Binomial test for 50% ratio 
 
*** = significant at the 0.01% level 
**   = significant at the 0.05% level 
*     = significant at the 0.1% level 
ns   = not statistically significant at the 0.1% level 
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7.3.3 Proportion of Cases with Positive Returns 
Examining the proportion of cases with positive bidder gains (Table 7-3 line I) shows 
“waived through” and “referred completed” groups have proportions significantly 
greater than 50% (i.e. significantly greater than would occur by chance), supporting 
evidence of investors’ perceptions of Synergy as the dominant motivation (cf Table 7-1 
line I). However, “prohibited”, “laid aside” and “allowed not completed” groups had 
proportions not significantly different to 50%, supporting evidence of perceptions of 
Synergy in the presence of Hubris (cf Table 7-1 line I). These findings are summarised 
in Table 7-5 line I.  
 
7.3.4 Relationships of Target to Bidder and Combined Returns 
Closer examination of the relationship between target and bidder gains allows 
indications of Hubris to be detected. For all the cases in this positive combined gains 
group, the relationship between target and bidder gains (Table 7-3 line J) is non-
significant, indicating Synergy motivation in the presence of Hubris (Table 7-1 line J). 
By sub-dividing this positive combined returns group into positive and negative bidder 
returns sub-groups, and comparing these two target to bidder relationships in the sub-
groups, we are able to detect Hubris if the relationships are significantly different. When 
Hubris is present, we expect the negative bidder gains subgroup to have a negative 
target to bidder gains relationship and be significantly different to the positive subgroup. 
If the relationships of the positive and negative sub-groups are not significantly 
different, an investor perception of Hubris is considered not to be present. Using this 
approach and comparing results (Table 7-3 lines K & L) with our expectations (Table 
7-1 lines K & L), we find evidence of Synergy in the “waived through”, “prohibited”, 
and “laid aside” groups, and evidence of Synergy in the presence of Hubris in the 
“referred completed” and “allowed not completed” groups. 
 
Finally, we examine the relationship between target and combined gains. Comparing 
results (Table 7-3 line M) with our expectations (Table 7-1 line M) we find all groups 
show evidence of Synergy coexisting with Hubris. 
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These results are summarised in Table 7-5 lines J, K, L, and M. 
 
7.4 Results for Negative Combined Gains: Hubris v 
Managerialism? 
We would expect to find evidence of either Hubris or Managerialism in the negative 
combined gains group since both theories can explain value destruction. Closer 
examination of the negative combined returns group in Table 7-4 allows differentiation 
of Hubris and Managerialism. 
 
Table 7-4. Test results for negative combined firm (bidder plus target firm) 
returns. 
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Negative combined returns subgroup 
 
     
N. bidder gains on average (see note 1)   (%) -5.9 -5.8 -5.3 na -19.6
p 0.000 0.003 0.000 na 0.012
sig *** *** *** na **
      
O. target gains on average (see note 1)  (%) 6.4 8.8 5.6 na 20.2
p 0.000 0.007 0.000 na 0.001
sig *** *** *** na ***
      
P. relationship between target and combined gains  (β) 3.51 5.95 5.69 na na
p 0.288 0.206 0.001 na 0.000
sig ns ns *** ns ns
number of negative combined gains cases 7 4 5 0 1
      
Note 1. This test does not differentiate between motivations 
 
*** = significant at the 0.01% level 
**   = significant at the 0.05% level 
*     = significant at the 0.1% level 
ns    = not statistically significant at the 0.1% level 
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7.4.1 Bidder and Target Returns 
Bidder gains and target gains (Table 7-4 lines N & O) in this negative combined gains 
group are as expected (Table 7-1 lines N & O), but these tests do not differentiate 
between Hubris and Managerialism. Bidder gains (Table 7-4 line N) are all significantly 
negative from -19 .6% to -5 .3%. Target gains (Table 7-4 line O) are all significantly 
positive, between 5.6% and 20.2%. Apart from noting these test results are as expected, 
they will not be discussed further. 
 
The test that differentiates between Hubris and Managerialism is the relationship 
between target and combined gains. Our results for this test (Table 7-4 line P) show no 
significant relationship except for the “prohibited” group, where the result is 
significantly positive. A comparison of the results with expectations (Table 7-1 line P) 
indicates evidence of perceptions of managerial Hubris amongst investors. However, no 
evidence of Managerialism was found by this test in the negative combined gains group.  
 
The significant positive result for the negative combined gains of the “prohibited” group 
is not consistent with our original expectations. In Managerialism value is considered 
not to be created but transferred from the bidder to the target shareholders and to 
management, and we expected an inverse relationship between target and combined 
gains. As value is transferred to managements’ welfare, contributing to negative 
combined gains, bidders offer attractive premiums to ensure target shareholders accept 
the offer. The only other theoretical, motivational, cause of negative combined gains is 
Hubris. The primary expectation for Hubris, because of its random nature, is that no 
relationship exists between target and combined gains. However a non-negative 
relationship could be also interpreted as excluding Managerialism. Therefore in the 
negative combined gains group our test result expectation for Hubris could be extended 
from no relationship to a non-negative relationship between target and combined gains. 
On this basis, we can reasonably interpret the positive relationship found as evidence of 
Hubris. As the result is non-negative, it cannot be interpreted as evidence of 
Managerialism, and the positive nature of this test result would seem to be a stronger 
rejection of Managerialism in this sample of cases. 
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7.5 Overall Interpretations of the Motivations Present 
Using the above set of tests and comparing results with expectations has allowed us to 
identify market perceptions of the motivation for mergers in each group of the merger 
cases studied. The results of the tests are summarised in Table 7-5 and show the 
motivation appropriate to each test result (Table 7-5 lines A to P).  
 
It is possible that each group of like regulatory decisions will contain a mixture of 
Managerial motivations. In an environment of multiple motivations within each group, 
it is to be expected that the test results will show a range of Management motivations 
present in each merger decision grouping, and we now look at how we may form a 
broad conclusion about motivations from the complex detailed results of the tests. 
 
A method of scoring has been adopted, counting each motivation detected. First, a raw 
score is calculated for each decision group by counting the number of instances each 
motivation was found in the test results shown in Table 7-5. These raw scores are 
converted to a percentage score, representing the number of instances found as a 
percentage of the maximum number of instances possible for that motivation. The 
maximum number of instances is the number of tests that could produce a particular 
motivation result in Table 7-5. For Synergy this is the total number of tests in the “All 
the cases” (i.e. five tests) and “Positive combined returns subgroup” (i.e. five tests) 
sections of Table 7-5. The “Negative combined returns subgroup” cannot give a 
Synergy result, only Hubris or Managerialism. For Hubris and Managerialism the total 
number of tests that could produce those results is the number of tests in the “All the 
cases” (i.e. five tests) and “”Negative combined returns subgroup” (i.e. one test). 
Similarly for Synergy plus Hubris the number of tests that could give this result are 
those in the “positive combined gains subgroup” only (i.e. five tests). Following this 
approach gives the maximum score of ten for Synergy, six for Hubris, five for Synergy 
plus Hubris, and six for Managerialism. The percentage scores taken together form a 
profile for each group and are shown in the bottom section of Table 7-5. In addition, the 
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percentage score profiles for the decision groups are also shown graphically in Figure 
7-1. 
 
From the percentage scores Table 7-5 and Figure 7-1, differences can be seen between 
the profiles of the merger groups studied. The “waived through” group is clearly 
dominated by investor perceptions of Synergy as the dominant rationale for the mergers, 
though evidence of Hubris is also present. The “referred completed” group is less 
dominated by perceptions of Synergy and contains greater evidence of Hubris. In this 
group both Synergy and Hubris clearly coexist. The level of Hubris in both the “waived 
through” and “referred completed” groups is similar and neither of these groups shows 
evidence of Managerialism. 
 
By contrast, the “prohibited” group shows the lowest indication of perceived Synergy 
alone, while evidence of Hubris alone and coexisting with Synergy dominated the 
motivations. The “prohibited” group was the only group to show any evidence of 
Managerialism, although this result was weak. The “laid aside” group had a similar 
profile to the “referred completed” group, but with slightly less evidence of Synergy 
and more of Hubris. Finally, the “allowed not completed” group showed evidence of the 
lowest level of Synergy, the highest level of Hubris, and was dominated by cases where 
Synergy and Hubris coexisted. 
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Table 7-5. Summary of the categorisation of managerial motivation by grouping of 
mergers. 
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All the cases 
 
     
A. combined gains on average (%) S S H S S 
B. bidder gains on average (%) S S H or M S S 
C. target gains on average  (%)   (see note 1)      
D. proportion of cases with +ve combined gains (%) H S H S H 
E. relationship between target gains and bidder gains  (β) S S S S S 
F. relationship between target and combined gains  (β) S H S H H 
      
Positive combined returns subgroup       
G. bidder gains on average  (%)   (see note 2) S S H+S H+S H+S 
H. target gains on average (%)   (see note 1)      
I. proportion of cases with +ve bidder gains  (%) S S S+H S+H S+H 
relationships between target gains and bidder gains  (β)      
J.                                         all positive combined gains cases S+H S+H S+H S+H S+H 
K&L.      pos & neg bidder gains subgroup interpreted together S S+H S S S+H 
M. relationship between target and combined gains  (β) S+H S+H S+H S+H S+H 
      
Negative combined returns subgroup      
N. bidder gains on average   (%)  (see note 1)      
O. target gains on average  (%)   (see note 1)      
P. relationship between target gains and combined gains  (β) H H H 
(see 
note 3) 
(see 
note 3) 
      
Scores      
Raw scores      
Synergy (max score of 10) 7 6 3 5 3
Hubris (maximum score of 6) 2 2 3 1 3
Synergy + Hubris (maximum score of 5) 2 3 4 4 5
Managerialism (maximum score of 6) 0 0 1 0 0
Percentage scores (see note 4)      
Synergy 70 60 30 50 30
Hubris 33 33 50 17 50
Synergy + Hubris 40 60 80 80 100
Managerialism 0 0 17 0 0
S indicates evidence of Synergy, H indicates Hubris, S+H indicates Synergy in the presence of Hubris, 
H+S indicates Synergy and Hubris with Hubris dominant, M indicates Managerialism, and H or M shows 
evidence that Hubris or Managerialism or both could be present.  
Note 1. This test does not differentiate between motivations and is not included in the scores. 
Note 2. This test only differentiates when Hubris cases dominate the group and denoted by H+S, 
otherwise interpreted as S if +ve. 
Note 3. The number of cases in this group was too small for analysis. 
Note 4. Calculated by taking the actual points of agreement as a percentage of the maximum points of 
agreement (maximum of 10 for Synergy, 6 for Hubris, 5 for Synergy +Hubris, and 6 for Managerialism)  
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Figure 7-1.  Competition policy, managerial motivations and merger outcomes. 
 
 
7.6 Sensitivity of the Overall Motivation Results to the Use of 
Initial Pre-referral Returns 
The first regulatory announcement by the competition regulator relating to a merger is 
either the announcement of the case being “waved through”, or being “referred” to the 
MMC/CC for inquiry. After this point the outcome depends on decisions made 
following the inquiry, if the merger has been referred. In order to make an equitable 
judgement of evidence of motivations, results have been based in this research on 
market returns made between announcement of the deal and up to, but not including, the 
first regulatory announcement. This allows all cases to be considered on an equal basis, 
since judgements by the financial markets will all relate to the same degree of 
regulatory uncertainty. It also allows both completed and uncompleted mergers to be 
evaluated. 
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Previous studies on USA mergers (see Berkovitch and Narayanan, 1993; Seth et al., 
2000) using similar methodology to this research, published results based on completed 
merger cases only. In view of the lack of evidence of Managerialism in this research 
compared to these earlier US studies, this section investigates if the use of initial pre-
referral returns could have been responsible for the lack of evidence of Managerialism 
in this research. 
 
7.6.1 Sensitivity Analysis 
The question that requires an answer is: - 
"Could the use of initial pre-referred returns, rather than complete deal returns, 
cause changes to the interpretations of a motivation that might explain differences 
from earlier research?" 
 
To examine this question all merger cases that were completed (i.e. waved through and 
referred completed groups) had the test results calculated using both initial pre-referral 
returns and total deal returns. These results are presented in Table 7-6. It is to be 
expected that the numerical test results will differ slightly for the pre-referral and full 
deal returns in each group. However the differences are only material if they change the 
outcome of the assessment of the motivations when compared with Table 7-1. The 
comparative summary of assessments is shown in Table 7-7. 
 
7.6.2 Comparison of Motivation Assessments based on Initial Pre-
referral and Full Deal Returns 
Comparison of the motivational assessments in Table 7-7 reveals that the overall 
motivation profile for the referred completed group is not changed by using initial pre-
referral or full deal returns. The waved through group exhibited a slight increase in 
evidence of Synergy, while evidence of Hubris, and Synergy coexisting with Hubris 
decreased, when the full deal returns were used. Significantly, when the full deal returns 
were used, there were still no results that could be interpreted as evidence of perceptions 
of Managerialism. 
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Table 7-6. Comparison of Completed Merger Test Results based on Initial Pre-
referral and Full Deal Returns 
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All the cases 
    
A. combined gains on average (%) 3.2 3.5 4.1 7.8 
sig *** *** ** ** 
B. bidder gains on average (%) -0.2 2.0 -0.3 7.5 
sig ns ns ns ns 
C. target gains on average (see note 1)  (%) 16.4 19.3 18.6 26.8 
sig *** *** *** *** 
D. proportion of cases with +ve combined gains (%) 63.2 81.0 73.7 66.7 
(see note 3)                                                          sig ns *** * ns 
E. relationship between target gains and bidder gains  (β) 0.60 -0.26 0.03 0.28 
sig ns ns ns ns 
F. relationship between target and combined gains  (β) 1.57 1.20 0.21 0.32 
sig ** ns *** ** 
number of cases 19 21 19 21 
Positive combined returns subgroup  
    
G. bidder gains on average (see note 2)  (%) 3.2 3.9 3.7 12.7 
sig *** ** ** *** 
H. target gains on average (see note 1)  (%) 22.3 21.8 22.9 32.4 
sig *** *** *** *** 
I. proportion of cases with +ve bidder gains  (%) 83.3 76.5 78.6 66.7 
(see note 3)                                                           sig ** ** * ns 
relationships between target and bidder gains  (β)     
J.                              all positive combined gains cases 0.17 -0.90 -0.07 0.33 
sig ns ns ns ns 
K.                                 positive bidder gains subgroup 1.14 -0.29 0.05 0.58 
sig ns ns ns * 
number of positive bidder gains cases 9 13 11 10 
L.                                negative bidder gains subgroup -2.10 -10.90 -0.154 -0.10 
sig ns ** ns ns 
number of negative bidder gains cases 3 4 3 5 
M. relationship between target and combined gains  (β) 1.44 0.80 0.15 0.39 
sig ns ns *** * 
number of all positive combined gains cases 12 17 14 15 
Negative combined returns subgroup 
    
N. bidder gains on average (see note 1)   (%) -5.9 -5.8 -11.5 -5.5 
sig *** *** *** * 
O. target gains on average (see note 1)  (%) 6.4 8.8 6.6 13.5 
sig *** *** *** *** 
P. relationship between target and combined gains  (β) 3.51 5.95 0.04 0.01 
sig ns ns ns ns 
number of negative combined gains cases 7 4 5 6 
Note 1.  This test does not differentiate between motivations 
Note 2.  This test only differentiates if Hubris cases are dominant in the group 
Note 3.  Binomial test for 50% ratio 
*** = significant at the 0.01% level  
**   = significant at the 0.05% level 
*     = significant at the 0.1% level 
ns   = not statistically significant at the 0.1% level 
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Table 7-7. Comparison of Motivation Profiles based on Initial Pre-referral and 
Full Deal Returns 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interpretations of motivations from test 
results 
Based on initial 
pre-referral 
returns 
Based on total deal 
returns 
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All the cases 
 
    
A. combined gains on average (%) S S S S 
B. bidder gains on average (%) S S S S 
C. target gains on average  (%)   (see note 1)     
D. proportion of cases with +ve combined gains (%) H S S H 
E. relationship between target gains and bidder gains  (β) S S S S 
F. relationship between target and combined gains  (β) S H S S 
     
Positive combined returns subgroup      
G. bidder gains on average  (%)   (see note 2) S S S S 
H. target gains on average (%)   (see note 1)     
I. proportion of cases with +ve bidder gains  (%) S S S S+H
 
relationships between target gains and bidder gains  (β)     
J.                                         all positive combined gains cases S+H S+H S+H S+H 
K&L.      pos & neg bidder gains subgroup interpreted together S S+H S S+H 
M. relationship between target and combined gains  (β) S+H S+H S S 
     
Negative combined returns subgroup     
N. bidder gains on average   (%)  (see note 1)     
O. target gains on average  (%)   (see note 1)     
P. relationship between target gains and combined gains  (β) H H H H 
     
Scores     
Raw scores     
Synergy (maximum score 10) 7 6 9 6 
Hubris (maximum score 6) 2 2 1 2 
Synergy + Hubris (maximum score 5) 2 3 1 3 
Managerialism (maximum score 6) 0 0 0 0 
Percentage scores (see note 4)     
Synergy 70 60 90 60 
Hubris 33 33 16 33 
Synergy + Hubris 40 60 20 60 
Managerialism 0 0 0 0 
 
S indicates evidence of Synergy, H indicates Hubris, S+H indicates Synergy in the presence of Hubris, 
H+S indicates Synergy and Hubris with Hubris dominant, M indicates Managerialism, and H or M shows 
evidence that Hubris or Managerialism or both could be present.  
Note 1. This test does not differentiate between motivations and is not included in the scores. 
Note 2. This test only differentiates when Hubris cases dominate the group and denoted by H+S, otherwise 
interpreted as S if +ve. 
Note 3. The number of cases in this group was too small for analysis. 
Note 4. Calculated by taking the actual points of agreement as a percentage of the maximum points of 
agreement (maximum of 10 for Synergy, 6 for Hubris, 5 for Synergy + Hubris, and 6 for Managerialism) 
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This comparison of profiles for completed merger cases has been based on the use of 
initial pre-referral returns compared to full deal returns for evaluating investor 
perceptions of Managerial motivations. It is possible to say that this methodological 
change does not offer an explanation of differences with earlier USA research findings, 
particularly regarding the lack of UK evidence of Managerialism. It can be assumed this 
methodological difference is not the explanation. Other possible explanations will be 
discussed in Chapter 8. 
 
7.7 Summary 
This chapter reports the results of tests to identify motives, as perceived by the capital 
markets and therefore reflected in share price movements, for managers pursuing 
mergers in the UK over the period 1989 to 2002. The analysis was based on the 
following approach: - 
 The analysis reports the mix of motivations present in mergers, up to the point of 
first announcement by the Competition Regulator on a merger. This allows 
examination of completed and uncompleted mergers on an equitable basis. 
 Mergers are grouped on the basis of the final ex-post decisions, which were only 
known after the regulatory process had been completed. 
 The assessment of the motivations is based on a comparison of measured market 
returns for merger cases using expectations of the market response to mergers 
motivated by Synergy, Hubris and Managerialism (derived in Chapter 5) 
 
The tests each identified motivations (i.e. Synergy, Hubris, Synergy coexisting with 
Hubris, and Managerialism) for each group (i.e. waived through, referred completed, 
prohibited, laid aside, and allowed not completed). These tests results were combined 
on a normalised basis and identified that: - 
 In the case of “waived through” and “referred allowed” groups, mergers were 
motivated mainly by Synergy, although some evidence of Hubris was also found in 
these groups based on investors’ perceptions. 
 Where merger cases were referred to the MMC/CC and the deal was subsequently 
not completed (i.e. “allowed not completed” “laid aside” and “prohibited”), these 
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groups of cases were dominated by investor perceptions of Hubris coexisting with 
Synergy. 
 Only very limited evidence of investor perceptions of Managerialism as the motive 
for mergers was found. Weak evidence was only found in the group of “prohibited” 
cases. The low evidence of Managerialism is in contrast to earlier research findings 
in the USA, which reported stronger evidence of Managerialism. 
 Hubris was found to be present in all groups of cases. Both Hubris, and Synergy 
coexisting with Hubris, were highest in the “allowed not completed” and 
“prohibited” groups. The “laid aside” group showed similar levels of these 
motivations to the “referred completed” group but also showed lower evidence of 
Synergy.  
 
An overall assessment of investors’ perceptions of Managerial motivations present in 
the groups of cases investigated showed that: -  
 Synergy and Hubris were both present in the value creating mergers (positive 
combined returns), while Hubris was present in value destroying mergers (negative 
combined returns). 
 Hubris was clearly the more prevalent of the two “value reducing” motivations, 
Hubris and Managerialism. Only limited and weak evidence of Managerialism was 
found, while Hubris appeared in all groups to varying degrees. 
 
In order to investigate the lack of evidence of Managerialism found in the study, 
sensitivity analysis was carried out to determine if the use of initial pre-referral returns 
could have led to this assessment. The analysis found that: - 
 The use of initial pre-referral returns cannot explain the lack of evidence of 
Managerialism in this sample of UK mergers compared to earlier research findings 
of USA mergers (see Berkovitch and Narayanan, 1993; Seth et al., 2000) that used 
full deal returns. Other possible reasons for the finding on Managerialism in this 
research compared to earlier studies are explained in Chapter 8. 
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8 Discussion of Results and Conclusions. 
 
 
8.1 Introduction. 
The purpose of this chapter is to develop the wider picture of how the research findings 
presented in Chapters 6 and 7 fit with the existing literature discussed in Chapter 2 and 
the original research question in Chapter 1. It also discusses the implications of the 
findings for theory, previous empirical findings, research methodology and policy and 
practice and identifies items of new knowledge. Finally the chapter looks at the 
limitations of the research and suggests areas for beneficial future research. To help 
build the final picture, a brief summary of each previous chapter will assist the reader to 
place the findings of this research in context. 
 
Chapter 1, Introduction, opened this thesis with a discussion around mergers, aspects of 
their success and failure and why managers pursue these high-risk ventures. Merger 
regulation was introduced to ensure mergers were only allowed to proceed when the 
resulting combination did not work against the public interest, chiefly by reducing 
competition. The research question was formulated as: - 
 
“What effect does the regulation of mergers by the competition authorities in the 
UK have on shareholder value and managers’ motivations for undertaking 
mergers?” 
 
In Chapter 2, Literature Review, the existing literature was examined to determine the 
current state of knowledge and identify the knowledge gaps relating to the research 
question. With regard to the shareholder value, it concluded that the existing literature 
only covered mergers from mid 1960s to around 1990. Since then stock market rules 
have made information available more promptly and consistently, Corporate 
Governance rules have developed, and a series of privatisation mergers have been 
attempted under a dual regulator arrangement, where the competition regulator works in 
tandem with the industry specific regulator. It would therefore seem worthwhile to 
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investigate this later period from 1989 to 2002 to see if the empirical findings of earlier 
work still applied. 
 
Regarding the second part of the research question relating to managers’ motivations for 
mergers, existing literature had examined factors associated with the relationship 
between the CEO, the Board and the shareholders. In addition, some work had been 
done in the US to explore the role of Synergy seeking, Hubris and Managerialism in 
pursuing mergers. However, this had not examined the effect of merger regulation by 
the competition authorities on these motivations and none of the existing research 
related to UK mergers. It was therefore worth investigating what relationship existed 
between Synergy seeking, Hubris and Managerialism in mergers to the decisions made 
by the UK competition authorities.  
 
Chapter 3, Mergers and Merger Regulation in the UK, outlined the approach adopted to 
UK competition regulation to avoid a reduction in competition, by controlling mergers 
when necessary. The chapter describes the stages involved in the regulatory process in 
the context of merger practice. It concludes that the process is only aimed at control of 
competition, and is not charged with any responsibilities for, or involvement with, 
consideration of shareholder value impacts of mergers. The capital markets make their 
own predictions of likely regulatory outcomes based on their knowledge of the 
particular circumstances of a merger and the regulatory regime. In this respect a clear 
unambiguous statement of policy linked with a consistent approach to the application of 
policy in merger cases is essential for the capital market to operate efficiently. 
 
In Chapter 4, Methodology, we considered the possible methods available for 
investigating the research questions, discussed the research paradigm and the 
ontological and epistemological considerations. Hypothetico-deductive approaches were 
presented, testing propositions based on capital market returns measured at relevant 
events in the regulatory process. These returns were measured using event study 
techniques.  
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Chapter 5, Methods and Data, developed the conceptual approach from Chapter 4, 
detailing the event study measurement method, giving details of the data collected and 
also forming the test propositions.  
 
Chapters 6 and 7 reported the findings of the measurements and tests. Chapter 6, the 
Results for Shareholder Value, concentrated on shareholder value, related specifically to 
the stages in the regulatory process and the various decision outcomes at the end of the 
regulatory process. It also presented the shareholder value results under a range of 
circumstances and reported evidence of less efficient capital market pricing during 
mergers involving what were termed for convenience as “privatised industries” 
(industries co-regulated by the competition regulator plus at least one industry specific 
regulator). 
 
Chapter 7, Results for Managers’ Motivations, presented results from the tests assessing 
Managers’ motivations as perceived by the capital market. It found that mergers waved 
through by the OFT were mainly motivated by Synergy, though some evidence of 
hubris also existed in this group. When mergers were referred for inquiry to the 
MMC/CC, the strength of evidence of Synergy decreased, while evidence of Hubris 
increased. Mergers that were not completed contained the strongest evidence of Hubris. 
Surprisingly, unlike similar earlier research in the US, only weak evidence of 
Managerialism was found. 
 
This chapter now provides a further discussion of the results presented in Chapters 6 
and 7. It applies the findings to the original research questions of Chapter 1 and 
considers the literature discussed in Chapter 2, to form a complete picture. The chapter 
concludes by indicating where this work has contributed to knowledge and the 
implications arising from the work in the areas of theory, empirical findings, 
methodology and practice/policy. An assessment of the limitations of the research and 
indications for possible fruitful areas of future research are also covered. 
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8.2 Shareholder Returns Comparisons with Earlier Research. 
Competition policy can be expected to impact on shareholder value during each stage of 
a merger inquiry process. Investors can be expected to reassess the probable final 
outcome of the inquiry at each step in the process, repeatedly revising the share prices 
of the merging companies. This research has examined the impact of UK competition 
policy on shareholder value based on 50 mergers investigated by the MMC/CC between 
1989 and 2002. The study builds on earlier work on the effects of competition policy on 
shareholder value (especially Wier, 1983; Franks and Harris, 1993; Forbes, 1994) and 
additionally examines whether the regulatory process decreases efficient market 
behaviour in certain industry groupings.   
 
The empirical results support the findings of earlier work in the US and UK regarding 
the general level of shareholder value created for the bidder and target companies with 
target company shareholders being the main beneficiaries. They also support earlier 
findings that, on average, high abnormal losses are incurred by target company 
shareholders when a decision is announced by competition authorities prohibiting a 
merger. However, taking the regulatory process from initial bid to the MMC/CC’s final 
decision, the study does not support the conclusion of Wier (1983) that target 
shareholders faced with a prohibition decision make an overall loss. Instead, a small 
gain to target company shareholder value is recorded.  
 
UK competition policy has been in existence for over 50 years and while it has gone 
through a number of changes, most recently with the Competition Act 1998 and the 
Enterprise Act 2002, investors should have developed an understanding of the 
likelihood of a referral to the MMC/CC and the likely decision of the Commission. This 
understanding will be based on past experience involving similar mergers. It is likely 
that with the benefit of experience, investors’ judgements of possible competition policy 
outcomes will be reasonably stable. This offers one possible explanation for the small 
percentage losses to target company shareholders reported by Wier (1983) compared to 
the results from this study, which found a small gain to shareholders in target 
companies. Wier’s study deals with a different competition regime, that of the US, and 
perhaps the US stock market had more difficulty in the period studied in correctly 
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anticipating competition policy decisions.  However, in view of the long period over 
which the US has had antitrust legislation, dating back to the 1890 Sherman Act and the 
1914 Clayton Act, experience of the US regime should have been well documented and 
understood during Wier’s study period of December 1962 to March 1979.  
 
8.2.1 Industries with Industry Specific Regulators. 
The results also indicated that mergers involving industries in the water, electricity and 
communications industries that were subject to competition inquiries showed less 
efficient market behaviour than those in other industries. The explanation for this 
possibly lies in the greater uncertainty that surrounded the response of dual regulators to 
mergers in these sectors. The water and electricity sectors had been given a particular 
organisational structure at privatisation and it was unclear whether the regulators would 
allow this structure to be altered through mergers. The government was known to take a 
special interest in the future of communications because of the perceived importance of 
this industry for national wellbeing. The ”privatisation” cases may have experienced 
share price changes that were influenced by inexperience on the part of investors of the 
dual regulatory regime that exists for these sectors in the UK, involving both the 
MMC/CC and sector-specific regulatory offices. Another possible explanation relates to 
the large number of smaller shareholders in privatised firms as a result of government 
policy at privatisation. Small investors are likely to be less knowledgeable about 
competition policy than the financial institutions. Our research was unable to separate 
out these different possible explanations because the method used was not suitable for 
investigations of that nature.  
 
In summary, the study identifies that where a competition policy regime is stable and 
understood, there is no evidence of adverse overall costs due to share price movements 
for shareholders of target companies, when a merger bid is taken in its entirety from 
announcement to completion. Cases were also tested for evidence of efficient market 
behaviour using Propositions 1 and 2 as formulated in Chapter 5, section 5.5.1 and with 
the results reported in Chapter 6, section 6.3. Both Propositions (repeated below in 
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italics) are based on the assumption of efficient market behaviour and provide a 
yardstick against which cases are tested directly.   
 
 Proposition 1. In merger cases where the deal is prohibited by the regulator or 
abandoned by the companies, the value change arising from bid specific events 
to the target company, from bid announcement to bid abandonment, is expected 
to be zero.  
 
 Proposition 2. In merger cases where the deal is allowed (but not conditionally 
allowed) the value change arising from bid specific events to the target company 
from bid to deal close is greater than zero.  
 
Conditionally allowed cases were excluded from tests of these propositions because 
their outcomes can vary widely. They represent a continuous spectrum of decisions in 
the middle ground between allowed (as presented by the bidder) and prohibited, and 
depend on the nature and degree of remedies required by the MMC/CC. As such they 
present a classification problem for use in these tests, and have been omitted.  
 
While the “other” industry group cases matched both propositions, the “privatised” 
industry group failed to match in about half of the cases. This provides evidence that the 
market behaviour differed for the two groups. The “other” industry group, operating in a 
more stable, mature and less complex regulatory regime, showed evidence of efficient 
market behaviour having taken place. However the “privatised” industry group with the 
dual (or even multiple) regulatory structure, of which investors had less experience, 
showed evidence of less efficient market behaviour. The evidence is consistent with a 
stable regulatory regime supporting efficient market behaviour. This finding suggests 
that where major changes to merger policy are introduced, it is to be expected that a 
period of adjustment will follow for investors, during which experience is being gained, 
before more efficient market behaviour returns, and investors, managers and policy 
makers should be cognisant of this when making plans. 
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8.3 Motivation Results. 
This research has considered the stock market’s perceptions of Managers’ motivations 
for mergers and the possible impact of competition policy on those motivations. 
Collectively, stock market investors made judgements of the merger related 
announcements. These investors’ judgements were then reflected in the market price 
movements. The classifications of Managers’ motivations were inferred statistically 
from these share price movements for the merging firms resulting from the 
announcements specifically related to merger related events. The motivations were then 
classified into the three groups Synergy, Hubris and Managerialism. The results of 
Chapter 7 therefore reflect how capital market investors collectively interpreted and 
judged Managements’ behaviour through information contained in the related merger 
announcements and information already released to the markets before the bid was 
announced. 
 
In summary, the research results suggest that during the study period investors 
perceived Synergy as the dominant motivation for mergers which were “waived 
through” by the OFT. For those mergers referred to the MMC/CC by the OFT for a full 
competition investigation, the results indicate the “referred completed” group being 
motivated by Synergy and by Synergy coexisting with Hubris. However, in the three 
groups of merger cases where the deals were not completed Hubris dominated. 
Interestingly, there was an almost complete lack of evidence of Managerialism in the 
results with only weak evidence of it in the “prohibited” group. This stands in stark 
contrast to earlier US research findings. We will now discuss the results and their 
meaning in more depth. 
 
8.3.1 Motivations in Cases Waived Through by OFT. 
Of the 19 cases “waived through” by the OFT a total of 12 had positive gains for the 
combination (bidder plus target shareholders), while seven had negative combined 
gains. The cases overall showed evidence of Synergy dominating, but they also 
indicated it co-existed with Hubris. As these cases were “waived through” by the OFT, 
capital market investors would probably have been less concerned about the bidders’ 
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assessment of the possibility of regulatory intervention in the bidders original bid 
proposal and more concerned about possible valuation errors in bids. In the negative 
combined group only evidence of Hubris was found. 
 
The results suggest that the group of cases “waived through” by the OFT were 
motivated by Managers seeking benefits, savings and synergies from combination. 
However the results also suggest that markets detected some signs of overpayment for 
the shares of the target firm, hence leading to reduced shareholder value for bidders’ 
shareholders. The risk of regulatory intervention would be low in this group, and 
therefore the capital market is less likely to have perceived Managers had incorrectly 
underestimated this risk. 
 
8.3.2 Motivations in Cases Referred to the MMC/CC by the OFT. 
In the UK, competition policy has been based on preventing mergers where there would 
be a detrimental effect on the public interest and more recently where mergers can be 
expected to lead to a substantial lessening of competition. Where the OFT suspect 
mergers fall into this group they refer them to the MMC/CC for an inquiry and decision 
on the competition issues of the cases. It is not the role of the OFT and the MMC/CC to 
protect shareholders from ill-founded mergers that lead to a reduction in shareholder 
value. Neither are competition authorities concerned with policing mergers for Hubris 
and Managerialism. Nevertheless, our findings suggest that, as a by-product, the 
competition regime may have these effects.  
 
The almost universal presence of Hubris in the initial bids of referred cases does suggest 
that these merger bids are perceived as error prone from the outset. However, in some of 
the groupings where Hubris was perceived, the mergers were not completed i.e. they 
were withdrawn and fall into the categories of “laid aside” and “allowed not 
completed”.  It is possible, therefore, that because a competition inquiry by the OFT and 
especially by the MMC/CC delays the conclusion of a merger and turns the spotlight on 
it, the effect is to reduce the prevalence of Hubris and Managerialism. In particular, 
during a competition inquiry managers are asked to provide much information about the 
merger and its rationale. They also can be expected to seek advice from consultants 
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(legal, economic and financial) and are accountable to major shareholders for the 
outcome of the inquiry. It is probable, therefore, that the competition inquiry provides 
time and the opportunity for Managers to rethink the case for the merger and to unearth 
errors in previous calculations and rationales for the merger. In this sense, the 
competition inquiry process may provide an unintended opportunity for Managers to 
reflect on cases and reconsider if they should proceed with their bid. This would 
eliminate some mergers motivated by Hubris and Managerialism and the associated 
value destruction. We will now look at the motivations associated with the referred 
cases. 
 
8.3.2.1 Motivations in Referred Cases Allowed to Proceed After Inquiry. 
In any cases referred to the MMC/CC for inquiry, the OFT has doubts about 
competition and regulatory aspects of these merger bids. When bid details are 
announced any aspects of regulatory doubt will be placed before the capital market and 
the collective judgements of investors will be exercised in the pricing. The referred 
cases have more competition issues than those “waived through” by the OFT, and 
therefore have greater potential for managers to underestimate the risk and 
consequences of regulatory intervention in addition to valuation errors. As with the 
valuation errors, over-estimation by bidders of the likelihood of regulatory intervention 
and an adverse finding would have made the merger more unattractive at the planning 
stage resulting in it not being pursued. Hence over-valuation errors and under-estimates 
of regulatory intervention are the only errors likely to be seen by capital markets.  
 
The “referred completed” group includes seven “allowed” decisions and 14 
“conditionally allowed” decisions (six involving behaviour remedies and eight with 
structure remedies). The “conditionally allowed” cases involve bidders agreeing 
remedies with the OFT in return for the merger being allowed to proceed. The 
behavioural remedies involve a change or restraint to operations of the combined entity, 
and would typically involve measures such as voluntary price restraint. Structural 
remedies involve changes to the structure of the proposed combined operation. 
Typically this involves organisational changes to combined corporate assets, often 
involving divestments and sales of assets of either the bidder or target companies, 
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thereby limiting the degree of operation of the final merged entity in a market. The 
agreed remedies can have a significant financial and economic impact on the predicted 
outcome of the proposed merger from that originally described by the bidder in the 
initial bid announcement. 
 
Cases likely to be referred will have unresolved regulatory issues when they are first 
announced. Bidders have an opportunity to negotiate an undertaking with the OFT in 
lieu of being referred, which can take place between the bid announcement and the OFT 
referral decision. Failure to address potential regulatory issues in advance of the OFT 
referral announcement would therefore be consistent with under estimation of the 
regulatory issues and the bid could be perceived by the capital markets as motivated by 
Hubris. The greater the significance of the unresolved regulatory issues when a bid is 
referred, the more likely capital markets would perceive the bidder’s Management are 
motivated by Hubris. 
 
The empirical findings for the “referred allowed” group are consistent with this 
argument. An increase in Hubris would be expected while Synergy would be expected 
to decrease. This would apply to merger cases that the capital markets expect to be 
referred even when there is a good chance of the merger eventually being allowed to 
proceed after inquiry. 
 
8.3.2.2 Motivations in Referred Cases which were not Completed. 
Referred merger cases that were referred but not completed fall into three decision 
groups, “laid aside, “prohibited” and “allowed not completed”. Cases are laid aside 
during an inquiry when the bidder and target companies decide not to proceed with the 
merger and give undertakings to the competition regulator that the merger will not 
proceed. This may occur if the background to the bid changes (e.g. a new bidder makes 
a competitive bid for the target and the original bidder does not wish to enter a 
competitive bidding competition after the inquiry is completed). Alternatively, the 
bidder and the target may not wish either to take the risk of the deal being prohibited or 
the imposition of certain conditions on the deal by the MMC/CC and the OFT. 
Management in cases in the laid aside group reconsidered their positions after referral 
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and obtaining further information. This makes this course of action consistent with the 
bidder being motivated by Hubris and discovering errors or over-confident assumptions 
in their initial bid. The empirical findings of the laid aside group, being motivated 
mainly by Synergy coexisting with Hubris, is consistent with this scenario with 
Management taking the opportunity to reconsider during the inquiry process. 
 
In the prohibited merger cases the MMC/CC would have found evidence that the 
mergers are against the public interest, even though synergies may be significant in 
some mergers if allowed to proceed. Why then should our findings show the prohibited 
group of cases were initially perceived as dominated by Hubris rather than pure 
Synergy? Is this an artefact of the methodology and an aberration of the lens through 
which we are interpreting motivation, or is there an explanation of deeper significance?  
 
A manifestation of Hubris is when a bidder’s Management believes merger benefits are 
present and realisable at a level greater than the publicly available facts and data might 
support. For example, this could occur when the information available to the bidder 
about the target is limited during the bid process, and over-optimistic valuation 
judgements are made. In these circumstances, the capital market could arrive at different 
conclusions to the Management of bidding companies regarding the degree of value 
likely to be created by the merger. This difference of opinion is reflected in the pattern 
of bidder and target firms’ share price movements and gains. The reported perception of 
Hubris in prohibited cases is consistent with over-optimistic  Management in the 
bidding firms, underestimating the likelihood of regulatory intervention.  Such over-
optimism about the degree of anticipated regulatory intervention could arise, for 
example, from taking inadequate professional advice during bid preparation, ignoring 
professional advice, over-confident opinions by the bidder of their abilities to persuade 
the OFT or the MMC/CC of the merger’s merits, “we will worry about it later if it 
happens” or “they wouldn’t dare stop this deal because it’s a special case…”. Our 
finding of Hubris in prohibited cases is consistent with over-confident and unrealistic 
assessments by Managers of their abilities to persuade the regulators of their case and 
the possible impact of the subsequent regulatory intervention. 
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The “allowed not completed” group consists of merger cases that completed their 
inquiry and were allowed to proceed either conditionally or unconditionally. Events 
subsequent to the MMC/CC decision resulted in the bidder not completing the deal. 
There are only six cases of this in the full sample of mergers analysed and the details of 
the cases are shown in Table 8-1 to provide a better understanding of this group. All the 
cases were involved in competitive bidding and Table 8-1 shows the relationship to the 
competitive bidder. All the cases in the “allowed not completed” group are losers in 
competitive bidding situations who had announced the first bid. The regulatory 
treatment of the bidding competitors was very similar with both cases being referred 
and receiving similar decisions in five of the six cases. In the other case (PacifiCorp and 
Energy Group) the initial bid was referred and allowed to proceed. After the decision 
was announced Texas Utilities entered the bidding and this merger was waived through 
by the OFT.  
 
Allowed not Completed Cases Winning Competitive Bidder 
Bidder Target Bid date R
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Winning bidder R
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Yale Valor Myson 21 Jul 89 A Initial Blue Circle A 
Unichem Macarthy 11 Jul 91 A Initial Lloyds Chemists A 
Brit Aerospace VSEL 12 Oct 94 A Initial GEC A 
Unichem Lloyds Chemists 18 Jun 96 CA Initial GEHE CA 
PacifiCorp Energy Group 11 Jun 97 A Initial Texas Utilities WT 
Carlton United News & Media 26 Nov 99 CA Initial Granada CA 
Key to regulatory decisions;  
A is allowed, CA is conditionally allowed, WT is waived through.  
Table 8-1 Allowed not completed cases shown with winning bidders 
 
A bidder may have only a few permissible situations to allow them to disengage from a 
merger bid at a late stage without serious risk of litigation by the target company. It is 
usual for merger bids to be conditional on obtaining the necessary regulatory approvals 
and other legal essentials such as shareholder approval, but there are usually only a 
small number of other circumstances in the agreed contract that might allow a bidder to 
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withdraw from their purchase. Hence, once the regulatory approvals have been given 
the most likely reason for withdrawing is the intervention of rival bidders. 
 
 The empirical findings for this group indicated the highest level of Hubris, and Synergy 
coexisting with Hubris, for any group. These findings are consistent with investors 
perceiving over-valuation errors or over-confident estimates in the pre-referral bids but 
which have a reasonable chance of regulatory approval. Under the pressure of 
competitive bids, perceptions of Hubris would be expected to increase as Managers 
struggle to improve offers involving increased premiums. Ultimately one of the bidders 
realises that the premium required to win the merger battle is too great to be funded by 
realisable synergies and benefits, and withdraws. It may also be at this late stage that 
Managers become more aware of any weaknesses in their original bid and take the 
opportunity to withdraw from further bidding. A further explanation also exists based 
on one bidder knowingly over-bidding to force up the price, but allowing the competitor 
finally to win only after considerably over-paying for the purchase (i.e. the winner’s 
curse). We will never know what precisely happened in the minds of the bidders or the 
covert games being played in each case, but the behaviours associated with losers of 
competitive bidding could be interpreted as evidence of Hubris. The relationship 
between Managers’ motivations and possible behaviours is discussed further in 
Appendix 1. 
 
8.3.3 Overview of Motivations by Regulatory Outcome. 
Two major points of interest can be drawn from the results of this study in addition to 
the finding on the absence of Managerialism. Firstly Synergy is well represented as the 
perceived motivation for mergers, but it does decline in cases referred for inquiry to the 
MMC/CC or which ultimately failed to be completed (“prohibited”, “laid aside” or 
“allowed and not completed” by the bidder). It appears the more that a merger bid is 
perceived to be motivated by Synergy, the greater are its chances of proceeding through 
the competition regulation process without impediment. Secondly, the role of Hubris is 
important. As Synergy declines Hubris increases. When account is taken of its ability to 
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coexist with Synergy, it is a major factor in reducing value creation. In some groups 
where it co-exists, the evidence suggests that Hubris may dominate over Synergy.  
 
Overall, the study findings suggest that in the UK between 1989 and 2003, mergers 
subject to scrutiny by the competition authorities were considered by capital market 
investors to be mainly motivated by Synergy seeking behaviour. However the capital 
market also suspected a degree of Hubris was present. Insofar as investor perceptions 
were correct, this means that the mergers analysed were mainly driven by value creation 
motives. Where value was destroyed it appears to have been more by accident (Hubris) 
than managerial conspiracy (Managerialism). Interestingly, the few cases where the 
capital market initially perceived Managerialism to be present, namely the prohibited 
group, the mergers were later prohibited by the regulatory process on competition 
grounds.  
 
8.3.4 Absence of Evidence of Managerialism. 
The absence of perceptions of Managerialism as the motivation for mergers in the 
research results stands in stark contrast to the findings of Berkovitch and Narayanan 
(1993) and Seth et al. (2000), where both found evidence of Managerialism using 
broadly the same method and relying on investors’ perceptions. The difference in 
findings may be explained by the different data sets used and by the fact that the US 
studies were based on gains from bid to close for completed mergers and would 
therefore include the effects of auctions when bids became competitive. Neither 
Berkovitch and Narayanan nor Seth et al. were concerned specifically with mergers 
subject to competition policy vetting. In this study we were concerned with the effects 
of competition policy on merger motivation and therefore with both completed and non-
completed bids. To investigate if the different results might be due to using initial bid 
results rather than full bid results for completed deals, as a check full bid results were 
used for the merger deals in this study. No evidence of Managerialism was found in 
these completed cases when the full deal was taken into account (for the full discussion 
see Chapter 7, section 7.6). This finding suggests that the use of gains from the initial 
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bids only does not explain the relative lack of evidence of Managerialism in this UK-
based study compared to the earlier US studies. 
 
The sample used in this study was developed to focus on merger regulation by the UK 
competition authorities, and it is quite small in terms of the number of cases analysed. 
The finding of only weak evidence of Managerialism may reflect the difficulty of 
separating out Hubris from Synergy and Managerialism given the statistical method 
used. In this regard, Hubris could be considered as an intermediate category between 
Synergy and Managerialism as far as stakeholder value effects are concerned in this 
sample. 
 
In addition to including completed and uncompleted mergers, this study also includes 
different time periods to the earlier studies, using data on more recent mergers. As 
capital markets and the market for corporate control become more competitive, it is 
possible that the opportunity for Managerialism may decrease.  
 
8.3.5 The Role and Importance of Hubris. 
The results of this research demonstrate that capital markets perceive that mistakes are 
present in the initial merger bids and that it is Hubris rather than Managerialism that 
predominates in explaining the disappointing performance of many mergers. In addition 
Hubris increases and Synergy decreases as the possibility of regulatory intervention 
rises. This suggests that management needs to become more skilled with respect to 
understanding the competition regulation regime when undertaking merger deals. 
 
The relative importance of Hubris could be usefully tested by further research on a 
larger and more general sample of UK mergers. If Hubris is confirmed as the major 
cause of shareholder value reduction in UK mergers, it leads directly to the question of 
what can be done to UK practice and policy to improve matters.  
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8.4 Overall Summary of Discussions in Relation to the 
Research Question. 
The research question formulated in Chapter 1 asked: - 
 
“What effect does the regulation of mergers by the competition authorities in the 
UK have on shareholder value and managers’ motivations for undertaking 
mergers?” 
 
The discussion above can now be summarised to answer this question. 
 
 
The shareholder value effects of merger regulation by the UK competition regulator 
have been similar in the period studied by this research (1989 to 2002), compared to 
earlier research by Franks and Harris (1993) and Forbes (1994) over the period from the 
late 1960s to around 1990. This research has added some detail to earlier findings about 
the shareholder value effects when cases are laid aside, having a similar effect to the 
merger being prohibited. The research was not able to confirm findings in US mergers 
by Wier (1983) which showed an overall loss to target company shareholder when the 
merger was prohibited. 
 
In addition, the findings of this research showed that mergers of companies in privatised 
industries behaved differently to mergers in other industries. Market efficiency appears 
to have been reduced in the cases of the so-called “privatised industry” mergers 
compared to the mergers in the other industries. The mergers involved dual regulators 
(industry specific regulators working in tandem with the competition regulator), and 
were the first merger cases involving privatised companies with capital markets having 
little previous experience of regulatory outcomes. In addition, the shareholder structure 
had a higher than normal proportion of small investors. All these characteristics of the 
privatised companies at the time differed from companies in other industries and could 
have interfered with efficient market operation. 
 
The second part of the research question, relates to Managers’ motivations for mergers. 
This research provides evidence that investors perceive Managers to be mainly 
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motivated by seeking Synergy when mergers were waived through by the competition 
regulator. However, there was also evidence that Synergy coexists with Hubris in this 
group.  
 
In merger cases referred to the MMC/CC the evidence of Synergy decreased while 
evidence of Hubris increased. Hubris was found to exist almost universally across the 
sample in all groups related to MMC/CC decisions and appears to be the largest 
motivation associated with value destruction. Only weak evidence was found of 
Managerialism in the prohibited group. This lack of Managerialism is in contrast to 
findings in earlier US studies (Berkovitch and Narayanan, 1993; Seth et al., 2000). It 
appears that the competition regulator unintentionally is more likely to become involved 
in cases motivated by higher levels of Hubris and Managerialism, while cases motivated 
by Synergy have the best chances of proceeding without involvement of the regulator. 
This research suggest that Hubris, rather than Managerialism, is the more common 
motivation associated with shareholder value loss in mergers. 
 
8.5 Contributions to Knowledge. 
There are several new findings in this research that contribute to knowledge. They occur 
in the results relating to: - 
 The impact of merger regulation on shareholder returns  
 Comparisons with similar work both in the US and the UK 
 Aspects of the methodology used 
 Findings of the effects of regulatory scrutiny on Managers’ motivations for 
mergers.  
 
A conceptual matrix framework has been adopted, to systematically embrace the items 
contributing to knowledge and to allow them to be grouped. The form of the matrix is 
shown below in Table 8-2. The four categories of contributions are: - 
 Theory 
 Empirical Findings 
 Methodology  
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 Policy and Practice.  
Each of these categories is examined to identify if the contribution is: - 
 Non-confirmation of previous findings 
 Confirmation of previous findings 
 Developments of previous findings 
 A new finding.  
This approach covers the possible forms of the research contribution. Since this research 
does not put ticks in all boxes it also shows where contributions have not been 
identified, giving a comprehensive overview of what contributions have been made and 
where. In the matrix the items listed are in straight text format, each subparagraph 
representing the contents of each of the cells in the matrix. The appropriate 
subparagraph numbers below, including the relevant discussion, are contained in the 
cells of Table 8-2. 
 
Areas of 
Contribution 
Not confirmed Confirmed Development New 
Theory 8.5.1.1 8.5.1.2 8.5.1.3 8.5.1.4 
Empirical 
Findings 
8.5.2.1 8.5.2.2 8.5.2.3 8.5.2.4 
Methodology 8.5.3.1 8.5.3.2 8.5.3.3 8.5.3.4 
Practice and 
Policy 
8.5.4.1 8.5.4.2 8.5.4.3 8.5.4.4 
Table 8-2. Matrix of Contributions to Knowledge arising from the research (showing subparagraph 
numbers). 
 
Using this matrix-based concept the contributions to knowledge are discussed below. 
 
8.5.1 Implications for Theory. 
Implications for theory arising from the findings of this research are concentrated 
around the impact of regulatory policy on market efficiency, and the relative importance 
of Agency and Hubris theories on value destruction in mergers.  
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8.5.1.1 Aspects of Theory Not Confirmed. 
 Managerialism which is related to Agency theory, is not confirmed as being the 
major motivation associated with shareholder value destruction in either mergers 
referred to the MMC/CC for inquiry or in cases waived through by the OFT. 
Hubris appears to be a far more important source of shareholder value reduction 
from the results of this research. Therefore this research does not support the 
view that Managerialism was the sole or major cause of shareholder value 
reduction in mergers between 1989 and 2002, at least in the subset investigated 
in this thesis, namely those mergers subject to UK competition regulation. 
 
8.5.1.2 Aspects of Theory Confirmed. 
 Hubris is confirmed as being present in Managers’ motivations in UK mergers, 
particularly those referred to the MMC/CC between 1985 and 2002. 
 Evidence of Synergy seeking behaviour is also confirmed in UK mergers 
between 1989 and 2002, though evidence also suggests it coexists with Hubris. 
 
8.5.1.3 Implications for Theory Development. 
In this research, for UK mergers between 1989 and 2002, the findings suggest that: - 
 A positive relationship exists between the degree of Hubris in Managers’ 
motivations for mergers and the degree of regulatory intervention present in the 
final decisions of MMC/CC inquiries. 
 A negative relationship exists between the degree of Synergy in Managers’ 
motives for mergers and the degree of regulatory intervention present in final 
decisions by the MMC/CC inquiries. 
 
8.5.1.4 New Implications for Theory. 
 The research in this thesis has not revealed findings that provide new theories. 
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8.5.2 Implications for Empirical Findings 
Earlier empirical research that can be compared with the findings of this research are 
contained in the work on shareholder value by Wier (1983) in the US, and Franks and 
Harris (1993) and Forbes (1994) in the UK. There have not been any previous studies 
relating to motivations for mergers in the context of competition regulation in the US or 
UK. General findings relate to earlier studies by Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) and 
Seth et al (2000).  
 
8.5.2.1 Empirical Findings Not Confirmed. 
 This research indicates different findings to Wier (1983) whose research was 
based on US cases over the period 1962-1979. Wier’s finding of a loss to US 
target company shareholders of –3% when a merger was cancelled was not 
confirmed by this research. 
 Findings in two earlier US studies using a broadly similar event study 
methodology to this research by Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993), and Seth et 
al (2000), found stronger evidence of managerialism in their samples. This 
research does not support the earlier US findings in this respect. Evidence of 
Hubris is greater than evidence of Managerialism, which suggests Hubris is the 
main cause of poor performance in UK merger deals, rather than Managerialism, 
at least in the sample of competition cases included in this study. 
 
8.5.2.2 Empirical Findings Confirmed. 
 This research, based on UK merger cases between 1989 and 2003, updates work 
by Forbes (1994) and Franks and Harris (1993) whose findings were based on 
UK cases of  regulated mergers over the period 1965 to 1990. The findings show 
broadly similar impacts of regulatory decision announcements as in the earlier 
period for both bidder and target company shareholders 
 For UK target company shareholders, the finding of no overall impact when a 
merger is prohibited, is consistent with earlier findings (Franks and Harris, 
1993). UK target shareholders suffered statistically significant losses on referral 
announcement of -3.2% compared to  –9% reported by Franks and Harris 
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(1993). On a prohibition, decision losses of -8.9% were found compared to –9% 
reported by Franks and Harris (1993). However, overall these losses did not 
exceed the gains made on initial announcement of the bid, leaving target 
company shareholders with a small gain overall (4.8% compared to an 
equivalent inferred gain by Franks and Harris (1993) of 3%). In the context of 
the findings on target shareholder gains, the effect of the UK merger regulation 
policy during the second half of the regime (1989 to 2002) is similar to the first 
half of the regulatory regime (1965 to 1990). 
 
8.5.2.3 Developments and the Empirical Findings. 
 This work extends the knowledge of the impact of the regulatory decision 
announcements in “Laid aside” and “Conditionally allowed” decisions, which 
were categories not previously reported in earlier research. 
 
8.5.2.4 New Empirical Findings. 
 Evidence of inefficient market pricing was found in some mergers of companies 
in UK “privatised industries”. These industries were not included in the earlier 
studies because privatisation and the creation of new regulatory structures did 
not occur until from the mid 1980s. 
 The research on the effect of regulatory scrutiny on Managerial motivation for 
mergers offers new insights about the effect of the regulatory process on 
Managerial behaviour. The research finds initial Managerial motivation for 
mergers is correlated with the ex post regulatory outcome. The group of cases 
waived through by the OFT contained greater evidence of Synergy compared 
with groups of cases referred for investigation by the MMC/CC in which Hubris 
dominated the findings. However evidence of Hubris occurs to varying degrees 
in all groups. 
 The competition regulatory process seems to detect cases where there is lower 
evidence of Synergy, rather than deterring Managers in the first place from 
making decisions motivated by Hubris. This is interesting since competition-
reducing mergers (i.e. referred cases) could be expected to be highly motivated 
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by Synergy seeking, with Management pushing the regulatory authorities to 
allow the increased scale of operations even where the merger may reduce 
competition. 
 
8.5.3 Implications for Methodology. 
Methodologically this research has been based on previously used approaches that have 
been refined and adapted to suit the nature of this particular research. Summated 
announcement returns have been used in place of wide event windows to calculate 
shareholder value returns, and earlier methods of assessing Managers’ motivations have 
been developed to allow comparisons between groups and to include both completed 
and uncompleted merger cases in the comparison. 
 
8.5.3.1 Aspects of Methodology Not Confirmed. 
This research has not revealed any findings that contradict existing knowledge of 
methodology as used in this thesis. 
 
8.5.3.2 Confirmed Aspects of Methodology. 
 The use of event study to measure shareholder short-run, announcement returns 
for time-bounded events in studies of regulatory impact is confirmed.  
 The hypothetico-deductive methodology using event study measurement of 
announcement returns is confirmed for comparative testing of market efficiency 
between two groups of mergers.    
 The hypothetico-deductive methodology based on event study measurement of 
announcement returns is confirmed for the assessment of investor perceptions of 
Managerial motivations for undertaking mergers. 
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8.5.3.3 Development Aspects of Methodology. 
 Method of measurement using summation of announcements gives more 
discrimination against confounding events than previous event study research 
using measures with a single, wide event window. 
 Use of summated announcement returns allows selective measurement of a 
specific time period with greater precision than using a wide event window. In 
the case of this research, it allows the returns to be measured up to referral, 
however long that period was.  
 
 
8.5.3.4 New Aspects of Methodology. 
 The use of summated announcement returns allows comparison of uncompleted 
merger bids, abandoned or prohibited after referral, with completed bids on the 
basis of initial motivations before referral occurred. 
 The methodology used to assess Managers’ motivations has been extended 
beyond that in previously reported research to allow the ranking of motivations 
between comparative study groups. 
 
8.5.4 Implications for Practice and Policy. 
The findings of this research have implications for the formulation of, and changes to, 
regulatory policies. They indicate when policies may cause side effects on the 
functioning of capital markets and hence have shareholder value implications.  
 
Findings related to Managers’ motivations for mergers have implications for Corporate 
Governance mechanisms associated with best practice and policies for merger. These 
contributions are considered in more depth below.  
 
8.5.4.1 Aspects of Policy and Practice Not Confirmed 
 Managerialism is not confirmed as a dominant motivation, and hence the main 
motivation associated with shareholder value reduction, in the UK merger cases 
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studied between 1985 and 2002. This implies that Corporate Governance, 
merger practice and merger policy initiatives and improvements aimed at 
minimising the worst aspects of Agency relationships may yield increasingly 
diminishing returns in terms of “hoped for” performance improvements. General 
assumptions by UK practitioners and policy makers that all value destruction in 
mergers is due solely to Agency Theory are questionable based on the findings 
of this research. 
 
8.5.4.2 Aspects of Policy and Practice Confirmed 
 The findings of this research indicate that over the period 1989 to 2002 the 
shareholder value impacts of competition regulation involving mergers are 
consistent with research findings of earlier UK research covering the period 
1965 to 1990.  
 
8.5.4.3 Development Aspects of Policy and Practice 
 Hubris has been identified as the major Management motivation associated with 
shareholder value reduction in the group of mergers studied covering 1989 to 
2002. This implies that professional practitioner best practice and merger policy 
measures aimed at improving merger performance should focus to a greater 
extent on minimising losses associated with Hubris than losses associated with 
Managerialism and Agency Theory. 
 Appendix 1 discusses behaviours in typical circumstances and their 
classification into Synergy, Hubris or Managerialism. Some important situations 
associated with Hubris include the following: - 
o Accurate valuation in conditions of information asymmetry 
o Accurate assessment and management of the risk of regulatory 
intervention 
o Overpayment in competitive bidding situations 
These situations can have major impacts during the preannouncement stage 
when deals are being assessed and valuations carried out. They are also 
important in the competitive stages of the post-announcement phase when 
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competitive bids are being reviewed and responses planned. In both of these 
phases the bid details and tactics are highly confidential. Decision-making and 
involvement is usually limited to a small number of senior Managers and their 
professional advisors in these early stages.  
 
 Processes, procedures, training, qualifications and organisational structures used 
during the bidding process, including the possible roles and responsibilities for 
independent intermediary professionals, should be reviewed, revised and 
developed with the principal aim of improving the performance of mergers. 
From the finding that Management motivated by Hubris is an important value 
reducing aspect of mergers in practice, there would appear to be potential 
benefits justifying a greater focus on and closer examination of practice aimed at 
reducing the prevalence of Hubris. Both the development of management 
training and Corporate Governance may provide economic benefits if there is an 
increased focus on the causes and circumstances associated with Hubris and on 
best practice measures to reduce its occurrence. 
 
8.5.4.4 New Aspects of Policy and Practice 
This research found that there was evidence of market inefficiency with mergers in 
“privatised industries” associated with the new dual regulator structure. However, over 
the same period, “other industries” using the long-standing, single competition regulator 
structure did not show evidence of market inefficiency. Managers, investors and policy 
makers need to be aware that following introduction of major policy changes it is to be 
expected that a period of adjustment will follow for investors, during which experience 
is gained, before more efficient market behaviour returns.        
 
8.5.5 Summary of the Contribution to Knowledge. 
To aid the reader, the overall view of the contribution to knowledge is shown in Table 
8-3. The concept of a matrix framework, used above, to present the contributions has 
been employed. The information in the sub-sections of section 8.5 above has been 
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summarised to fit in to cells, showing where contributions have been made and areas 
where knowledge has not been increased. 
 
 
Areas of 
Contribution 
Not confirmed Confirmed Development New 
Theory M M M X 
Empirical 
Findings 
S & M S S S & M 
Methodology X S & M S & M M 
Practice and 
Policy 
M S M S 
S = contributions to knowledge about Shareholder value effects of merger relation  
M = contributions to knowledge about Managers’ motivations for mergers 
X = contributions to knowledge have not been identified in this area 
Table 8-3 Summary of areas to which knowledge has been contributed. 
 
 
8.6 Limitations of the Research 
This section summarises the limitations of the research. These points have already being 
covered in other sections of this thesis, either implicitly of explicitly. Suggestions for 
future research to investigate beyond the limitations of this study are discussed under 
Further Research, in sections 8.7.1 and 8.7.2 below.  
 
8.6.1 Nature of Companies and Size, Timing and Territory of the 
Merger Deals. 
The group of companies involved in the researched mergers had the following 
characteristics: - 
 Bidder and target companies were publicly quoted on a stock exchange from at least 
one year before the bid announcement, during the bid and to close of the deal. Daily 
share price data and records of company announcements were available from public 
records. 
 The merger deal was above the statutory qualifying limits of: - 
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o £30 million value of combined assets from 1984  
o £70 million value of combined of assets from 1990 to the present or, 
o 25% of market share. 
 The deal involved a quoted UK bidder or target company (or both). 
 The merger deal was announced between 1989 and 2002 
The characteristics of companies and deals need to be considered when deciding how 
the findings and conclusions of this research might apply to companies and deals which 
fall outside these characteristics (e.g. the applicability of these findings and conclusions 
to smaller mergers, below the qualifying limits, and between private companies). 
 
8.6.2 Event Study Returns over the Merger Deal. 
An event study methodology has been used throughout this research. All measurements 
of shareholder returns and conclusions drawn are therefore under-pinned by this 
methodology. This research has not investigated shareholder value changes after closure 
of merger deals by using either an event study or accounting data approach. No 
conclusions have been drawn relating to the longer-term economic performance after 
the closure of the deals. 
 
8.6.3 Motivation Assessments linked to Three Broad Categories. 
The assessment of motivation evidence is based on the three broad categories of 
Synergy, Managerialism and Hubris. These categories are described in the work of 
Penrose (1959), Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Roll (1986) respectively. However 
there are no precise definitions of what associated behaviours fit into which category. 
Appendix 1 has been written to help clarify this matter, but the precise fitting of 
associated behaviours and circumstances to the motivation categories may be open to 
different interpretation by some readers.  
 
8.7 Further Research. 
The research in this thesis has raised some questions or identified limitations that still 
require further work before answers can be provided. The methodology used is not able 
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to provide answers to these questions and different approaches may be needed to gain 
greater insights. In particular, some findings have been discussed that present a different 
view to that available from earlier studies, which would invite further work to clarify 
the situation. Five broad areas could provide fruitful research opportunities for the 
future. 
 
8.7.1 Expanding Research Beyond the Limitations of Firm Size, 
Nature, and Event Study Announcement Returns of this 
Thesis. 
This research in this thesis has investigated side effects of UK competition policy on 
publicly owned companies quoted on stock exchanges on the basis of their returns 
between deal announcement and deal close. This has ensured that the larger merger 
cases have been studied, but the limitation of event study has resulted in private 
companies involved in UK mergers regulation not being studied, as discussed in 
sections 8.6 above. Research based on accounting measures to compare shareholder 
value side effects on publicly quoted companies and private companies could usefully 
indicate how far the findings of this research can be generalised to all companies in 
merger regulation by the UK competition authorities.  Such a study could also compare 
the longer run profitability of mergers regulated by the UK competition authorities with 
the short run measures of performance in this study. While such future research based 
on accounting measures would not be able to investigate the effects of each regulatory 
step, it would be able to establish overall shareholder losses or gains beyond the deal 
close, and broadly complement findings in this research. 
 
8.7.2 Categorisation of Management Behaviours and Motivations for 
Mergers. 
The research in this thesis has identified that Hubris is a prevalent motivation for 
Managers involved in mergers regulated by the UK competition authorities. This 
knowledge offers a possible route to improving merger performance if the degree of 
Hubris can be reduced. Further research could develop a better understanding of how 
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Hubris is involved in Management decisions. Section 8.6.3 identified that there was an 
absence of clear definitions and categorisation of behaviours with respect to the three 
motivational theories used in this thesis for assessing Management motivation for 
mergers. To help overcome this, Appendix 1 was written to categorise behaviours, but 
different interpretations may be adopted by some readers. Future research to associate 
management behaviour in mergers with the three motivation theories of Synergy, 
Hubris and Managerialism would create a more comprehensive taxonomy of 
Management behaviours in mergers as a foundation for further research into improving 
the management of mergers and their performance.  
 
8.7.3 Managers’ Motivations for Mergers in the UK versus the US. 
The findings of this research relating to merger motivation suggest that motivations may 
not be identical in the UK to those found in the US. While both countries have broadly 
similar legislation and corporate governance, at a detailed level there are many 
significant variations in approach, policy and practice. This could lead to different 
understandings of Managements’ motivations for mergers between the US and the UK.  
 The mergers studied in this research did not show strong evidence of 
Managerialism. Since “absence of evidence” cannot be interpreted as “evidence of 
absence”, further research is needed to assess if there are differences in the levels of 
Managerialism between the US and UK. New research findings in this area could 
have profound implications for policy and practice in relation to measures designed 
to reduce shareholder value destruction by mergers. 
 
 Over time, an increase in the intensity of competition in the capital market 
and/or the market for corporate control may result in reduced opportunities for 
Managerialism. Research to investigate the relationship between the presence of 
Managerialism and the degree of competition in the capital market and the market 
for corporate control could lead to an explanation of the low level of Managerialism 
found in this study.  
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8.7.4 Circumstances and Behaviours Associated with Hubris. 
This research identifies that Hubris in mergers is an important element in reducing 
shareholder value. However the methodology used in this research is not able to 
quantify the contributions of particular circumstances or behaviours to this overall broad 
conclusion. Some investigation of the following aspects would add knowledge about the 
causes and impact of Hubris. 
 Can skill and process deficiencies in merger teams, particularly at the pre-bid stage, 
be improved? For example would the use of independent and impartial 
intermediaries as advisors prior to bid announcement improve valuations and 
remove uncertainty by reducing information asymmetry between bidder and target 
companies? 
 Would the reduction in information asymmetry lead to lower risks of overpayment 
in mergers? 
 
8.7.5 Reduced Efficiency of Market Pricing in Privatised Industry 
Mergers. 
This research identified that in the case of mergers in the “privatised industries”, market 
pricing was less efficient than in mergers in the other industries. In Chapter 6, section 
6.3, possible causes of this pricing inefficiency were suggested, but the methodology 
used in this research is not able to identify the causes directly. Further research could 
usefully identify the underlying causes of reduced market pricing efficiency in the cases 
of the privatised industry mergers considered. Increased knowledge of this topic could 
have implications for policymakers and practitioners in the future related to regulatory 
structures and the impact on capital markets. 
 
8.8 Summary of Conclusions. 
The aim of this research was to investigate any side effects, or by-products, of the 
regulation of mergers by the UK competition authorities, specifically relating to the 
impact on shareholder value and Managers’ motivations for undertaking mergers. The 
research in this thesis has demonstrated that these side effects do exist, and has 
categorised and quantified the effects of them. Therefore it has answered the research 
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question in Chapter 1, and established that side effects to the UK merger regulation 
policy do exist, and that the impact of UK competition policy is wider and more 
complex than the primary aims embodied in the relevant UK legislation.  
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APPENDICES 
 
1 A Discussion of Synergy, Hubris and Managerialism: 
Associating Managerial Motivations with Possible 
Behaviours and Situations. 
 
1.1 Overview 
Mergers are initiated and carried out for a wide variety of reasons. These reasons are 
usually part of the agenda of senior managers involved with implementation of a broad 
strategy for a company. Often this strategy and the associated agenda have public and 
private faces. What can be discussed and considered behind closed doors within the 
company is often much wider than can be disclosed publicly at any time. The two main 
reasons for this arise from: - 
 The need for commercial confidentiality to protect the company’s competitive 
position 
 Strict rules controlling how listed companies make public disclosures of 
information that might be considered as price sensitive 
 
Senior managers who are central to the merger deal may also have personal objectives 
that are not openly disclosed or discussed with anyone else in the bidder company or 
outside it. As a result, bidder companies have a publicly discussed agenda, and also may 
have one or more "secret" agendas. External parties, i.e. the general public, investment 
community and most company employees, are only told of items on the public agenda 
as part of the senior management’s public explanation of the rationale of the proposed 
deal.  
 
External parties usually compare their own views of the proposed merger with the 
official company disclosure statements. They may agree with the published view, or 
judge the publicly disclosed explanation does not fully accord with their view of the 
likely merger outcomes. If they have a differing view, external parties may feel a need 
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for more information to enhance their understanding of management’s pursuit of the 
merger and will make assumptions to complete their own explanation of the merger bid. 
In forming these assumptions, external parties will take a view on missing items of 
company information, and may speculate on managers’ personal objectives and 
motives, and how they may possibly also influence the merger bid. This appendix seeks 
to develop a better understanding of these motivations, and how they are related to 
situations and observed behaviours. 
 
Management "motivations" have been proposed by researchers to explain broad 
categories of managerial behaviour. These theoretical proposals were discussed in 
Chapter 2 Literature Review, Chapter 4 Methodology, and Chapter 5 Methods and Data. 
This appendix looks at the Synergy, Hubris and Managerialism motivations and 
discusses typical behaviours and situations that might fall into each category. Some 
situations, which do not fall neatly into one particular category, are discussed later in 
this appendix. The purpose of this appendix is to clarify the meaning of the three 
motivational groups by reference to specific situations and behaviours. Before looking 
at each motivation, we first discuss what is meant by management in the context of this 
research. We then go on to discuss each of the motivations and associate some of the 
typical situations and behaviours that might be found in mergers. 
 
1.2 Who Exactly is referred to by the Term "Management"? 
In this appendix "Management" refers to the small group of a company's managers that 
are the prime initiators of merger decisions. This is limited to the following corporate 
roles: - 
 Chairman 
 Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
 Chief Financial Officer (CFO) 
 Limited other members of the senior management team involved in the bid 
preparation (e.g. Chief Operating Officer in some companies or Business 
Development Director) 
Within this very small group the CEO or Chairman is often the active leader of the bid. 
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All other managers in the company can be considered as part of the general pool of 
employees for the purpose of considering motivations to initiate and execute a merger 
deal. Of course, once the deal is finalised and closed, numerous other managers in the 
company become intimately involved in the subsequent implementation and integration 
activities. These managers will be implementing the merger integration activities in an 
attempt to deliver the original publicly announced merger objectives, even though they 
may not have been involved in the preparation of the merger bid or consulted about the 
merger plan. The degree of involvement varies from case to case and company to 
company, but only a few managers are involved in the initial very secretive process of 
preparing the initial merger bid for a target company. For the purpose of this appendix, 
the term “Management’s motivation” will refer to the reasons the small select group of 
senior managers listed above have for carrying out mergers. 
 
These Management motivations therefore represent the composite motivation of this 
small senior management group of the bidding company, and reflect the public, private 
and personal agendas of that group. There may be conflicts between individuals’ 
personal agendas within the group, but these tensions remain internal to the group and 
are not considered in the three broad motivational groups Synergy, Hubris and 
Managerialism. The broad motivational groups will now be discussed in more depth 
below, combining the theoretical origins of the grouping with examples of practical 
situations and behaviours falling into each. 
 
1.3 Synergy 
The term Synergy, as used in this thesis, is shorthand form for "synergy seeking 
motivation". Theoretically, it represents behaviour by a group of managers who have 
agendas to seek out synergies that may arise from combining companies, thereby 
creating increased value for the combined company and its shareholders. The concept is 
that the combination of the companies will yield increased value in excess of the 
premium paid to the target shareholders (to convince them to agree to the deal), and the 
administrative cost of the deal and the post-deal integration of the companies. 
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The theoretical basis of this motivation arises from work by Penrose (1959) in the 
"Theory of the Growth of the Firm", which is discussed in Chapter 2. The term 
“synergy seeking” includes seeking savings and benefits from combination, and the 
sharing of operational assets, capacity and processes. This applies to Synergies arising 
from both the area of marketing and sales activities, as well as other cost savings and 
benefits throughout the company. 
 
1.3.1 Typical Synergistic Situations 
Benefits and savings may be found in the following list of examples: - 
 Rationalisation of sales channels, facilities and processes. 
 Improved asset utilisation. 
 More efficient use of processes due to increased scale and rationalisation. 
 Sales of surplus assets. 
 Reductions in the number of employees and managers through rationalisation of 
organisational structures. 
 Reduced cost of finance due to increased scale. 
 Reduced costs of supplies and raw materials due to increased scale leading to 
increased bargaining power. 
 
Managers seeking such legitimate synergies in excess of the cost of acquiring them, 
create value for their shareholders. However Managers’ rewards may not necessarily 
align fully with the rewards to shareholders. Poor alignment between the rewards of 
shareholders and managers might lead Managers to act to improve their rewards rather 
than attempt to maximise shareholder value. The nature of rewards to Managers can be 
radically different to shareholders. Managers contract with the company for a salary, 
usually a performance related bonus and other benefits in compensation for exercising 
their specific skills, knowledge and judgement in the interests of the company. The 
Manager might bring widespread benefits that are difficult to measure and assess. By 
contrast shareholder rewards are quite specifically limited to the payment of dividends 
and increases (or decreases) in the market value of the company. Unless the Manager is 
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either an owner/manager or has a significant shareholding in the company, it is unlikely 
the Manager’s rewards (and hence motivations) will correspond with shareholders 
rewards under differing levels of company performance. However this does depend on 
the form of the Manager’s contract and in particular the nature of bonus payments and 
the circumstances under which they are paid. 
 
In principle, if shareholder value is created Synergy seeking behaviour is considered to 
be present in the Manager's motivation. In an attempt to explain the pursuit of value 
destroying mergers by Managers two other theories, Managerialism and Hubris, have 
been proposed. We will now discuss these with regard to examples of typical behaviour 
that can be involved. 
 
1.4 Managerialism 
Managerialism was first proposed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and developed from 
the theory of the principal-agency problem, which considers the issues of finding 
suitable reward mechanisms for agents so that they also produce the required rewards 
for the principal.  When applied to corporate mergers, the agent (or in this case the 
Manager) does just sufficient to satisfy the principal (or in this case the company owner, 
or shareholders). However agents also concentrate on increasing their rewards. While 
Synergy seeking embodies the concepts of maximising and optimising profitable 
opportunities, Managerialism embodies the concept of satisficing or following 
satisfactory rules until something becomes unsatisfactory, when managers look for new 
rules, which will be satisfactory. 
 
This agency problem is most apparent when contract terms for the agent result in 
objectives adopted by the agent that are incompatible with those of the principal. The 
theory also assumes the concept of a clearly identifiable principal who can quickly react 
to enforce the contract against abuse. In some companies a Manager can dominate the 
company Board, and shareholders are a fragmented group, consisting of numerous small 
investors. It is then possible for Mangers to receive little organised controlling restraint, 
and the amount of satisficing by Managers for shareholder interests can be low. 
221 
However, shareholders may eventually become sufficiently concerned and organised to 
take effective enforcement action to discipline Managers. 
 
1.4.1 Typical Managerialist Situations 
In such situations Managers may pursue mergers that do not create additional 
shareholder value and also divert value away from the shareholders to increased 
Management benefits. These Management benefits resulting from undertaking mergers 
can include: - 
 Increased remuneration (for managing a larger organisation) 
 Bonus payment for carrying out a merger 
 Increased job security for bidding company Managers (mergers may reduce 
possible future takeover bidders and increase the cost of a future take over) 
 Job security and enhanced benefits for target company Management (negotiated 
by target managers in return for agreeing the bid and recommending it to target 
shareholders). 
 
In Managerialism in its most pure form, Managers would cynically view the merger as 
an opportunity to extract greater personal benefits with minimal concern for shareholder 
value creation. Typically merger proposals driven by Managerialism might: - 
 Suggest the purpose of the merger was to gain strategic advantages such as size, 
access to geographic territory or new markets, BUT: 
 Contain few, if any, genuine potential synergies, benefits or acquisition of 
unique strategically important assets arising from these strategic moves, AND: 
 Contain hints that significantly enhanced benefits may be provided to Managers 
as a result of the merger, AND/OR: 
 Be proposed by companies with weak Corporate Governance structures, not 
complying with corporate best practice (see below). 
 
1.4.2 Control of Managerialism in Companies 
The effects of such Managerialist merger proposals can lead to the value created from 
combining firms being insufficient to cover the premium paid to the target shareholders 
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and to cover administrative costs of the deal and integration of the companies. 
Managerialism is characterised by its cynical and deliberate attempts to divert value to 
Managers and satisficing when meeting the needs of shareholders. Because of the 
potential danger of Managerialism to shareholder value, some Corporate Governance 
practices are used to reduce the risk of Managerialism taking hold in a company. 
Examples of such measures are: - 
 Splitting of Chairman and CEO roles 
 Outside Board member representation 
 Encouraging Managers to hold shares in the company 
 Excluding the CEO from being a member of the Remuneration Committee 
 Other ways of limiting the power of principally the CEO to avoid Board 
domination.  
 
The existence of large block shareholders in a company (e.g. investment funds and 
insurance companies) can also act as a significant deterrent to Managerialism. If these 
large shareholders hold less than 50% of the equity, but can quickly form alliances with 
other block shareholders to reach a voting majority, they can call General Meetings and 
collectively have power to discipline Management if they believe they are not acting in 
the best interests of the shareholders. 
 
The final control over Managerialism is referred to as the “market for corporate 
control”. Companies with poor performance become undervalued on the capital market, 
thereby inviting takeover bids from companies identifying their weaknesses. If the 
merger deal is completed it often results in the ineffective management (motivated by 
managerialism) being removed in the subsequent reorganisations. This option usually 
occurs when there is insufficient shareholder power, often due to a fragmented 
shareholding with many small shareholders unable to effectively discipline wayward 
Management behaviour more directly. 
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1.5 Hubris 
The Hubris theory was proposed by Roll (1986) as a further cause of value destruction 
in mergers (see Chapter 2, Literature Review). Unsatisfied that the Synergy and 
Managerialism theories covered all merger cases, Roll proposed that managers 
proceeded with the best of intentions to create value, but they made random valuation 
errors resulting from Hubris. If the error undervalued the combination, the merger 
would not proceed. However if the error overvalued the combination, the merger would 
go ahead and subsequently result in damage to the value of the completed merger.  
 
Hubris is defined by the Oxford English dictionary, as "arrogant pride or presumption". 
Management judgements based on elements of information presumed to be true, rather 
than based on fact or logical estimates grounded in facts, would therefore be considered 
as involving hubris. Where mergers are subject to regulation, merger proposals that 
appear to external parties to fall foul of the prevailing regulatory regime may also be 
viewed as motivated by Hubris. Management would need to deal specifically with the 
regulatory issue in the proposal and argue their reason for proceeding. If it appears 
Management had failed to understand or fully assess the risk of regulatory intervention 
the case could be considered to be driven by Hubris.  
 
1.5.1 Company valuation error 
The valuation of a possible merger combination involves valuation of bidder and target 
companies, in addition to estimating the value of the combined firm after 
implementation and integration is completed. While the valuation of existing bidder and 
target companies is relatively straightforward, particularly if they are traded on a public 
stock exchange, the valuation of the combination is more difficult. The bidder is faced 
with the problem of evaluating sources of savings and benefits (synergies) before the 
bid is announced. While the bidder Management has a good knowledge of the bidder 
company, they have a far less clear understanding of the detailed operations of the target 
company. This information asymmetry therefore requires assumptions to be made 
where key data on the target company is not available to the bidder Management. 
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When Hubris is present in decisions, the assumptions can turn into presumptions. 
Rather than using assumptions based on logical estimates of magnitude and probability, 
the overconfidence of Hubris leads to presumptions of outcomes based on belief, hunch, 
rumour or speculation. While it is necessary to make assumptions and estimates, they 
should be based on realism, linked to logically supportable facts. However, the 
presumptions of Hubris are less well grounded in reality and fact, and in extreme cases 
may be little more than fanciful beliefs lacking logical support and evidence. 
 
1.5.2 Typical Hubris Situations 
Hubris involves innocent errors by Managers while attempting to create value, rather 
than deliberate, cynical attempts to divert value away from shareholders and towards 
Managers. It represents accidental damage to shareholder value rather than a deliberate 
attempt to capture value from shareholders. 
 
Since Managers will be trying to create value by identifying synergies in a proposed 
bid, this makes it difficult to identify mergers motivated by Hubris from mergers 
motivated by Synergy. However external parties may not be able to agree with 
valuations of savings and benefits in the bid proposal and consider them to be 
optimistic. This also relates to the external parties’ view of the reality of the assessment 
of possible regulatory intervention. Unsubstantiated over-optimism to either valuation 
or regulatory issues may be the best indication of Hubris in a bid.  
 
Suggestions that Managers believe thoughts such as the statements below would amount 
to Hubris being present, although it is unlikely that a bid would contain such direct 
statements as: - 
 “I know there is extra value in the target, but we can’t confirm it until we 
complete the deal and have full access to target information” or  
 “The Regulator wouldn’t dare intervene in this case because it has special 
significance” 
 “We will worry about it (regulatory intervention) later if it happens” 
225 
Hubris can be present whether shareholder value is created or destroyed, and it can be 
considered as an intermediate stage between the value creation of pure Synergy and the 
deliberate capture of value from shareholders of pure Managerialism. 
 
1.5.2.1 Difficulty of valuation of a target company when information 
asymmetry is present. 
When considering a possible merger target at the planning stage before a bid is 
announced and even before the target company CEO has been approached, it is 
important to try to estimate the value of the merged combination as accurately as 
possible. In particular, it is important to try to evaluate the benefits and synergies that 
may make the merged combination worth more than the sum of the parts. Unless there 
are sufficient benefits available from combining to pay for the premium necessary to 
convince the target shareholders to sell their shares, the deal will be doomed to create a 
loss of shareholder value for the bidder shareholders.  
 
However, the valuation process is fraught with difficulty. The bidder Management will 
have a very good knowledge of their company in a financial, personnel and operational 
sense, but their knowledge of the target may be scant, flawed and have large gaps. The 
more detailed information they need to make an accurate valuation may not be available 
from the public record. This information asymmetry means that the bidding 
management team usually has no option but to make assumptions where information 
about the target company is weak or missing. The judgements involved in making these 
assumptions are critical to the accuracy of the valuation and price offered in any 
subsequent bid. The greater the degree of information asymmetry, the greater the need 
to rely on assumptions. 
 
When making assumptions in a valuation it is possible for Managers to be over 
confident and follow their beliefs about what might result from a combination, even 
though these beliefs may be not be fully supported by reasonable public evidence.  
Investors, who are likely to take a view of a bid based more on publicly available 
evidence and information, will detect this over-confidence or over-optimism in the 
merger bid when announced. It will not be until due diligence has been undertaken or 
226 
the deal is completed that the bidder becomes fully aware of the true position. By this 
time Management may find it is too late to withdraw from deal, but following the bid 
announcement the capital markets will have priced the bidder and target shares to take 
investor concerns into account. Hence the greater the degree of information asymmetry, 
the greater the need to rely on assumptions and the greater the possibility of Hubris 
entering into the bid process. 
 
1.5.2.2 Risk of regulatory intervention 
It is worth noting here that mergers, which substantially increase market power or 
reduce competition, are not permitted by the UK Competition Regulator, the OFT. 
While such a merger bid might have benefits from combining companies, external 
parties, including the capital markets, would realise that this proposed bid would result 
in regulatory intervention. Parties external to the bidder would expect modification or 
prohibition of such a bid. They are also unlikely to consider such a bid to be motivated 
by Synergy in the context of this research because the final outcome, after regulatory 
intervention, is likely to be different from that originally proposed by the bidder. In 
many cases the estimated impact of a merger on markets and competition is not 
straightforward to identify and involves significant amounts of professional judgement. 
The prediction of the outcome of an inquiry in a case referred to the MMC/CC involves 
a degree of risk, which varies from case to case. However it is likely that the higher the 
risk of regulatory intervention, the more external parties would judge the merger to be 
motivated by Hubris, even if significant synergistic benefits were predicted, unless the 
competition issues were openly and realistically addressed in the bid statements. 
However Management may not be willing to do this voluntarily, or feel it inappropriate 
to be sufficiently open on this matter, to allay concerns of the capital markets.   
 
1.5.2.3 Mergers involving competitive bidders 
When more than one bidder enters a competition to buy a target company there is a risk 
that the winning bidder will have bid beyond what he believes the target company is 
worth in order to win the subsequent “auction”. The over-payment for the target can 
result in the bidder being unable to create any value from the deal. This is what 
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economists know as the “winners’ curse” – the bidder won the auction but over-paid in 
the process, leaving the bidder with a long-term problem. How should this be 
interpreted in term of Managers’ motivations for mergers? Let us assume a bid failed to 
create any value for the bidder, should the act of over-paying at the auction be 
considered as Hubris or Managerialism? Since the target company could be estimated to 
be worth different amounts to each of the bidders, the price paid at the “auction” does 
not help us to come to a conclusion about the motivation of the winning bidder.  
 
If the over-payment was the result of over-enthusiasm to win at the auction, the effect is 
exactly the same as a simple over valuation error leading to over-payment. In that case it 
would be reasonable for external parties to judge that Hubris was the motivation. 
However if the winning bid had factors associated with the bid indicating an attempt to 
transfer value to Managers, and over-paid for the target in order to reinforce the original 
merger plan, the act of over-paying could be considered as being motivated by 
Managerialism. 
 
The effect of an auction on the price paid in a merger would not seem to be a factor in 
deciding what motivation was at play by Managers in the bidding company. The key 
points that would decide what motivated the Managers would be: - 
 Evidence of whether the bidder over-paid, and if so  
 Were there any other aspects of the merger indicating unnecessary transfer of 
value to Managers? 
As a result, over-payment in a competitive bid cannot be classified simply as a result of 
a competition for the target. It needs to be considered further on the grounds discussed 
earlier relating to evidence in the bid proposal and whether a valuation error had taken 
place or if the merger was a vehicle for unnecessary transfer of value to Managers. 
 
1.6 Comparisons of behaviours associated with Synergy, 
Managerialism and Hubris. 
Management motivated by Synergy makes accurate valuations and only proposes 
mergers that will create value for both the bidder and target shareholders. Bidders 
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motivated by Synergy would not propose deals that would not create value in the 
combined firm. Capital market investors would largely concur with bidders’ decisions 
on the basis of their own analysis of information in the public domain. The bidder's 
proposals would reflect a professional understanding of the regulatory issues involved 
in the bid. The capital market investors would judge the merger to have a good chance 
of passing through the regulatory regime with minimal regulatory intervention, based on 
likely outcomes from the historic record of cases handled by the regime. 
 
Management motivated by Hubris would make valuation errors and so capital market 
investors would not completely agree with the bidder's proposal of the savings and 
benefits available from the combination. In addition, the capital markets may find it 
difficult to accept that the competition regulator will allow the deal to proceed without 
intervention and modification to the original deal. They may even consider that the 
competition authorities will prohibit the merger. However, investors may find that the 
merger proposal does not cause concern with regard to the unnecessary transfer of value 
from the bidder shareholders to Management by way of enhanced benefits or protection 
to Managers. 
 
Capital market investors would find difficulty agreeing with valuations made in the bid 
announcement by Managers motivated by Managerialism because: - 
 Investors would have difficulty reconciling their view with the bidder’s view of 
the deal when examined on the basis of publicly available information. 
 Bidder explanations of the rationale for the merger may focus on reasons other 
than value creation (e.g. size, industry position or territorial opportunities) 
 Investors’ assessments of the likely regulatory outcome may suggest a risk of 
regulatory intervention and hence deal modification or prohibition. 
 Investors would find unnecessary increases of economic welfare to bidder's 
Management and perhaps also to the target Management. They may also find 
some arrangements with the target Management that could frustrate the 
extraction of the claimed synergies in the integration phase (e.g. unnecessary 
retention of some of the target's senior managers). 
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1.7 Conclusions 
This appendix summarises a number of aspects regarding the three theoretical 
motivations, Synergy, Hubris and Managerialism, adopted in this thesis and how they 
relate to common situations and behaviours. The discussion highlights the main 
managers whose motivations influence merger bids, and key situations and behaviours 
that could differentiate between Synergy, Hubris and Managerialism. 
 Only a small number of managers in a bidding company can be considered to 
influence merger bid preparations. These include the Chairman, CEO, CFO and 
perhaps one or two other key senior managers. It is the motivations of these key 
managers that influence the nature of the merger bid. 
 Synergy is always involved when value is created by a merger. 
 Managerialism is always associated with value destruction and the transfer of 
value from shareholders to managers in excess of that required to make the 
merger effective. 
 Hubris can be associated with both value creation and destruction, depending on 
the degree involved. It is associated with over valuation errors by Management, 
but does not involve unnecessary transfer of value to Managers. 
 Failure to fully appreciate the likelihood or degree of regulatory intervention, or 
not to have taken pre-emptive actions would have a similar effect on investors’ 
perceptions as a valuation error. The merger could therefore be interpreted as 
being motivated by Hubris, if there is an absence of circumstances indicating 
unnecessary transfer of value to Managers. 
 
 
 
 
